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Abstract: Transformation in the global political economy in recent years has been both rapid 
and profound. This thesis applies concepts developed by Antonio Gramsci, leader of the Italian 
Communist Party in the early 1920s, in seeking to identify and understand the dynamic 
material and ideational forces driving contemporary global restructuring. Gramsci’s 
interpretation of hegemony as 'intellectual and moral reform' is used to explain the rise to 
dominance of the new intellectual and political right in the early 1980s. Mobilized by an 
ideology which shuns any state interference in the economy, the thesis stresses that the new  
right political economy perspective has been instrumental in transforming capitalist hegemony 
at the world level along pro-market, anti-statist lines. The argument hinges on the assertion 
that the new right's resurrection of laissez-faire  capitalism has triumphed over Keynesianism  
on the ethical, moral and intellectual terrains of Marxist class struggle. It is demonstrated that 
the ideological hegemony of market capitalism is directly attributable to the consummate 
development of monetarist theory, and the subsequent spread of related neo-liberal principles 
to other disciplines, including, most prominently, development economics. The thesis concludes 
by asserting that a Gramscian analysis of the production, dissemination, and consumption of 
market ideology in both the North and the South is o f paramount importance in advancing our 
understanding of present and future possibilities of international capitalist order.
Chapter One.
Crisis and Change in the Global Political Economy: 
Disintegration of America's Historic Bloc
Crisis does not mean the end. On the contrary, 'crisis' refers to the critical time 
during which the end will be avoided through new adaptations if possible; 
only failing these, the end becomes unavoidable. [...) The crisis is a period in 
which a diseased social, economic, and political body or system cannot live on 
as before and is obliged, on pain of death, to undergo transformations that will 
give a new lease on life. This period of crisis is a historical moment of danger 
and suspense during which the crucial decisions and transformations are made, 
which will determine the future development of the system if any and its new 
social, economic, and political basis. [Andre Gunder Frank] ^
The structure of the American Empire ... is dissolving and a Hobbesian-like 
struggle of all against all seems to be emerging. [Stephen Hymer] ^
Everything is political, even philosophy ... and the only philosophy' is 
history in action, that is, life itself. [Antonio Gramsci] ^
Introduction
Providentially spared the indecencies of waging a major war on its own 
continent, the United States emerged from the systemic chaos of World War 
II as the uncontested leader of the non-Communist world. As the moral 
guardian of the new world order, the United States sought to consolidate a 
distinctly Americanized regime of capitalist world hegemony in the post-war 
era through a complex network of geo-strategic, politico-military, economic, 
socio-cultural and ideological alliances. Mobilized by a doctrine of global 
Manifest Destiny, successive US adm inistrations from Trum an onw ard 
zealously pursued the establishment of an American imperium , which 
would largely transform much of the capitalist world in its own image.
 ̂ Andre Gunder Frank, "Crisis of Ideology and Ideology of Crisis," Dynamics of Global Crisis. 
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982, pp. 109.
2 Stephen Hymer, The Multinational Corporation: A Radical Approach -  Papers by Stephen 
Hymer. Robert Cohen et. al. (eds.). New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 270.
 ̂Antonio Gramsci, "The Study of Philosophy," pp. 357.
At the core of the global spread of "Americanism" — understood in 
terms of a systematically embedded and organizing ideology of and for 
American supremacy -  was a mythic belief in US exceptionalism. As the 
second millennia dawns, however, it is becoming more and more evident to 
students of global political economy that America is no longer so exceptional. 
Indeed, a key argument in this thesis is that the classical "Pax” limits of the 
post-1945 "Americanist" regime of capitalist accumulation had been reached 
by the early 1970s, culminating in an "organic" crisis of capitalist hegemony at 
the world level. This continuing crisis of hegemony is an organic, or long­
term crisis, since its roots go sufficiently deep enough to provoke a 
fundamental qualitative and quantitative restructuring of the world capitalist 
order.
Although the crisis is calling into question a certain historical form of 
capitalism, it is not challenging the capitalist system itself. However, the 
crisis does include lasting structural distortions whose resolution requires a 
fundamental change In the operation of the system. Seen in this light, it is 
clear that the continuation of "formal" American hegemony is no longer a 
viable historical option since it is now dysfunctional to the new needs of 
capitalist accumulation on a world scale.
While the crisis of capitalism is ineluctably related to the relative 
decline of American supremacy v is -a -v is  Japan and a uniting Europe, the 
crisis cannot and should not be seen merely as a crisis of US power per s e . 
Rather, the crisis must be understood in terms of the realignment of, and 
transformation in, basic social forces at the global level. Thus, the structures 
and institutions which once collectively served as the formal integrative 
instruments of the previous American-dominated regime of world capitalist
accumulation and regulation -- i.e., the welfare slate. Bretton Woods, 
Fordism, Cold War, Keynesianism, NATO, patriarchal household, etc. -- are 
being radically "restructured," transformed and /o r superseded by emergent 
forms of socio-political organization, reflecting the requisite new needs of 
international capitalist accumulation.
The underlying dynamics of crisis have an ideological dimension as 
well. As the thesis will argue, the crisis of hegemony is reaching its matures! 
expression on the ideological, political and intellectual terrains of Marxist 
class struggle. Thus, as the dominant post-war Keynesian mode of ideological 
consensus began to break dow n in the early 1970s, the disintegrating 
tendencies of the system have become more pronounced, conflicts of interest 
more visible, and underlying power relations more transparent. Hence, the 
crisis — as reflected in declining rates of productivity, rising rates of 
unemployment, persistent inflation, chronic financial instability and the 
widening social rift between North and South -  has made it virtually 
impossible for political elites to sustain the post-World War II Keynesian 
compromise -  i.e., higher wages for higher rates of productivity.
Responding to the system-wide demand for order, the "new right" 
ascended to political power in the early 1980s. Involving a synthesis of 
reactionary conservative politics and la issez-fa ire  economics, the new right 
political economy has sought to refocus attention on the profitability of 
business in economic crisis. As a consequence, elites in the Western and non- 
Western worlds (in the case of the latter via the World Bank/International 
Monetary Fund's Structural Adjustment Programmes) have turned en masse 
to the prevailing orthodoxy of neo-conservatist-type solutions -  i.e., 
privatization, deregulation, monetarism, contraction of the welfare state, etc. -
- in a desperate, though still largely unsuccessful, attempt to resolve the crisis 
in the world economy. As will be shown in this thesis, the new  right's 
ideology has been instrum ental in  transform ing capitalist hegemony at the 
world level in a more market-oriented and less state-dominated direction.
The contem porary dom inance of m arket ideology both in the 
developed and developing worlds and related dislocation in leftist political 
culture, as well as the disintegration of state socialism in Eurasia, raise several 
crucial questions concerning our understanding of transformation in the 
global political economy. Some of these questions might include: How do 
free m arket ideas become translated into m aterial forces capable of 
restructuring the world economy? As political economists, how do we 
understand the contemporary dominance of neo-liberal ideas over Keynesian 
ideas? Why have monetarist "supply-side" concepts and political practices 
replaced the traditional "demand-side" orientation of Keynesian-influenced 
intellectuals and politicians? Who produces and disseminates neo-liberal 
ideas and why? Can neo-liberalism, like Keynesianism before it, save 
capitalism? W hat will the eventual outcome of this phase of global 
restructuring be? These questions are the focal points of concern in this 
thesis.
Approach, Purpose and Outline of Study
In confronting and analyzing the question of global restructuring of 
capitalist hegemony, this thesis adopts a G ram scian political economy 
approach. For anyone unfamiliar with Antonio Gramsci, he was one of the 
founding members of the Italian Communist Party in 1921. Gramsci led the 
party through the turbulent and uncertain early years of the rise of Italian
Fascism in the early 1920s. An outspoken opponent and vehement resistor of 
Fascist rule, Gramsci was arrested in November 1926. Speaking for 
Mussolini, Gramsci's Fascist prosecutors proclaimed: "We must prevent this 
brain from functioiiing for twenty years!" In prison, suffering from an acute 
degenerative spinal malformation, insomnia, tuberculosis and a series of 
other mental and physical ailments Gramsci literally rotted away. He died in 
a prison hospice in April 1937, at the age of 46.
Despite untold personal hardship and pain, Gramsci was not silenced. 
He produced a series of highly disjointed and fragmented notes (subject to the 
censorship of Italian officials) which were posthumously published, for the 
first time in English, in a collection entitled. Selections From the Prison 
Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci in 1971.^ It is from a contemporary derivation 
of Gramsci's ideas as set down in the Prison N otebooks that political 
economists identify their approach as "Gramscian."
Set against the dramatic backdrop of the inter-war period, Gramsci's 
Prison Notebooks represent a major, though sadly neglected, contribution to 
W estern Marxist thought. Based on an integrated merging of historical 
materialism with politics, philosophy and ethics, Gramsci's notes constitute a 
creative, non-reductionist challenge to economistic in terpretations of 
Marxism. Unlike his contemporaries, and particularly relevant to this thesis, 
Gramsci understood that intellectuals are powerful and influential catalysts of 
social change, and that ideas play an active and crucial role in determining 
the outcome of Marxist class struggle. The central thrust of this thesis is 
precisely that a Gramscian understanding of the production, elaboration and
Antonio Gramsci, Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Quintin Hoare 
and Geoffrey Smith (editors and translators), London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971.
dissemination of neo-liberal ideology throughout the world is of paramount 
importance in explaining present and future possibilities of world capitalist 
order.
Given Gramsci's two over-riding concerns in the Prison Notebooks — 
namely, explaining the rise to dominance of Italian Fascism, and, identifying 
what the proper strategy of the working class should be in building an 
alternative form of socialist state and society -  it is not surprising that he had 
very little to say directly about global political economy. However, as this 
thesis attempts to demonstrate, Gramsci's body of writings, particularly his 
superior elaboration of the concept of hegemony, has a universal setting and 
relevance which extends far beyond the desperate milieu of Fascist Italy.
The pu rp o se  of this thesis, then, is to further develop and extend a 
global interpretation of Gramsci's conception of hegemony as "intellectual 
and moral reform." Set in a Gramscian tradition, the concept of hegemony 
adopted here dialectically links material interests and institutional capabilities 
with moral and intellectual leadership purposes. In stressing the "ideational" 
or consensual aspects of hegemonic leadership, the thesis rejects the state- 
centric preponderance of power approach to hegemony typical in most 
orthodox Marxist and non-Marxist (especially realist) schools alike. Generally 
speaking, Marxist materialist "power-over" interpretations and applications 
of hegemony to international relations tend to denigrate the whole realm of 
culture, political motivation and ideology brilliantly identified by Gramsci, 
while over-determining the economic in explaining global restructuring. 
Thus, many Marxists see the current period of international restructuring as 
merely the product of intensified, or so-called "super" imperialist rivalry, in 
which the three dominant powers -  the United States, Germany and Japan -
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are supposedly jockeying for economic, technological, and ultimately (so one 
would presume) m ilitary dom ination. This preponderance of power 
approach to global restructuring specifically, but capitalist hegemony more 
generally, tends to lead most Marxist analyses toward state-centrism and 
economism, respectively. Invariably, by equating hegem ony with 
dominance, Marxists, intentionally or not, reify the international state system 
and reinforce the "iron" laws of economism.
In contrast to most M arxist interpretations of social change, a 
Gramscian political economy approach asserts that ideas, and the 
dissemination of those ideas by influential intellectuals, plays an active and 
crucial role in Marxist class struggle. Gramscian-influenced scholars believe 
that the concept of hegemony cannot and should not be reduced to a situation 
describing the "power-over" dominance of one state or one class over 
another. Though his work was left unfinished and unpolished, Gramsci 
showed that hegemony is much more than dominance. Thus, for Gramscian 
scholars, recent transformations in the global political economy are thought 
to defy, indeed supersede, the simplistic M arxian schema of "super" 
imperialist rivalry. As a young Gramsci wrote in March 1918: "... mechanical 
forces never prevail in history: it is men, it is their consciousness, it is the 
spirit which moulds external appearances and always t r i u m p h s . With 
dramatic shifts now occurring in the global distribution of military and 
economic power in a post-Cold War complex, it is absolutely crucial to 
understand the contribution ideological forces are making in the 
reconstitution of capitalist hegemony and international order.
 ̂ Antonio Gramsci, "A Year of History," originally published in l l  Crido del Popolo , Marci 16, 
1918.
This thesis builds upon an emerging Gramscian "school" of 
international political economy thought, which was first introduced in the 
literature by Robert Cox in a 1981 article entitled, "Social Forces, States and 
World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory." From that article 
and one other published in 1983 -  "Gramsci, Hegemony and International 
Relations: An Essay in Method" -  Cox's path-breaking work on applying 
Gramscian concepts to world order culminated in the 1987 publication of 
Pow Production and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. 
Directly and indirectly inspired by Cox, several scholars have recently taken 
up the challenge of broadening the theoretical parameters of Gramscian 
global political economy. Among many others, some of the more extensive 
uses of Gramscian concepts in theorizing global relations include: America's 
Ouest for Supremacy and the Third World: A Gramscian Analysis by Craig 
Murphy and Enrico Augelli (1988); The Global Political Economy: 
Perspectives. Problems and Policies by Stephen Gill and David Law (1988); and 
American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission by Stephen Gill (1990).^ 
Although the Gramscian school of global political economy has gained 
a respectable and growing following, it is clear that much work needs to be 
done. Stephen Gill explains:
The movement toward the extension of Gramscian ideas to the study of 
international relations [IR] has been slow and relatively recent, and has 
involved relatively few ambitious studies concerned with defining the origins, 
developm ent, and dynamics of the emerging global political econom y. 
[AJIthoiigh many soci ti scientists are aware of the application of Gramscian 
ideas to analyze the role of politics, popular culture, and ideological and 
cultural hegemony at the national level, this is much less the case for IR and 
IPE [International Political Economy]. [...] In this light, it is clear that much
 ̂ For a more complete bibliographical citation of Gramscian concepts adapted to the study of 
global political economy, please consult the bibliography section entitled. Applications of 
Gramscian Theory to International Political Economy, beginning on page 212.
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needs to be done to develop Gramscian perspectives in ways which can have 
appeal to students of IPE and thus make a more general contribution to the 
f ie ld /  [emphasis added]
In particular^ if a Gramscian political economy perspective is to become 
a more reputable, holistic school of thought, then much more work will have 
to be done on conceptualizing the North-South dimensions of global order 
To date, most Gramscian approaches to global political economy continue in 
the traditional Northern, mainly Ameri-centric, mode of analysis. Generally 
speaking, the South, when or if it is theorized, is stuck on more as an after­
thought than a vital constituent part of the g lo b a l  complex. The 
marginalization of the South is tragically unfortunate, especially considering 
the fact that three-quarters of humanity live in the Southern hemisphere. A 
global political economy which selectively ignores or superficially treats the 
South is still not yet a "dialectic totality." In this thesis, I hope to address this 
oversight in Gramscian political economy, however im perfectly, by 
incorporating the South in my analysis of global restructuring.
The contributions this thesis proposes in advancing Gramscian 
concepts to the emerging global political economic order are fourfold. In the 
chapter immediately following, 1 lay out the conceptual framework for the 
thesis by providing a brief critical exposition of the problematic of hegemony 
in Gramscian theory, specifically focusing on how a "bloc" of social forces first 
attains, then exercises consensual hegemonic relations in society. In Chapter 
Three of the thesis, I attem pt to account for the contemporary rise to 
Gramscian dominance in the 1980s of market capitalism and spread of related 
neo-liberal views throughout the developed and developing world via the
 ̂ Stephen Gill, "Historical Materialism, Gramsci, and International Political Economy," The 
New International Political Economy [IPE Yearbook Volume-6L Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze 
(eds.), Boulder: Lynne Rlenner Publishers, Inc., 1991, pp. 54.
1 1
political economy modicums of the new right. Chapter Four provides an 
analysis of the emerging contours and dynamics of the so-called "new world 
order/' an international capitalist order I believe is being shaped and 
determined by the three dominant regional powers at the centre of the world 
system: the United States, a uniting Europe and Japan. In the concluding 
chapter of the thesis, I outline some innovative Gramscian ideas for 
revitalizing Marxist thought and praxis in wake of the dissolution and 
collapse of the Stalinist model in Eurasia.
I leave this chapter with a final provocative thought from one of 
Gramsci's letters from prison: "[I]s the war really over? ... Certainly not. 
Therefore, the moral and intellectual battle must go on; the issue is just alive 
now as it was then, we should not give up the struggle."® [emphasis added]
® Antonio Gramsci, Letters From Prison. Lynne Lawner (translator), New York: Harper and Row 
Publishers, 1973, pp. 230.
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Chapter Two.
The Gramscian Problematic of Hegemony
It is [...] necessary to combat econom ism  not only in the theory of 
historiography, but also and especially in the theory and practice of politics.
In this field, the struggle can and must be carried on by developing the concept 
of hegemony. [Antonio Gramsci] ^
[I]t must be stressed that the political development of the concept of hegemony 
represents a great philosophical advance as well as a politico-practical one. 
[Antonio Gramsci] ^
The problematic which has the concept of hegemony at its centre remains of 
vital importance not only for the empirical analysis of modern societies, but 
also for the renewal of a coherent, and relevant, political and social theory, 
based upon a rational, radical moral and political philosophy. Moral and 
political philosophy cannot be made to disappear from the disciplines of 
politics, sociology, economics or history in the way positivists and relativists 
in various guises have attempted to do. The Gramscian concept of hegemony 
reminds us that this is so, and provides a foundation for renewing social theory.
[Ernesto Laclau and Chantai Mouffe] ^
Introduction
The series of disjointed, uneven and fragm entary notes which 
constitute Gramsci's P rison  N otebooks is the culmination of a highly 
innovative, critical and equally compelling and elusive Marxism.'* Despite 
the sketchy style of the "unfinished and unpolished" system of the Prison 
N o teb o o k s, the problem atic of hegemony is ultim ately the dom inant
* Antonio Gramsci, "The Modern Prince," pp. 165. *Note; All primary citations from Gramsci's 
prison writings are taken from Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gram sci. 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Smith (eds. and translators), London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971.
2 Gramsci, "The Study of Philosophy," pp. 333.
3 Ernesto Laclau and Chantai Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics. New York: Verso, 1985, pp. 128.
^ Beyond problems that inevitably arise in translation, the abstruseness of Gramsci's prison 
writings is attributable to at least four other factors: i) intense intellectual, physical and 
emotional detachment from his subject; ii) deteriorating emotional and physical health; iii) 
Gramsci's deliberate ambiguous writing style (to evade prison censors); and, perhaps most 
conclusively, iv) the profound sense of dialectic to be found in Gramsci's writings.
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unifying theme in all of Gramsci’s work.5 Arguably, there are two aspects to 
the problematic of hegemony working in Gramscian theory. The first 
concerns identifying the most appropriate strategy an alliance of Leftist anti­
capitalist forces should take in countering bourgeois hegem ony and 
actualizing a socialist hegemony. The second aspect of the wider theoretical 
and practical framework Gramsci intended to situate his Prison Notebooks 
involves understanding the reason behind subordinate groups consensually 
submitting themselves to bourgeois exploitation.
There is little doubt that Gramsci's novel development of the concept 
of hegemony as "intellectual and moral reform" represents his m ost 
im portant and enduring contribution to the canons of tw entieth century 
Western Marxism.^ Gramsci's body of writings, as I will demonstrate in this 
thesis, has a universal setting and relevance which extends far beyond his 
own immediate and desperate historical setting of Fascist Italy. In particular, 
this thesis aims to show that a Gramscian-informed analysis of the rise of the 
new intellectual and political right in the 1980s is absolutely crucial to 
understanding the current domination of market capitalism and spread of 
related neo-liberal views throughout the world.
In this theoretical chapter, my intention is to set the conceptual 
framework for the thesis by providing a critical exposition of the problematic 
of hegemony in Gramscian theory, specifically focussing on how a social
5 While "unfinished and unpolished," Gramsci was still able to produce, from February 1929 
intermittently until 1935, when deteriorating health made sustained concentration impossible, 
32 notebooks consisting of 2848 pages (about 4000 when typewritten).
6 Strictly speaking, Lenin was the first Marxist theoretician to incorporate the concept of 
hegemony Into a revolutionary strategy for the proletariat. However, in Lenin's rather 
restricted use of the term, hegemony is analogous to his "dictatorship of the proletariat " over 
the peasantry. In Gramsci, hegemony becomes a more nuanced, less deterministic concept, which 
can refer to the practice of a bourgeois or revolutionary proletariat hegemon.
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group first achieves then exercises consensual hegemonic relations. This 
chapter, therefore, lays out the conceptual framework and theoretical tools of 
Gramscian Marxism which will be subsequently applied in later chapters to 
analyses of global restructuring and the changing nature of capitalist 
hegemony.
Because interpretations and appropriations of Gramsci's P rison  
N otebooks vary widely, I have chosen to stress three aspects of Gramsci's 
general theory which has helped guide me through an otherwise elusive, 
and, at times, personally frustrating text. In so doing, I hope to avoid some of 
the more blatant m isinterpretations and m isapplications of Gramsci's 
thought.
First and foremost, it must be understood that Gramsci's concept of 
hegemony is dialectical. As much as Gramsci was inspired to develop his 
concept of hegemony to guide revolutionary socialist practice in a strategy 
which would effectively "counter" bourgeois [Fascist] hegemony (hence the 
term "counter-hegemony")^, Gramsci would be equally displaced to employ 
the term in historical reference to the strategy of the bourgeoisie in soliciting 
the exploitation of subordinate classes. Depending upon the context, then, at 
any one time Gramsci's interpretation of hegemony can refer to the political 
strategy of either one of Marxism's "fundamental,"* or antagonistic social 
classes.
 ̂ Gramsci never explicitly adopts the term "counter-hegemony" in his prison writings. 
However, the strong sense of dialectic in Gramsci suggests that counter-hegemony is implicit in 
his development of the concept of hegemony. Following Gramsci, 1 have taken the liberty of 
using the term in reference to a gradual "molecular" revolutionary process, involving a profound 
cultural and ideological transformation of bourgeois hegemony by an anti-capitalist alliance of 
social forces.
* To avoid prison censorship and Marxist overtones, Gramsci inserted the more politically 
neutral terminology "fundamental" when referring to either one of Marxism's major social
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Secondly, I have found it extremely helpful to situate Gramscian 
M arxism in its own peculiar historical context and developm ent, 
emphasizing the relation between Gramsci's commitment as a Communist 
leader on the one hand, and his intellectual rejection of economistic 
interpretations of Marxism on the other. As Chantai Mouffe correctly 
observes: ”... it is impossible to understand the very problem s posed by 
Gramsci and his importance for marxist theory if his writings are not related 
to ... the theoretical and political context of the struggles of the working-class 
movement at the beginning of the century.”9 Since Gramsci's understanding 
of hegemony developed from his own deep distrust and disillusionment 
w ith orthodox or m echanistic M arxism of the Second and Third 
Internationals, I have stressed the importance of Gramsci’s rejection of 
economism. As I will argue, Gramsci's ideological disdain for economism 
allows him to restore the consensual non-dependent side of politics, and 
ultimately contributes to his formulation of a non-deterministic theory of 
social change.
Thirdly, and lastly, it bears em phasizing that only through the 
complimentary development and refinement of other unique and integral 
Gramscian concepts (i.e., civil and political society; v*?ar of movement versus 
war of position; integral and ethical state; regulated society; historic bloc, etc.) 
was Gramsci able to arrive at a quintessential understanding of hegemony as 
the ability of a fundamental social group to exercise consensual intellectual, 
political and moral leadership.
classes (i.e., bourgeoisie or proletariat) defined in strict Marxist terms by the "fundamental" 
role it plays In the relations of production. 1 have chosen to continue using Gramsci’s 
terminology.
 ̂ Chantai Mouffe, Gramsci and Marxist Theory. Chantai Mouffe (ed.), Boston: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1979, pp. 3.
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In what follows, then, 1 will stress that understanding hegemony in 
Gramsci requires: i) sensitivity to the dialectical quality in his writing; ii) 
consideration of his political convictions and iii) recognition of the 
com plim entary relation that exists between all his major theoretical 
constructs. Hopefully, by keeping these three attributes closely in mind, the 
reader who is unfamiliar with Gramsci will gain an appreciation of one of the 
greatest, yet still largely unknown, Marxist scholars of the twentieth century.
The chapter itself has been organized into three main sections. Section 
one discusses the details of Gramsci's critique and rejection of economism, as 
well as the profound influence the Russian Revolution had on Gramsci. 
Section two, which forms the bulk of the chapter, discusses the conditions 
deemed necessary by Gramsci for actualizing hegemonic relations in society. 
It argues that Gramscian-type hegemony is not just simple doctrinal 
domination of one class over another (or one country over another). Rather 
hegemony, as Gramsci perceived it, requires a fundamental social group 
leading ethically, morally and consensually in the ideological, cultural, 
intellectual and economic realms. Section 111 discusses the failure of an 
aspiring hegemon to secure any one of these conditions, resulting in a crisis 
of bourgeois hegemony. A brief concluding section is also included to prepare 
readers for the subsequent chapters.
I. Diverging Intellectual and Political Traditions in Gramsci
Marx did not write a nice little doctrine, he is not a messiah who left a file of 
parables pregnant with categorical imperatives, of absolute indisputable norms 
independent of time and space. (Antonio Gramsci]
Antonio Gramsci, "Our Marx," originally published in ll Crido del Popolo , May 4,1918.
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Gramsci's Marxism (what he called the "philosophy of praxis") 
developed from a profound sense of disillusionment with orthodox 
Marxism. Although Gramsci led the Italian Communist Party during the 
mid-1920s up to his arrest in November 1926, he nonetheless remained 
skeptical of the "actually existing socialist" doctrines of the second and third 
Internationals which, as he argued throughout the Prison Notebooks, were 
marred by "crude scientism" and equally "primitive economism," 
respectively.!^ Gramsci emphatically held to the philosophical view that 
because purposeful human action involves motives, acts of will, thoughts, 
hopes, fears, desires, and so forth, historical movement and social change 
could not be fully understood within purely mechanistic, "objective" or 
scientific parameters of economistic analysis:
(I]t is absurd to think of a purely 'objective' prediction ... (because] ... i.) strong 
passions are necessary to sharpen the intellect and help make intuition more 
penetrating; ii.) because reality is a product of the application of human will to 
the society of things.! 2
Unlike economism, then, which tends to demean individual will in 
the process of social transformation, Gramscian Marxism sees active, willful 
and conscious people making creative history. As Gramsci would
! !  Scientific Marxism emerged from the second International's belief that economic 
contradictions inherent in the development of the capitalist mode of production could be 
objectively analyzed, scientifically predicted and empirically quantified according to Marx's 
three iron "laws of capital": overproduction, increasing concentration of capital and progressive 
proletarianization. The Second International's fetishism with science is in part attributable to 
the rising influence of Darwin's ideas concerning evolution and natural history, which set off a 
number of important nineteenth century thinkers (including Marx) on a quest for seeking general 
scientific principles underlying human historical and social change. Economism, on the other 
hand, is that doctrine of Marxist belief which gives undue primacy to economic and 
technological forces over political ones in the explanation of historical change. In its most 
"pure" form, economism holds that all superstructural elements (ie. ideology, politics, culture, 
class consciousness, subjectivity, etc.) are reducible to, are epiphenomena of, or "conditioned" by, 
the economic base.
!2 Gramsci, "The Modern Prince," pp. 171,
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consistently argue throughout the Prison N otebooks, m echanistic 
interpretations of Marx, premised on apocalyptic capitalist breakdown and the 
historical inevitability of proletarian revolutions, were leading Marxism 
down a defeatist path of political irrelevancy, fatalism, and even worse still, 
utopianism. In fact, Gramsci attributed the cause of defeat of the working- 
class movements in Eurasia and America during this century -  i.e., the 
trium ph of Fascism in Italy under M ussolini, "New Deal" Fordist 
corporatism in America, and the rise of Stalinism in Russia, respectively — to 
the extreme sense of determinacy and reductionism prevalent in the Marxian 
theoretical and political praxes of the day.
In order to restore Marxism's political validity for a revolutionary 
strategy, Gramsci contended that it must be purged of every residue of 
primitive economism. Consequently, the desire to escape the infectious and 
fatalistic trappings of "vulgar" and "infantile" Marxism in the P r i so n  
Notebooks, led Gramsci to rebel against the typical economistic suggestion 
that, in the last instance, politics is "conditioned" by the economic b a s e .  13
13 The famous passage from Marx to which I am of course invoking here is from the Preface to 
the Critique of Political Economy which runs thus: "the mode of production of material life 
con d itions the social, political and intellectual life process in general." To be fair, Marx's 
writing d id  stress the non-deterministic reciprocity between economics and politics, In Marx's 
defense, Engels wrote: "[I]f somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the 
only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless 
phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure ... 
also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggle and in many cases 
preponderate in determining their form ... and w e had not always the time, the place or the 
opportunity to allow the other elements involved in the interaction to come into their rights." 
The critical point to be made here, of course, is in the matter and degree of emphasis: Marx 
emphasized economics, whilst Gramsci tended to reflect more on politics. For a more lucid 
discussion of this point, see Leonardo Salamini, The Sociology of Political Praxis: An 
Introduction to Gramsci's Theory. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981.
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Hence,
The claim, presented as an essential postulate of historical materialism that 
every fluctuation of politics and ideology can be presented and expounded as an 
immediate expression of the structure, must be contested in theory as primitive 
infantilism, and combated in p ractice .[em p h asis added]
A passage such as this (and others like it) lead some scholars to read
into Gramscian theory an inversion of classical Marxism. They contend that
for the Italian Communist leader, the Marxian categories of human will,
consciousness, politics, culture and ideology are primary, and in the last
instance, d e t e r m i n a n t . ^ 5  por these Gramscian scholars, the most immediate
and pervasive theme to be extricated from the Prison Notebo_oks is that class
struggle m atures on a "higher plane than the imm ediate world of the
e c o n o m y . H o w e v e r ,  such readings of Gramsci appear to be more than just
a little forced- Contrary to the facetious suggestion of some, Gramscian
Marxism, in the finest tradition of Marx, em phasized the "necessary
reciprocity" which exists between economics and politics. Hence, for Gramsci,
the complex, contradictory and discordant en sem b le  of the superstructures is 
the reflection of the en sem b le  o f  the social relations of production. [...] T his  
reasoning is  based on the necessary reciprocity betw een structure and 
superstructure, a reciprocity which is  nothing other than the real dialectical 
p r o c e s s . !  7 [emphasis added]
Thus, politics is not a dependent sphere in Gramscian theory, and any 
attempt to make it so is not in keeping with the dialectic of Karl Marx's
Gramsci, "Problems of Marxism," pp. 407.
See professor Norberto Bobbio's influential account of the supposed two "inversions" of Marx 
in Gramscian theory -- eg., i) the prevalence of the superstructure over the structure and ii) the 
prevalence of the ideological over the institutional moment in, "Gramsci and the Conception of 
Civil Society," Gramsci and Marxist Theory. Chantai Mouffe, (ed.). For a critique of Bobbio's 
position, see Jacques Texier, "Gramsci, Theoretician of the Superstructures: On the Concept of 
Civil Society," Gramsci and Marxist Theory, pp. 48-79,
Gramsci, "The Modern Prince," pp. 184.
Gramsci, "The Study o f Philosophy," pp. 366.
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Marxism, Recognizing the indeterminacy in Gramscian theory, Stuart Hall 
correctly points out that Gramsci,
... does not think that politics is an arena which simply reflects already 
unified collective political identities, already constituted forms of struggle. [...]
It is where forces and relations in the economy, in society, in culture, have to be 
actively worked on to produce particular forms of power, forms of domination.
[...] This conception of politics is fundamentally contingent, fundamentally 
open-ended. There is  no law of history which can predict what must inevitably 
be the outcome of a political struggle. Politics depends on the relations of forces 
at any particular moment.^® [emphasis added]
The Russian Revolution and Gramsci
Clearly and irrevocably it was the extraordinary events of the 1917 
October Russian Revolution which brought Gramsci face to face with his 
personal skepticism over theoretical orthodoxy. Undoubtedly a little too 
caught up in the euphoria which surrounded the immediate "successes" of 
the October moment, a young spirited Gramsci proclaimed, even heralded, 
the Bolshevik Revolution as the revolution against Marx's Capital:
In Russia Marx's C a p ita l was the book of the bourgeoisie more than of the 
proletariat. It [the revolution] was the critical demonstration of the fatal 
necessity that in Russia a bourgeoisie had to be formed, that an era of 
capitalism had to begin, and that a western-type civilization had to be 
installed before the proletariat might even be able to think about insurrection, 
class vindications, and revolution. Events have overcome ideologies. Events 
have exploded the critical schemes within which the history of Russia would 
have had to develop according to the canons of historical materialism. The 
Bolsheviks repudiate Karl Marx, they affirm with the testimony of explicit 
action, with achieved conquests, that the canons of historical materiaiism are 
not so unyielding as one would think or as one has thought.^^ [emphasis added]
Stuart Hall, "Gramsci and Us," Marxism T oday, (June 1987), pp. 20 
Gramsci, "The Revolution Against Capital," originally published in A v a n ti ! Novem ber 
24, 1917. One can detect in the young Gramsci a degree of innocence and naivety about the 
Russian Revolution, for even when it went obviously sour, deteriorating into what Rosa 
Luxemburg correctly referred to as domineering "bureaucratic-centralism" under Stalin, Gramsci 
appeared oblivious. He continued to extoll upon the virtues of the soviet factory systems, 
which he wrongly held to be a source of popular democratic initiatives at the point of 
production.
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Despite later betrayal of the revolution by Stalinism (some Stalinists' 
apologists would say in defence, a "rationalization" of the revolution), for a 
young Gramsci the events of October 1917 were emblematic of Marxism's fatal 
deficiencies. The failure to understand, much less predict, the conditions 
which make socialist revolutions possible had for ail intents and purposes 
relegated traditional Marxism redundant for Gramsci, both as an analytical 
category, and even more importantly, as political strategy. Not only had the 
revolution in the most "advanced" capitalist societies in the West proven 
elusive, despite the "fact" that objective conditions there nad been ripe for 
several decades, but also as if to add insult to injury, w hen a socialist 
revolution actually did occur it was realized in the context of a political 
economy Marx himself had w ritten off as distastefully "backward." Even 
conceding Russia's "exceptionalism" -  i.e., that the Russian proletariat was 
"underdeveloped" relative to that of the West and hence not as likely or 
capable of undertaking a project of revolutionary socialism -- Gramsci, like 
Lenin, looked for answers to Russia's apparent historical "aberration" beyond 
mere "objective" criteria. Indeed, in the Prison Notebooks' mature vision, 
the lessons of "Leninism," including the primacy and capacity of politics to 
"spontaneously" mobilize revolutionary consciousness in the proletariat, and 
the fact that "socialism can be realized at any one moment," became 
increasingly central to Gramsci's deliberations upon the problem of realizing 
revolutionary change in the West. It is hardly surprising, therefore, given 
both the extraordinary set of events which unfolded in revolutionary Russia, 
and the resilience capitalism showed in the West even in the midst of the 
deep economic crisis of the 1930s, that Gramsci would tu rn  his critical 
faculties in the Prison Notebooks to the hitherto denigrated Marxian category
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of the superstructure (i.e., ideology, consciousness, politics, culture, etc.) in 
search for an explanation as to why socialist revolutions did or did not take 
place. Ultimately, the articulation of a non-reductionist theory of social 
change would lead Gramsci in the direction of speculating that answers to 
Marxism's most perplexing mysteries could be found in the superior 
elaboration of the concept of hegemony.
II. Consent and Force in  Gramsclan Theory
This research will ... concern the concept of the State, which is usually thought 
of as political society — i.e., a dictatorship or some other coercive apparatus 
used to control the masses in conformity with a given type of production and 
economy -- and not as a balance between political and civil society, by which 1 
mean the hegemony of one social group over the entire nation, exercised through 
... private organizations like the Church, trade unions, or schools. [Antonio 
Gramsci]
For Gramsci, there are two aspects of social and political control: the 
first involves "domination," or rule by direct physical coercion; the second 
involves "hegemony," or rule by consensual "intellectual and moral 
leadership." In Gramsci's words, "the supremacy of a social group manifests 
itself in two ways, as 'domination' and 'intellectual and moral leadership 
[emphasis added].
In clarifying his theoretical position, Gramsci further distinguished 
between political society -  which is the organizer of domination -  and civil 
society -  which is the organizer of consensus or hegemony. Gramsci explains 
the contrasting roles civil and political society perform in m aintaining 
bourgeois control in these terms:
20 This passage is taken from one of Gramsci's letters to a friend written in prison in September 
1931. In the letter, Gramsci briefly sketches out the "plan," such as it was, o f  the Prison  
N otebooks. It is reproduced in Letters from Prison, selected and translated by Lynne Lawner, 
New York: Harper and Row, 1973, pp. 203-207.
21 Gramsci, "Notes on Italian History," pp. 57.
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(W]e can ... fix two major superstructural 'levels:' the one that can be called 
'civil society,' that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private,' and 
that of 'political society' or 'the State.' TTiese two levels correspond on the one 
hand to the function of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises 
throughout society and on the other hand to that of 'direct domination,' or 
command exercised throughout the State and 'juridical' government.^^
While preferring (for analytical purposes only) to draw a distinction
between the sphere of consent [i.e. civil society] and force [i.e. political society],
Gramsci clearly perceived that in the real world of modern class-divided
societies civil society cannot be meaningfully divorced from political society.
Thus, Gramsci’s conception of the modern integral state was given by the
equation: "state = political society + civil society, in other words, hegemony
protected by the armour of c o e r c i o n " 2 3  [emphasis added]. Similarly, "by
State' should be understood not only the apparatus of government but also
the 'pri-'ate' apparatus of 'hegemony' or civil s o c i e t y . "24 Gramsci, therefore,
can be seen to abandon an instrumentalist conception of the state, which in
liberal political theory is identified primarily w ith the political systems of
governance. Instead of separating political and civil society, Gramsci's
concept of the integral state allows for a far more historicized and expanded
notion of hegemony, consisting of a dialectical unity of civil and political
society. For Gramsci, the degree to which the apparati of "dictatorship"
remain latent and the "private" apparati of civil society prevail at any one
moment determines the degree and relative strength of hegemony in society.
Gramsci perceived the use of the coercive apparatus of the state as
typically reserved for "moments of crises of command and direction when
spontaneous consent has failed ."25 Thus, in Gramscian theory, the
22 Gramsci, "The Intellectuals," pp. 12.
23 Gramsci, "State and Civil Society," pp. 263.
24 Ibid., pp. 261.
25 Gramsci, "The Intellectuals," pp. 12,
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inclination of a dominant fundamental group to rely upon institutionalized 
forms of repression and violence to sustain its class rule is a reflection of that 
group's ideological weakness and historical immaturity, not strength; a social 
group is driven to use force only when legitimate consensus arrangements 
have broken down. Contrary to the opinion that "might makes right" in the 
exercise of hegemony, then, Gramsci shows that successful (or "expansive") 
hegemony involves the creation of an active and direct consensus resulting 
from the genuine acceptance of the political and class interests of the 
dominant group in society by subordinate groups. Gramscian-type hegemony 
occurs when subordinate groups in society actively consent to their own 
exploitation. The dominant group's authority to lead is not challenged by 
lesser social groups. In fact, the dom inant group's values and ways of 
perceiving the social world are passively and uncritically internalized by 
subordinates. In the Gram scian sense, hegemony is ultim ately a 
psychological state of being. Once the prevailing mode of consensus is 
internalized in a population, through institutional and ideological structures, 
the use of state coercion becomes less and less necessary. As Stephen Gill and 
David Law note:
With time, the coercive use of power may become less necessary and also less 
obvious as consensus builds up on the basis of shared values, ideas and material 
interests on the part of both the ruling and subordinate classes. What is 
important in this process is that such ideas and institutions come to be seen as 
natural and legitimate, and that they become embedded in the frameworks of 
thought o f the politically and econom ically significant parts of the 
population. In this way, a hegemonic structure of thought and action emerges, 
one which militates against the raising, or even conception of alternative types 
of political, economic and social arrangement.^^ [emphasis added]
26 Stephen Gill and David Law, "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital," 
International Studies Quarterly. 33:4, (December 1989), pp. 480.
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Gramsci theorized that the "repressive character of state coercive power 
diminishes in importance as its 'ethico-political' character, that is, as its 
hegemonic function increases and grows in importance."27 For Gramsci, the 
attainment of a "regulated society" (which is roughly equivalent to Marxism's 
"withering state," marking the beginning of the eventual passage to a classless 
society) materializes at the point in which force in political society becomes 
redundant -  i.e., is completely reabsorbed by the consensual apparati of civil 
hegemony:
It is possible to imagine the coercive elements of ‘he State withering away by 
degrees, as ever-more conspicuous elements of regulated society (or ethical 
State or civil society) make their appearance. [...] In the doctrine of the State 
as regulated society, one will have to pass from a phase in which 'State' will 
be equal to 'government,' and 'State' will be identified with 'civil society.'-®
It would seem, then, that Gramsci would perceive the unprecedented
expansion of civil society in the modern industrial democracies as a "good"
thing, since it tends to replace force in political society with the consensual
rule of civil society. However, as Esteve Morera asserts, the crucial question
focuses on whose hegemony?
Because we all belong to some private organization of civil society -  a club, or 
the readership of a newspaper, a school, religious association or a family -- w e  
are all engaged, passively or actively, in the organization of hegemony in our 
society. We all belong in this way to a party. Hence, in the same way that w e 
are philosophers, that w e are all intellectuals, w e are also engaged in 
political activity. The issue, then, is clearly the same as in the case of 
developing a coherent world-view; w e are all faced with the task of 
transforming the inherent political significance of the organizations o f civil 
society into well-organized, coherent and progressive activity. Political 
participation, then, must begin with the task of transforming an already 
existing activity, of rendering critical and active the passive consensus imposed 
by the environment.^^
27 Esteve Morera, "Gramsci and Democracy," Canadian lournal of Political Science. 23:1, 
(March 1990), pp. 28.
2® Gramsci, "State and Civil Society," pp. 263.
2  ̂Esteve Morera, "Gramsci and Democracy," pp. 29.
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The Revolutionary War of "Manoeuvre" versus "Position"
Gramsci's concepts of civil and political society have Important 
political and theoretical implications for revolutionary praxis. Gramsci 
argued that civil society in the West has become a massively complex, ever- 
expanding and politicized realm of social conflict. Since civil society is the 
place where the different "private" instruments of bourgeois rule -  i.e., the 
schools, churches, m ilitary complexes, media and cultural industries, 
factories, etc. -- organize, elaborate and disseminate cultural, ideological and 
social hegemony throughout the rest of society, Gramsci suggested that a 
successful transition to socialism in such societies could only come 'bout 
through a long-term "organic," or "molecular" struggle for hegemony in civil 
society. Accordingly, the struggle for socialist hegemony in the West (what 
Gramsci referred to as a revolutionary "war of position") must occur both 
within and against bourgeois civil society. In order to realize socialism, 
oppressed classes m ust reconquer civil society, transforming it from the 
insidious control of the bourgeoisie.
In the hope of more fully clarifying his theoretical position on the 
"proper" forms of revolutionary struggle for Western and Eastern Marxists 
alike, Gramsci draws upon the experience of Leninism in Russia to determine 
what, if any, of the "successful"30 lessons employed by the Bolsheviks in and 
through the October Revolution were directly transferrable to the immediate 
experience of the West. Gramsci ultimately conceded that the range of 
economic, cultural, political, national and historical factors which went into
"Successful" in quotations because though managing to capture the realm of the Russian state 
(i.e. political society) capturing, reconstructing and restoring Gramsci's all-important "politico- 
ethico" realm (I.e. civil society) have arguably proven far more frustrating and elusive tasks 
fo’' temporary post-revolutionary leaders from Lenin on down to Gorbachev, now Yeltsin.
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producing a socialist revolution in Russia were so overwhelmingly distinct 
from anything in the Western experience that a new revolutionary strategy 
would have to be developed for the West where the bourgeoisie had 
managed to firmly entrench its intellectual and ideological hegemony within 
civil society.
In explaining the crucial differences between Eastern and Western 
revolutionary struggle, Gramsci draws heavily upon the use of military 
metaphor:
In Russia the State was everything, civil society w as primordial and 
gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil 
society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at 
once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a 
powerful system of fortresses and earthworks.^*
Thus, while Lenin was able to successfully instigate a frontal, or "Jacobist,"
attack on the Russian state itself (i.e., a minority conquest of state power from
above), in the West such a strategy would be hopelessly naive, given the
"proper" balance between force and consensus which binds together the
modern industrial democracies. For Gramsci, then, the crucial difference
betw een W estern and Eastern political econom ies (and ultim ately
revolutionary strategy) laid in the relative degree of complexity and
refinement of vastly contrasting civil and political societies.
In the concepts of "war of manoeuvre" and "war of position," the
theoretical and political implications for Western and Eastern revolutionary
struggle were further elaborated upon by Gramsci, For Gramsci, the war of
manoeuvre denotes a Jacobist revolutionary strategy, involving the conquest
of power through direct confrontation and acquisition of the state proper.
Gramsci, "State and Civil Society," pp. 238.
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Gramsci believed that the war of manoeuvre would be the appropriate mode 
of revolutionary struggle where political society is overly developed and civil 
society weak (i.e., Russia in the early 20th century, and by extension, much of 
the Third World today). The Gramscian "war of position," on the other 
hand, refers to a long-term "molecular" struggle for hegemony in civil 
society. It was thought to be the favoured mode of revolutionary strategy for 
political economies where consensual hegemony prevails. While not 
completely rejecting the state as an arena for socialist struggle per se, Gramsci 
was of the opinion that seizure of state power in the West should be 
considered a tactical, rather than a strategic option -  i.e., a secondary, rather 
than primary object of revolutionary political activity. Invariably, Gramsci 
contended (and history does appear to affirm) that the acquisition of state 
power w ithout prior transformation of civil society would be what the 
acquisition of state power has been since the inception of the capitalist state 
system in 1648 -  a means of suppressing popular democratic initiatives:
Socialist transformation [in the West] would have to be an organic process 
evolving beneath the facade of liberal democratic institutions, rooted in the 
relations of production and in the dialectic of everyday life. One of the 
fallacies of social democracy ... was its preoccupation with the existing state 
apparatus as a set of structures to be taken over, administered, and transformed 
from above, thus undercutting any genuine thrust toward democratization of 
civil society. [...] Movements which set out to 'conquer' the old state institutions 
can only wind up hopelessly ensnared in the logic of capitalist development -  a 
logic that works against autonomous mass power in hundreds of ways. Instead of 
constructing new political forms, they reproduced the old ones which remain 
embedded in the bourgeois social division of l a b o u r . 3 2  [emphasis added]
It would perhaps bode well in the present context of profound 
dislocation and disorientation in radical scholarship to heed Gramsci's 
"warning" that the state is often not the most correct, ultimate, nor for that
32 Carl Boggs, The Two Revolutions: Gramsci and the Dilemmas of Western Marxism. Boston: 
South End Press, 1984, pp. 84-85.
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matter, desirable means to achieve socialist ends. As the recent "people's" 
revolutions in Eurasia demonstrate, hegemony cannot be imposed upon civil 
society; hegemony must grow organically from the "masses." From this point 
of view, the state, even in its m odern social-democratic welfare variants, 
might be considered more disabling than enabling for realizing participatory 
radical democratic politics.
The Contestation of Hegemony
Despite "colonization of civil society " by the bourgeoisie, Gramsci 
considered the actual exercise of instilling relations of consensual hegemony 
in society as problematic. According to Gramsci, the degree to which a 
fundamental social group is successful in "expanding" its hegemony over 
wider elements in society is determined by a range of national, cultural, 
economic and h isto rical factors. In th is h isto rical m ateria list 
conceptualization of hegemony, the development of the forces and relations 
of production at the particular moment in which hegemony is being sought, 
and the degree of equilibrium which exists between political and civil society, 
are thought to define the strength of consensus in society. Gramsci argued 
that disequilibrium rather than broad ideological consensus was the general 
rule in European history, not the exception. Far from implying that modern 
capitalist societies are hom ogeneous m onolithic wholes cem ented by 
ideological consensus, then, Gramsci showed that societies are always divided 
and that hegemony is, and will always be, contested. Stuart Hall elaborates:
Gramsci Is one of the first modem Marxists to recognize that interests are not 
given but have to be politically and ideologically constructed. [...] In modern 
societies, hegemony must be constructed, contested and won on many different 
sites, as the structures of the modern state and social complexify and the points
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of antagonism proliferate. (...] Hegemony is not a state of grace which is 
installed forever. It's not a formation that incorporates everyone.^^
As Hall relates, since politics is a non-dependent sphere in Gramscian
theory, his concept of hegemony is fundam entally contingent upon
ideological and political struggles waged amongst contending hegemonic
principles (or "world-views") in civil society. Hegemony, therefore, is a
dynamic, always on-going historically, socially and politically constructed
process. If there is a "law" to be extrapolated from Gramsci's general theory of
hegemony, then it would simply be that the attempt to construct a hegemonic
system of rule will always, dialectically, generate a set of counter-hegemonic
tendencies. As will be argued later on in Chapter Three of this thesis, present-
day attempts by certain internationalist-oriented fractions of the bourgeoisie
to create a more la issez-fa ire  "open" type of capitalism via international free
trade is being vehemently resisted by counter-hegemonic tendencies and
social forces situated w ithin the nation-state itself whose material and
political interests are better served by state protectionism, and thus, a "closed"
global economy. This dialectical struggle between global free-traders and state
mercantalists is argued to be the driving logic behind global restructuring.
Ideology and Hegemony
In contrast to his Marxist contemporaries who consistently slighted the 
concept of ideology w ith such negative value judgements as "illusory," 
"distorting," and in Engels's famous expression, with "false c o n s c i o u s n e s s , "34
33 Stuart Hall, "Gramsci and Us," pp. 17.
34 Ideology as "false consciousness" is associated with this famous passage from Engels' Ih e  
German Ideology: "Ideology Is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is 
true, but with a false consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him remain unknown to 
him; otherwise it simply would not be an ideological process. Hence he imagines false or 
seeming motive forces."
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Gramsci argued that the organization, elaboration and dissemination of ideas 
and ideological structures, especially those of the ruling classes, do in fact play 
an active and crucial role in determ ining the outcome of hegemonic 
struggles. In his notes entitled "The M odern Prince," Gramsci argued 
succinctly and persuasively against the "error" of reducing ideology to a 
meaningless abstraction of reality:
Ideas and opinions are not simultaneously 'bom' in each individual brains.they 
have had a centre of formation, of irradiation, o f dissemination, of persuasion -
- a group of men, or a single individual even, which has developed them and 
presented them in the political form of current reality.^® [emphasis added]
In deliberating on the establishment of past and present hegemonies in
Europe, Gramsci observed that every potential hegemon would attempt to
legitimize its social power, wealth and prestige to the masses it sought to
dominate ideologically. Gramsci argued that a fundamental social group
the course of seeking hegemony would "present -  and cause ... to be accepted -
- the conditions of its existence and its class development as a universal
principle, as a world-view as r e l i g i o n . "36 Thus, the "moment" of hegemony
in Gramsci occurs
if and when there is a widespread acceptance of the key principles and 
political ideas of a leading class fraction. [To] ... become hegemonic ... means 
that the policies which embody them will appear more natural and legitimate 
to broad elements within the society.37
Insofar and inasmuch as subordinate groups uncritically and passively 
internalize the dominant group's values, beliefs and ideas -  i.e., accepts the 
ruling classes' "Weltanschauung," or world-view -  then is the consensual
33 Gramsci, "The Modern Prince," pp. 192.
36 Antonio Gramsci, cited in Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, America's Quest for Supremacy 
and the Third World: A Gramscian Analysis. London: Pinter Publishers, 1988, pp. 120.
37 Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission. N ew  York; Cambridge 
University Press, 1990, pp. 118.
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basis of ideological hegemony ensured. At this, ultimately psychological 
level,
... hegemony performs functions that the military and police machinery could 
never carry out: it mystifies power relations, public issues, and historical 
events; it encourages fatalism and passivity toward political action; it justifies 
various types of system-serving deprivation and sacrifice. Hence the structure 
of ideological domination works in many ways to induce the oppressed strata to 
accept or 'consent to' their own daily exploitation and m i s e r y . 3 8  [emphasis 
added]
Thus, in Gramscian theory, "hegemony is a relation, not of domination by 
means of force, bu t of consent by means of political and ideological 
leadership. It is  the organization of consent"^? [emphasis added]. Any credible 
analysis of hegem ony, then, m ust take into account the consensus 
problematic addressed by Gramsci -- why and how do subordinate groups 
submit themselves to the exploitation of the bourgeoisie?
Ideology, as Gramsci demonstrates, is an instrument and force of class 
transformation; it is not a mere abstraction of reality which the bourgeoisie 
uses in order to dupe inferior and stupid masses. In order to play a politically 
relevant role, however, Gramsci believed that an ideology must first be 
functionally, or "concretely," related to the economic structure of society. 
Thus, while ideology is for Gramsci, "the terrain on which men move, 
acquire consciousness of their position, struggle,"'*^ or, "in its highest sense ... 
a conception of the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in 
economic activity and in all manifestations of individual and collective 
life,"41 it is simultaneously, "the level ... that men become conscious of
Carl Boggs, Ttie Two Revolutions, pp. 161.
Roger Simon, Gramsci's Political Thought; A n Introduction. London: Lawrence and Wistiart, 
1982, pp. 21.
Gramsci, "The Study of Philosophy," pp. 377.
41 Ibid., pp. 328.
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conflicts in the world of the economy "42 and would be "individual faiic[y] 
w ithou t... material forces."43 Thus, in Gramscian theory, as will be concretely 
demonstrated in Chapter Three where I analyze the rise to dominance of the 
new intellectual and political right in the early 1980s, ideas and ideological 
structures of thought are capable of becoming material forces. In the presence 
of, and manipulation by, a hegemon's caste of "organic intellectuals," the 
power of abstract ideas can be translated into concretized relations of class 
exploitation.
Hegemony and "Organic Intellectuals"
To the arduous, yet vastly crucial tasks of lending ideological legitimacy 
to and soliciting the "spontaneous" consensual participation of subordinate 
groups in an aspiring hegemon's program m e of "intellectual and moral 
reform," Gramsci assigned to "organic intellectuals." For Gramsci, an organic 
intellectual is defined as one "who [comes] into existence on the same ... 
terrain as the economic group."44 Gramsci demonstrated that each mode of 
production and all bourgeois revolutions produce their own distinct stratum 
of intellectuals. These intellectuals are thought to provide the articulating 
link between economics and politics in the construction of a hegemonic social 
group. Hence,
Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential 
function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, 
organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and 
an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social 
and political fields.*^®
42 Gramsci, "The Modern Prince," pp. 162.
43 Gramsci, "The Study of Philosophy," pp. 377.
44 Gramsci, "The Intellectuals," pp. 18.
45 Ibid., pp. 5.
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Since these organic intellectuals also share the same "prestigious" class 
background as their "fundamental" counterparts enjoy in the world of the 
economy, the tasks of building consensus and legitimating relations of class 
exploitation become that much less complicated as subaltern classes are 
encouraged to place their trust and confidence in the ideas of "men of 
destiny."
Because in Gramscian theory hegemony is organized and exercised 
along consensual not dictatorial lines, the importance of his category of 
organic intellectuals in securing, exercising and protecting hegemony can 
hardly be emphasized enough; it is, afterall, at the very essence of Gramsci's 
invocation of hegemony as "intellectual and moral reform." Gramsci 
understood better than any other Marxist scholar the sociological importance 
of intellectuals:
My study on intellectuals is a vast project. [...] I extend the notion of intellectual 
considerably, and do not limit myself to the habitual meaning, which refers 
only to great intellectuals. This study also leads to certain determinations of 
the concept of the State [for] ... it is precisely in civil society that intellectuals 
operate especially. [...] This conception of the function of intellectuals, 1 
believe, throws light on the reason, or one of the reasons, for the fall ... of the 
rule of an economic class ... not able to create its own category of intellectuals 
and thus exercis a hegemony as well as a dictatorship.^^
Gramsci argued that organic intellectuals have become an indispensable and 
proliferating "necessary evil" in the industrial democracies, as they alone 
serve to defend the status quo relations of class exploitation:
The function of organizing social hegemony and state domination certainly 
gives rise to a particular division of labour and therefore to a whole hierarchy 
of qualifications. [...] In the modern world the category of intellectuals ... has 
undergone an unprecedented expansion. The democratic-bureaucratic system has 
given rise to a great mass of functions which are not at all justified by the social
Gramsci, "Notes on Italian History," pp. 56.
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necessities of production, though they are justified by the political necessities 
of the dominant fundamental group.'^^
While, for Gramsci, "each man ... outside his professional activity 
carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is everyone is a 
'philosopher,""*®  not all persons have the "function" of the organic 
intellectual in society. Acting as the dominant group's "functionaries" and 
"deputies," organic intellectuals are charged with the responsibility of 
producing, organiz: ig and disseminating to the rest of society the dual duties 
of "social hegemony and political g o v e rn m e n t.M o re o v e r , in continuing 
Gramsci's argum ent, Enrico Augelli and Craig M urphy claim that 
contemporary organic intellectuals must also produce
a philosophy, political theory and economics which together constitute a 
coherent w orld-view , the principles of which can be translated from one 
discipline to another. As actors in the ideological struggle, the intellectuals of 
the dominant class must prevail over the intellectuals of other classes by  
developing more convincing and sophisticated theories, inculcating other 
intellectuals w ith  the dominant world-view, and assim ilating them to the 
hegem on's cause. Totential hegemons fail when they fail to consolidate the 
support of intellectuals.^^) [emphasis added]
Following Gramsci's interpretation of the role of intellectuals play in 
constructing hegemony, in Chapter Three of this thesis I present the 
argum ent that "neo-classical" la is s e z - fa ir e  influenced economists and 
politicians have trium phed over Keynesian intellectuals on the moral, 
ethical, and ideological terrains of class struggle. To a large degree this 
ideological trium ph of market capitalism has been secured by the intellectual 
development of monetarist or "supply-side" economic theory and the spread
Gramsci, "The Intellectuals," pp. 13.
Ibid., pp. 9.
Ibid., pp. 12.
50 Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, America's Quest for Supremacy and the Third World, pp. 
123.
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of related neo-classical economic principles to other disciplines, including, 
most prominently, development economics.
Organic intellectuals, then, are seen to provide an aspiring hegemonic 
class with key unifying and concrete hegemonic principles which, when 
translated into economic motion, move the "historic bloc" of social forces 
progressively forward. Without intellectuals providing the functioning link 
between economics and politics, between theory and practice, the ideological 
bloc of social forces is destined to crumble away, leaving w hat Gramsci 
disparagingly referred to as a "primitive [i.e. non-hegemonic] economic- 
corporate" reality. At this stage of "primitive" class development, the 
potential hegemon is incapable of transcending beyond immediate banal 
satisfaction of its own class and m aterial ends, let alone leading, in 
intellectual and moral terms, socially subordinate groups.
"Hegemony ... M ust Also Be Economic"
Gramsci does not reduce his concept of hegemony to ideological terms 
only. In a very well-cited and famous passage, Gramsci reveals the objective 
economic conditions which first must be present in a social formation before 
expansive relations of hegemony can be exercised:
Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the 
interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be 
exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed -  in 
other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic- 
corporate kind. But there is also no doubt that such sacrifices and such 
compromises cannot touch the essential; for though hegem ony is ethical- 
political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive 
function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic 
activity. 51 [emphasis added]
51 Gramsci, "The Modern Prince," pp. 161.
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In Gramscian theory, then, only a fundamental social group cognizant both of
the economic role it performs -  and the advantages it enjoys — in the
"de ’̂isive nucleus" of the economy can become a force of truly hegemonic
proportions. As Hyug Baeg Im points out, "the development of the material
forces of production provides the objective base for the establishment of
hegemony of a dominant class. [However] ... in order to reproduce hegemony
continuously, the dominant class should make every effort to reproduce the
existing mode of production."52 Furthermore, Gramsci argued that a "social
group can, and ... must, already exercise 'leadership' [ie. hegemony] before
winning governmental p o w e r . "53 Thus,
even before attaining power a class can (and must) 'lead'; when it is in power it 
becomes dominant, but continues to 'lead' as well. [TJhere can and must be 
political hegemony' even before the attainment of governmental power, and 
one should not count solely on the power and material force which such a 
position gives in order to exercise political leadership or hegemony.5^
Hegemonic relations must, therefore, be realized prior to the acquisition of
state power. Otherwise, Gramsci cautions, those who have acquired
premature possession of the state will remain in a phase of "economic-
corporate primitivism," incapable of leading intellectually or morally. Thus,
it is not enough for a potential hegemon to present and convince subordinate
groups that its political programme is ethical and wise (i.e., hegemony as
intellectual and moral reform) -  it must also simultaneously implement
economic development policies which w ill assure the consensual
participation of the social classes it seeks to lead and dominate. Gramsci poses
the problematic a potential hegemon faces in these terms:
52 Hyug Baeg Im, "Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony in Gramsci," Aslan Perspective. 15:1, 
(Sprlng-Summer 1991), pp. 128.
53 Gramsci, "Notes on Italian History," pp. 57.
54 Ibid.
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Can there be cultural reform, and can the position of the depressed strata be 
improved culturally, witl . iut a previous economic reform and a change in their 
position in the social and economic fields? Intellectual and moral reform has to 
be linked with a programme of economic reform -■ indeed the programme of 
economic reform is precisely the concrete form in which every intellectual and 
moral reform presents itself.^5 [emphasis added]
To briefly summarize this section, then, a dom inant fundamental 
social group which is able to achieve and exercise consensual intellectual, 
political, moral and economic direction over socially subordinate groups is 
said to be a hegemonic historic entity.
III. A Crisis of Hegemony in Gramscian Theory
Between consent and force stands corruption/fraud (which is characteristic of 
certain situations when it is hard to exercise the hegemonic function... [Cjracks 
open up everywhere in the hegemonic apparatus, and the exercise of hegemony 
[becomes] permanently difficult and aleatory. [Antonio Cramsci]^^
In his Prison N otebooks. Gramsci speculated that the theme of
hegemony would become so decisive and crucial a factor, especially in the
"advanced" capitalist states in the West where bourgeoisie hegemony is
firmly entrenched ideologically, that a transition to socialism would only be
realized in the context of a general "crisis of authority," or crisis of bourgeois
hegemony. For Gramsci, this crisis of hegemony involves, above all, the
collapse of old authority patterns and the subsequent installation of a "new
cultural order." In this section, I outline the significance of a crisis of
hegemony in Gramscian theory, relating how, and on what terms, the
bourgeoisie is capable of restoring order in and through the crisis of capitalist
hegemony.
^5 Gramsci, "The Modern Prince," pp. 133. 
Gramsci, "Notes on Italian History," pp, 80,
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The "Morbid" Crisis of Bourgeois Hegemony
According to Gramsci, a crisis of bourgeois hegemony is first observed 
when a fundamental social group is driven to exercise "domination without 
adership; dictatorship without hegemony."5  ̂It occurs on two conditions:
Either [I] because the ruling class has failed in som e major political 
undertaking for which it has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the 
broad masses (war, for example), or [ii] because huge masses (especially of 
peasants and petit-bourgeois intellectuals) have passed suddenly from a state 
of political passivity to a certain activity, and put forward [counter- 
hegemonic] demands which taken together,... add up to a revolution. A ‘crisis 
of authority' is spoken of: this is precisely the crisis of hegemony, or general 
crisis of the State.58
In the period between the onset of a general crisis of hegemony and its final 
resolution Gramsci anticipated that, "a great variety of morbid symptoms 
[would] a p p e a r . "59 For Gramsci, a crisis of hegemony's first "morbid 
symptom" was signalled when the dominant group openly uses the coercive 
apparatus of the state against civil society in order to preserve its preeminent 
position in society.
Gramsci theorized that crises of bourgeois hegemony w ould be 
frequent and unavoidable occurrences since a bourgeois hegemon will always 
be faced with the challenge of fulfilling contradictory economic and corporate 
sacrifices. These sacrifices -  the social price the bourgeoisie has to pay in 
order to ensure class peace -  tend to threaten the very economic base upon 
which the bourgeoisie's social hegemony rests. As a consequence, a 
bourgeois hegemon inevitably comes up against what Gramsci called the 
"limits of hegemony." Chantai Mouffe observes:
57 Gramsci, "Notes on Italian History," pp. 60.
58 Gramsci, "State and Civil Society," pp. 210.
59 Ibid., pp. 275.
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If in fact the the exercise of hegem ony involves economic and corporate 
sacrifices on the part of the aspiring leading class, the latter cannot, however, 
go so far as to jeopardize its basic interests. Sooner or later, therefore, the 
bourgeoisie comes up against the limitations of its hegemony, as it is an 
exploiting class, since its class interests must, at a certain level, necessarily  
clash with those of the popular classes,
Whilst a crisis of bourgeois hegemony generally tends to be precipitated 
by an economic crisis, not all economic crises produce hegemonic crises of 
Gramscian proportions. This is so, Gramsci argued, because concomitant 
with the development of capitalist relations, '"civil society' has become a very 
complex structure ... one which is resistant to the catastrophic 'incursions' of 
the immediate economic element (crisis, depressions, etc.)."^^ Hence, for 
Gramsci, economism's great "crisis theory" anticipating the final, irrevocable 
and complete great economic breakdown of capitalism as a result of incurable 
structural contradictions accruing to the system , w hich would then 
subsequently usher in a new era of revolutionary socialism, m ust be 
dispensed with as a viable political strategy since,
... it may be ruled out that Immediate economic crises of themselves produce 
fundamental historical events; they can sim ply create a terrain more 
favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of thought, and certain ways 
of posing and resolving questions.^^
Gramsci, therefore, is seen to avoid a deterministic relation between 
economic crisis and revolution. In drawing an analogy between defensive 
World War I trench warfare military strategy on the one hand, and the 
proponents of crisis theory on the other, Gramsci most ably and convincingly 
warned revolutionaries against the pitfalls of attempting to rally their forces 
around "catastrophic incursions of the immediate economic element." The
Chantai Mouffe, "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," pp. 183. 
Gramsci, "State and Civil Society," pp. 235.
Gramsci, "The Modern Prince " pp. 184.
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passage, not only for its incredible insight, but for sheer ingenious use of 
military metaphor is worth quoting in full.
The superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems of modern 
warfare. In war it would sometimes happen that a fierce artillery attack 
seemed to have destroyed the enemy's entire defensive system, whereas in fact 
it had only destroyed the outer perimeter; and at the moment of their advance 
and attack the assailants would find themselves confronted by a line of defence 
which was still effective. The same thing happens in politics, during the great 
economic crises. A crisis cannot give the attacking forces the ability to organize 
with lightning speed in time and in space; still less can it endow them with  
fighting spirit. Similarly, the defenders are not demoralized, nor do they 
abandon their positions, even among the ruins, nor do they lose faith in their 
own strength or their own future. Of course, things do not remain exactly as they 
were; but it is certain that one will not finu <he element of speed, of accelerated 
time, o f the definitive forward march... [...] Hence it [the revolution] is a 
question of studying in depth' which elements of civil society correspond to the 
defensive systems in a w ar.^
As Gramsci anticipates, then, a crisis of bourgeois hegemony would not be 
strictly confined to a matter of economic breakdown. Rather, a crisis of 
bourgeois hegemony could be expected to achieve its maturest expression on 
the political and ideological terrains of class struggle.
Presently, the struggle for capitalist hegemony at the global level is 
being waged most fiercely -  and in all likelihood -  most decisively on the 
ideological battle field. As Gramsci argued, the crisis of hegemony manifests 
itself exactly at that moment when "the great masses become detached from 
their trad itional ideologies, and no longer believe w hat they d id  
t r a d i t i o n a l l y . " 6 4  The painful transition from Keynesian hegemony to neo­
liberal hegemony has revealed massive cracks in the legitimizing apparati of 
the system. This delegitimization has opened up new political spaces and 
given rise to new forces of resistance, new methods of popular revolt and 
cultural protest, as the proliferation of the "new" social m ovem ents of
63 Gramsci, "Stale and Civil Society," pp. 235.
64 Ibid., pp,275.
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radicalism -  i.e., feminism, pacifism, environmentalism, anti-racism, etc. -  
demonstrate. However, Gramsci was adamant that even in the depths of the 
most severe economic crisis, the bourgeoisie may still be capable of resolving 
the crisis of capitalism favourable to its overall class interests. Thus, while 
these new movements are challenging a certain historical form of capitalism - 
- namely, patriarchal capitalism -  they have not been able, at least thus far, to 
fundamentally challenge the capitalist system itself. Nonetheless, these 
movements are important in that they convincingly demonstrate the fact that 
capitalism creates, w ith its expansion, new contradictions which threaten the 
very ecological and human support systems of our planet.
Restoring Bourgeois Order: The Passive Revolution
In Gramscian theory, the overthrow of bourgeois order is rarely (if at 
all) realized in the context of a devitalizing economic crisis. More often than 
not, Gramsci expected the restoration of bourgeois order (albeit in a 
reconstituted form) during and after a general crisis of hegemony to be 
guaranteed by the strategic intervention of the state. It is precisely on the 
level of w hat Gramsci refers to as the "passive revolution," where the 
relationship between the fundam ental group and masses is not organized 
along organically "consensual" means but based on state domination and /o r 
dictatorship, that the dialectic of destruction/reconstruction of bourgeois 
hegemony is thought to take place. This "revolution without revolution" 
generally corresponds to a "higher" stage in the development of the capitalist 
mode of production, and typically involves unprecedented state intervention 
on side of capital, favouring the overall conservatism of the capitalist system.
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In his Prison Notebooks. Gramsci cited the phenomenons of New Deal 
"Americanism and Fordism," and the emergence of Italian Fascism in the 
inter-war period, as two concrete historical examples of passive revolutions 
in the twentieth century. In both cases, Gramsci noted that the state 
intervened massively -- of course w ith different means, severity and political 
motives in mind -  in times of intense crisis to restructure and reorganize 
capitalist relations between labour and industry. In the case of the former, the 
passive revolution in the United States took the political form of Keynesian 
demand-side economics, w hilst in the case of Fascist Italy, corporatism 
p r e v a i l e d . 65 Whether the supply-side transformation of capitalist hegemony 
will save capitalism in the present conjuncture is still very much in doubt.
IV. Conclusion:
Toward An Application of Gramscian Hegemony
In this conceptual/theoretical chapter, I have provided a brief 
examination of the concept of hegemony in Gramscian theory. I have sought 
to clarify Gramsci's somewhat convoluted conceptualization of hegemony in 
the hope of applying, with some intellectual and practical rigour, this unique 
concept to the changing nature of capitalist hegem ony and related 
transformations in the "new world order." Towards which, we now turn.
65 See both Gramsci's "Notes on Italian History" (pp. 52*120), and "Americanism and Fordism" 




The Struggle for Capitalist Hegemony in a Changing World;
A Gramscian Analysis of the Rise to Dominance of the 
'New’ Intellectual and Political Right
For the important question today ... is the question whether those are right 
who think that the course of prudence and proved wisdom is to trust to time and 
natural forces to lead us with an invisible hand to the economic harmonies; or 
those who fear that there is no design but our own, and the invisible hand is 
merely our own bleeding feet moving through pain and loss to an uncertain and 
unprofitable destination. [John Maynard Keynes] ^
[T]he eclipse of a w ay of living and thinking cannot take place without a crisis. 
[Antonio Gramsci] 2
(Fjor all w e know a new period of struggle for world hegemony has already 
begun. [Giovanni Arrighi] ^
Introduction
Gramscian political economy holds that intellectual coherence can, and 
often does, play a leading role in influencing the direction of political and 
economic policy. This Gramscian assertion is perhaps most forcefully 
illustrated in the post-World War II era where a powerful intellectual and 
political alliance cohered around the ideas of the British economist John 
Maynard Keynes. Keynes's ideas for managing capitalism, mainly set down 
in The General Theory of Employment. Interest, and M oney, first published 
in 1936, were formulated on the premise that the state could and should 
intervene to reinvigorate and ensure the conditions for capitalist 
accumulation. While particularly influential in post-1945 Anglo-American 
worlds, Keynesian state interventionist strategies would come to be adopted, 
to varying degrees, by virtually all industrial democracies. The post-war
 ̂ John Maynard Keynes, cited in The Policy Consequences of lohn Maynard Keynes. Harold 
Watel (ed.), Armonk, New York: E. M. Sharpe, Inc., 1985, pp. 32-33.
2 Antonio Gramsci, "State and Civil Society," pp. 242.
3 Giovanni Arrighi, "The Three Hegemonies of Historical Capitalism," Review. 13:3, (Summer 
1990), pp. 405.
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policy development and implementation of Keynes's ideas by his followers 
can in fact be credited with restoring confidence, devastated by the depression 
and the war, in the private capitalist economy.
Keynes's ideas for managing capitalism  held powerful ideological 
currency, particularly in the Northern industrial world, from the end of 
World War II up to the mid-1970s. However, with the onset of the world 
economic crisis in the early 1970s, Keynesianism fell into public and political 
disrepute. A so-called monetarist political economy "counter-revolution,” 
which places weighty em phasis on the "supply-side" of the economic 
equation and whose politics are to the (far) right of the political spectrum, 
arose to aggressively challenge the post-war "Keynesian consensus." By the 
beginning of the 1980's, it was clear that Keynesianism had been superseded 
by a new, more powerful alliance of "new right" intellectual and political 
forces. In Keynes's stead, the ideas of rightist "organic intellectuals" -  
including, most prominently, Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek -  who 
extol the ethical, economic and moral virtues of "free" markets over state 
control, have gained the upper hand on Keynes's disciples in the struggle for 
Gramscian-type intellectual and moral superiority.
To understand how conservative intellectual and political movements 
with ideologies explicitly condemning Keynes and Keynesian policies have 
gained influence and power throughout the world during the past decade and 
a half, I employ a Gramscian analysis to the question of global restructuring. 
My aim in this chapter is to identify the conservative social forces which 
ascended in the 1970s and 1980s to provide the necessary intellectual and 
moral leadership absolutely crucial for the new right's radical restructuring of 
world capitalist hegemony, The argument presented here in this thesis is that
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capitalist hegemony at the world level is being transformed in conformity 
w ith the p ro -m arket/an ti-sta tist ideas of the new right's "organic 
intellectuals/' and those social forces favouring a more "liberal" global 
political economy. It is the contention of this thesis that a Gramscian- 
informed analysis of global restructuring is essential to understanding the 
contemporary dominance of market capitalism and spread of related "neo­
liberal" views throughout the developed and developing worlds.
The argument is presented in five sections. Section I outlines, in basic 
detail, Keynes's ideas for m anaging capitalism. It reveals that the 
interpretation and subsequent policy implementation of Keynes's ideas in the 
post-war era by his followers significantly differed from what Keynes himself 
had advocated. Section II provides a critical overview of the economic and 
political ideas of the anti-Keynesian "counter-revolution," the pro-market 
intellectual movement which rose in the early 1970s to aggressively challenge 
the "Keynesian consensus." Section III argues that the ascendance to political 
power of the "new right" in the early 1980s convincingly demonstrates that 
the ideas of rightist "organic intellectuals" have come to dominate over 
"traditional" (i.e. Keynesian) intellectuals. The global political economy of 
the new right is discussed in this section, in particular focusing on how the 
right's intelligentsia has been able to hold together a wholly unsettling 
alliance of conservative political and economic social forces. The 
contemporary decline and retreat of leftist intellectuals is discussed in section
IV. Section V looks at the contradictions involved in introducing 
disciplinarian neo-liberalism into the periphery of the world capitalist system, 
in context of the International Monetary Fund's-led structural adjustment
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programme for Third World development. A final concluding section 
informally speculates on the future political fortunes of the new right.
I. Keynes and the Crisis of Keynesianism
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right 
and when they a re  wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood.
Indeed the world Is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves 
to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually slaves to some 
defunct economist. [...] I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly 
exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. [John Maynard 
Keynes] 4
The essential prem ise guiding Keynes's economic thought was
precisely that free market capitalism does not work to establish a social
optimum. Throughout his career Keynes was an outspoken social critic of
classic la issez-fa ire  positions. On the topic of private investment, for
instance, Keynes wrote in a 1920s essay entitled, "The End of Laissez-Faire:"
1 believe that some coordinated act of intelligent judgment is required as to the 
scale on which it is desirable that the community as a whole should save, the 
scale on which these savings should go abroad in the form of foreign  
investments, and whether the present organization of the investment market 
distributes savings along the most rationally productive channels. I do not 
think that these matters should be left entirely to the chances o f private 
judgement and private profits, as they are at present.^ [emphasis added]
In The General Theory. Keynes argued that the "accepted classical theory of
economics ... [and] its tacit assumptions are seldom or never satisfied, with
the result that it cannot solve the economic problems of the real world."^ He
vehemently maintained that private free-enterprize capitalism is inherently
unstable, and, ultimately, amoral:
John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment. Interest, and Money. London: 
MacMillan, and Co. Ltd., 1964, pp. 383.
5 Keynes, cited in Allan Meltzer's Keynes's Monetary Theory; A Different Interpretation. 
Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 303.
 ̂Keynes, The General Theory, pp. 378.
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The decadent international but individualistic capitalism in the hands of 
which we found ourselves after the War, is not a success. It is not intelligent, it 
is not beautiful, it is not just, it is not virtuous -- and it doesn't deliver the 
goods.7
For evidence to support his claim that la issez-fa ire  capitalism "doesn't
deliver the goods," Keynes needed only to cite the cyclical boom-
b u s t/expansion-contraction nature of the capitalist business-cycle. Keynes
argued that excessive fluctuations in stock prices, triggered by the feverish
speculative urges and whims of private investors, caused the stock market
crash of 1929, culminating in the "Great" Depression of the 1930s. Keynes
recognized that the collapse of private investment in the 1930s had disrupted
capitalism's accumulation (i.e. savings-investment) process. Accordingly, if
capitalism was to be saved, then the critical accumulation process would have
to be reinvigorated. As Paul Sweezy contends, Keyne's radical insights into
how the capitalist system functions (and ultimately dysfunctions) led him to
propose a "sweeping reconsideration" of bourgeois economic theory:
For the first time the possibility was frankly faced, indeed placed at the very 
center of analysis, that breakdowns of the accumulation process, the heart and 
soul of economic growth, might be built into the system and non-self-correcting.
[Ijt was this feature of The General Theory which more than anything else 
marked it as a turning point in the development of bourgeois economic theory.
The stage was thus set for a sweeping reconsideration of the whole theory of 
investment.®
Keynes himself came to believe that he was writing, with The General
Theory, a truly "revolutionary" text. In a letter written to Bernard Shaw in
1935 (one year before The General Theory was published), Keynes remarked:
[Yjou have to know that 1 believe myself to be writing a book on economic 
theory which will largely revolutionize -  not, 1 suppose, at once but in the 
course of the next ten years -- the way the world thinks about economic 
problems. When my new theory has been duly assimilated and mixed with 
politics and feelings and passions, I can't predict what the final upshot will be
7 Keynes, cited in The Policy Consequences of lohn Maynard Keynes, pp. 31.
® Paul Sweezy, "Listen Keynesians!" The Policy Consequences of john Maynard Keynes, pp. 42.
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in its effect on action and affairs. But there will be a great change, and, in 
particular, the Ricardian foundations of Marxism will be knocked away.^
The one truly "revolutionary" aspect of Keynes's thought in T he
Cannerai Theory was his contention that the capitalist private economy is not
a self-equilibrating one; that is, supply does not always necessarily equal its
own demand that classical economists profess. In particular, Keynes argued
that left entirely to its own operational devices capitalism could not self-
correct for any deviation from full employment. In Keynes's "systemic," or
long-term view of capitalism in The General Theory, unemployment was
thought not to be caused by short-run imperfections in the m arket
mechanism. Rather, unem ploym ent was portrayed as an endemic, if
unfortunate, feature of a purely market-driven economy. Since the market
econom y is no t inheren tly  self-adjusting , Keynes advocated  an
interventionist policy of public spending on capital works projects for Britain
during the depths of the depression in order to artificially stimulate demand,
and thereby attem pt to reduce staggering unemployment rates. [Public
spending on capital works and other Keynesian counter-cyclical measures
designed to combat a downturn in the capitalist business-cycle would chiefly
distinguish the post-1945 from pre-war economic policy].
Keynes's deep distrust and ideological disdain for purely market-led
capitalist developm ent became his intellectual justification for a state
interventionist policy. Despite faulting capitalism at nearly every turn  -
particularly for inequality of wealth and chronic underemployment -  Keynes
nonetheless felt that there were some redeeming qualities in capitalism that
 ̂Keynes, cited on the back cover of MacMillan's 1964 reprinting of The General Theory.
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made it worth saving; that wisely managed, the capitalist system could be
made to work more efficiently and equitably:
I think that capitalism, wisely managed, can probably be made more efficient 
for attaining economic ends than any alternative system yet in sight, but that in 
itself is in many ways extremely objectionable. Our problem is to work out a 
social organization which shall be as efficient as possible without offending 
our notions of a satisfactory way of life.^^
Keynes leaves us little doubt that he much preferred "to substitute for the
operation of natural forces a scheme of collective planning."^^ But, while
Keynes entertained Bolshevik ideas of state [dirgiste] management, and, in
the concluding chapter of the General Theory even broadly advocates the
"com prehensive socialization of i n v e s t m e n t " ^ ^  i n  order to secure full
employment, in the end he was convinced that socialism held no "middle
course" between the doctrinal extremes of Fascism, Bolshevism and Free
Marketeerism:
The abuses of this epoch in the realms of government are Fascism on the one side 
and Bolshevism on the other. Socialism offers no middle course, because it also 
is sprung from the presuppositions of the era of abundance, just as much as 
laissez-faire  individualism and the free play of economic forces.13
Keynes thus abhorred Russia's experiment in Bolshevism equally as much as
he detested la issez-fa ire  capitalism.
In the General Theory Keynes gave his views on why and how the
state could and should rem edy the lack of capitalism 's regulatory
mechanisms. Keynes believed that capitalism 's more daunting social
problems could be redressed if the enormous productive capabilities of
capitalism could be tapped by the state and diverted (by an enlightened core of
111 Keynes, cited in Meltzer's Keynes's Monetary Theory: A Different Interpretation, pp. 39. 
Keynes, cited in The Policy Consequences of lohn Maynard Kevnes. pp. 33.
12 Keynes, 'fhe. General .Xheaiy.> pp. 378.
13 Keynes, cited in Keynes's Monetary Theory, pp. 253.
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altruissHi. ■’ate leaders) into achieving socially desirable welfare goals. In his
later years especially, Keynes became obsessed with the problem of raising
living standards through increased output. So far as Keynes was concerned,
the ultimate challenge for economists was to create a more equitable and
egalitarian capitalism.
While making a few sketchy references to counter-cyclical policy, the
general recommendation in the General Theory calls for state planning of
investment. Keynes favoured a state-managed monetary and investment
system which, in his mind, would reduce risk, economic uncertainty and
ignorance -  "the greatest economic evils of our time:"
Many of the greatest economic evils of our time are the fruits of risk, 
uncertainty and ignorance. It is because particular individuals, fortunate in 
situation or in abilities, are able to take advantage of uncertainty and 
ignorance, and also because for the same reason big business is often a lottery, 
that great inequalities of wealth come about; and these same factors are also 
the cause of unemployment of labour, or the disappointment of reasonable 
business expectations, and of the impairment of efficiency and production.!'^
Keynes believed that the intensity and frequency of economic contractions
(and therefore pervasive uncertainty in the private capitalist economy of the
time) could be reduced if the state intervened to stabilize and direct
investment. Keynes wrote expectantly in The General Theory that the "state,
which is in a position to calculate ... on long views ... the basis of the general
social advantage, [would] take an ever greater responsibility for directly
organizing investment."!^
Kejmes, '’ited in Ke>ngs!s.Monetary Theory, pp. 253. 
Keynes, Tlie General Theory, pp. 164.
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Keynesianism in Practice
There is little doubt that the American and British architects charged 
w ith planning for the post-W orld W ar II peace and international 
reconstruction were keenly anxious to avoid a return  to the inter-war 
experience. Consequently, immediate planning concerns centred on policy 
initiatives that would reduce risk and economic uncertainty in the 
international economy to a minimum, while at the same time increasing 
global output and global employment. Keynes's ideas for managing 
capitalism, designed on the premise that the state and international 
institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
should stabilize the macroeconomy and keep it running on an even keel, 
fitted the bill admirably.
With the traumas of the thirties and forties doubtlessly still in mind, 
even the most fervent and vigilante pro-market supporter felt politically and 
economically compelled to support Keynesianism’s interventionist full 
employment initiatives; putting people back to work was a compulsive 
concern for post-1945 capitalist planners and leaders. Thus, despite 
conservative protestation that Keynesian state planning was unnecessary, 
even "oppressive," it was politically indefensible to suggest a return to the 
kind of "decadent" capitalism which prevailed prior to the depression. As the 
historian Arnold Toynbee wrote of the early 1930s: "[Mjen and women all 
over the world were seriously contemplating and frankly discussing the 
possibility that the Western system of Society might break down and cease to 
w o r k . I t  was precisely the failures of capitalism during the 1930s which
16 Cited in The Mail Star. February 10,1992, pp. C l.
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ensured that Keynes’s ideas (however adulterated) would be adopted in the 
post-1945 se tting -K eynesian ism  would, in fact, save capitalism from itself.
Keynes liimself was aware that his proposals for managing capitalism’s 
affairs would mean some infringement on the individual liberties that 
classical econom ists and conservative ideologues alike dearly hold 
ideologically inviolable. However, as Allan Meltzer writes in K eynes'^ 
Monetary Theory: A Different Interpretation. Keynes also believed that,
personal freedom was compatible with the enlarged role o f  the state. [...]
Keynes believed that the power of the state would be checked by public 
criticism, elections, and elected officials serving as 'judges.' He was able to 
convince himself, and he tried to convince others, that the increase in living 
standards from state planning and direction of investment would more than 
compensate for the inefficiency and possible corruption that it would bring.^®
In retrospect, Keynes's belief that the interventionist state he proposed could
be intelligently, altruistically and efficiently run by a group of disinterested
"judges" was, of course, shamefully naive. Marx understood better than
Keynes that the capitalist state is merely an "executive" instrument through
which the bourgeoisie exercises and augments its class rule and material
wealth, Nevertheless, Keynes defended his proposals to increase the power of
the state in the economy on the grounds that it is "the only practicable means
of avoiding the destruction of existing economic forms in their e n t i r e t y . I n
Keynes's mind, the ends (saving capitalism) justified the means (state
interventionism ).
It is generally accepted, certainly among leftist political economists, that the failures of the 
capitalist economy during the 1930s were directly responsible for birthing national Fascist 
movements in Germany, Italy and Japan. Thus capitalism, not Fascism, was ultimately 
responsible for causing World War II.
18 Meltzer, Keynes's Monetary Theory, pp. 193.
1  ̂Keynes, The General Theory, pp. 380,
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However enviable in theory though, in practice, Keynesianism
deviated significantly from the unorthodox, even radical theoretical premises
Keynes had developed in The General Theory. As Robert Lekachman
correctly observes, the post-w ar in te rp re ta tio n  and subsequent
implementation of Keynes's ideas following his untimely death in 1946 often
left much to be desired:
Keynesians really are quite separable from Keynes. {TJhe textbook writers 
have 'bastardized' Keynes. Their Keynes turns out to be a rather mild fellow, 
willing to tinker with monetary and fiscal policy, the better to preserve 
capitalist arrangements with which he was for the most part content.2^
Paul Sweezy in "Listen Keynesians!" further takes up Lekachman's
argument, asserting that the orthodox interpretation of Keynes "bastardized"
The General Theory "to the point of turning Keynesianism into a cure-all for
the capitalist business cycle." In the post-war bowdlerized version of
Keynesianism, Sweezy contends, "Keynes's great achievement was seen not
as a highly original contribution to the understanding of capitalism's basic
m o d u s  operendi but as the invention of a set of clever recipes to counteract
the ups and downs of the business cycle."21
As both Lekachman and Sweezy suggest, Keynes himself was much
more "radical" than his Anglo-American disciples dared ever to be. One
commentator on Keynes even goes so far as to suggest that,
the failure of Keynesianism, indeed the contribution of Keynesiani.sm to its own 
demise, derived from a failure to elucidate the truly radical theoretical 
propositions implicit in Keynes’s analysis. If this had been done, then 
Keynesianism could not have become a quasi-free-rnarket doctrine. Instead, it
20 Robert Lekachman, "The Radical Keynes," The Policy Consequences of lohn Maynard 
Keynes, pp. 30.
21 Paul Sweezy, "Listen Keynesians,!" pp. 43.
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would have clashed directly with the interests vested in free markets and free 
trade, It is not Keynes that has failed but K e y n e s i a n i s m , ^2
The Crisis of Keynesianism
From the very beginning. Keynesianism's full employment fortunes 
were inextricably tied to, and premised on, an expanding global economy. 
Guaranteed by the supremacy of the United States, the post-war period, at 
least up to the early 1970s, was one unrivalled in capitalism's history in terms 
of global economic prosperity, political stability and industrial expansion. As 
Desmond King contends, the strong productivity gains of the post-war period 
allowed for economic growth to occur, which in tu rn  perm itted social 
consensus, Keynesian interventionism and full employment policies, as well 
as the "assumption by the state of responsibility for welfare, social security 
and education provisions, or what is frequently termed the 'social wage.'"23 
To crudely summarize the post-war period up to the mid-1970s, then, an 
expanding global economy generated productivity gains on the supply-side 
which, in turn, permitted expansionary Keynesian policies on the demand- 
side.
All of this post-war economic prosperity and social "peace" came to a 
dramatic halt, however, in the early 1970s when the rate of global output 
began to precipitously decline and Keynesian policy began to fail. [See Figure I, 
next page]
22 John Eatwell, "Keynes, Keynesians, and British Economic Policy," The Policy Consequences 
of lohn Maynard Keynes, pp. 75,
23 Desmond King, "Economic Crisis and Welfare State Commodification; A Comparative 
Analysis of the United States and Britain," Capitalist Developm ent and Crisis Theory: 
Accumulation, Regulation and Spatial Restructuring. M. Gottdiener and N. Komminos (eds.). 
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989, pp. 242.
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Figure I.
Average Annual Growth Rate of World Output, by Region: 1960-1990
1961-73 19ZfcSP 1981-90
---------------------- annual percent change..........................
World Output 5.5 3.6 3.0
Developed Market Economies 5.0 2.5 2.7
United States 4.0 2.2 2.6
Western Europe 4.8 2.4 2.8
Japan 9.8 3.8 3.8
Eastern Europe and USSR 6.6 4.6 2.6
Developing Countries 6.3 5.1 3.1
Source: United Nations, World Economic Survey 1990. New York, pp. 13.
As the world economic crisis -  reflected in declining productivity -  become
more generalized and deeper in the industrialized world, Keynesian policy
lost much of its credibility, reliability and potency. Keynesianism's failures in
the 1970s prompted many radical scholars to charge that the full employment
perspective operated only as long as economic prosperity and industrial
expansion allowed. Following this line of thought, Andre Gunder Frank
argues that, as the world economy began to contract. Keynesianism became a
hopelessly bankrupt dc .sion:
The Keynesians claimed that they had figured out a way to eliminate economic 
crisis and recessions forever through the use of Keynesian policy. They claimed 
that prosperity is the result of very good theory and their very wise policies. 
Ironically, the evidence suggests just the opposite: first of all, Keynesian policy 
did not work during the 1930s. It was not Keynesian policy that got us out of the 
Depression; it was World War II. Keynesian policy worked while there was 
prosperity and an expansion [i.e., 1945-1967]. Keynesian policy ceased to work 
when the new crisis emerged in the mid-1960s and particularly the 1970s, when 
Keynesianism became completely bankrupt. So it is just the other way around.
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Prosperity was the cause of success of Keynesianism, and not Keynesianism the
cause of the success of prosperity.
Whatever the cause for, or lack thereof, of Keynesianism's post-1945 
success one thing is certain: the public appeal of Keynesian policies began to 
decline precipitously from the mid-1970s onward, precisely when inflation 
became more generally widespread, higher and much more durable than 
previously experienced. In the 1970s, a crippling combination of spiralling 
inflation and persistent high unemployment -  "stagflation"- consistently 
rendered orthodox Keynesian counter-cyclical responses im potent. 
Expansionary Keynesian fiscal and monetary "fixes" proved to be thoroughly 
incapable of over-coming the contradictions of a non-expanding world 
economy. Classical Keynesian dem and m anagem ent strategies for 
reinvigorating the m acroeconom y, includ ing  "pum p-prim ing" and 
increasing government expenditures, only managed to amass huge public 
deficits throughout the 1970s. Yet even as governments everywhere were 
piling up these hugr* debts, unemployment and inflation continued to hit 
new unheard of extremes. As a consequence of declining productivity, the 
Keynesian welfare state found it increasingly difficult to fulfill the terms of its 
own social contract. In a contracting global economy. Keynesianism thus 
became an increasingly "costly" and hapless enterprize. The Keynesian 
consensus began to break down. One consequence of the failure of Keynesian 
policy in the 1970s was that it opened the door for the launching of the 
"counter-revolution's" offensive against Keynesianism,
Andre Gunder Frank, "Political Ironies in the World Economy,", 
the World-System. Terry Boswell and Albert Bergesen (eds.), New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1 9 8 7 ,  p p .  4 0 .
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II, The Anti-Keynesian "Counter-Revolution" in Bourgeois Economic Theory
Keynes may still be beloved among premiers and journalists who took economics 
101 in 1962 and have considered themselves authorities ever since, but we 
presume that we have more up-to-date advice. [Globe and Mall] 25
The struggle for intellectual and moral hegemony, as Gramsci
perceived it, is fundamentally an ideological struggle in which the superiority
of one dom inant group's intellectuals ultimately prevails over all other
political challengers. The dialectical quality of Gramscian political economy
asserts that intellectuals are not a social group independent of class. Rather,
they are firmly rooted in the social order. Gramsci contends that as each class
develops it generates jobs for intellectuals who are recruited from, and
therefore "organically" tied to, that class. Not only do these "organic
intellectuals" provide the necessary defense for class rule, but they must also
provide members of the ruling class with self-awareness. In so doing, organic
bourgeois intellectuals help the bourgeois class augment its material, and
hence, political power.
Gramsci further argued that the organic intellectuals of the aspiring
hegemonic class m ust first confront and trium ph ideologically over
"traditional intellectuals," who are recruited from an older dominant class,
and who still exercise some degree of intellectual influence over the entire
population. Hence, "one of the most important characteristics of any group
that is developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to
conquer 'ideologically' the traditional intellectuals."^^ In other words, any
25 Globe and Mail. Febfuafv 12,1992, pp. A12.
26 Gramsci, "The Intellectuals," pp. 10. Gramsci identified"traditionai intellectuals" in early 
twentieth century Italy as "men of letters," which included, clerics, humanists, lawyers, 
authors, and so forth.
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social group aspiring towards Gramscian hegemony must first neutralize its 
political opponents; it must win the all-important "battle of the ideas."
With these insights in mind, this section details, in Gramscian terms, 
the rise to dominance of an intellectual "counter-revolutionary" movement 
opposed to the prevailing Keynesian orthodoxy, Following Gramsci, I argue 
that the pro-market ideas of the counter-revolution's "organic intellectuals" 
gathered a strong political following in the 1970s, a decade characterized by 
chronic global economic and political dislocation. By the early 1980s, the 
"supply-side" ideas of the "new economists" had prevailed over those of the 
"traditional" demand-oriented Keynesians, as witnessed by the coming to 
political power of monetarism's "new right." The conservative political and 
social forces encapsulated under the new right banner are presently 
transforming the very nature and content of capitalist hegemony at the global 
level along pro-market/anti-Keynesian lines.
The Rise of the Anti-Keynesian Intelligentsia
The anti-Keynesian (or monetarist) "counter-revolution" in bourgeois 
economic theory began in the early 1970s when a small body of loosely 
integrated intellectuals, mainly from Britain and the United States, set out to 
create a systematic and coherent body of economic thought opposed to the 
prevailing Keynesian orthodoxy. Whilst, at first, mainly consisting of 
disgruntled economists professionally alienated from their peers, the 
intellectual movement against Keynesianism gained considerable world-wide 
momentum, especially from the mid-1970s onward, when Keynesian 
counter-cyclical policies were widely acknowledged to be failing to
60
reinvigorate a contracting world economy. In Restructuring the World
Economy, the author, Joyce Kolko argues that anti-Keynesian
view s and 'supply-side' concepts emerged ... forcefully (in the 1970s] ... as 
economists noted that Keynes's ideas were inadequate for dealing with the 
current problem, particularly with inflation. [...] High inflation and the 
persistent crisis allowed the monetarists in the universities to supersede the 
Keynesians as advisors to the men of power.27
As Kolko notes, by the mid-1970s inflation had proven irretractable to
traditional Keynesian methods. As a consequence, the ideas of a small, but
extremely aggressive group of anti-Keynesian economists became highly
influential.^®
The early efforts of the counter-revolutionaries focused almost
exclusively on publicly defaming Keynes and Keynesian policy. Public
statements, such as this one from the economist Norman Ture, were typical:
The influence of Keynesianism on public policy has been regrettable. Public 
policies have misidentified the barrier to economic progress as inadequate or 
misdirected aggregate demand. (...) The pursuit of these [Keynesian] polices has 
been associated with an ever-increasing presence of government in the economy, 
a presence that far more often than not has masked or distorted market signals 
and impaired market functions. ^9
In fact, blaming Keynes and his followers for causing high rates of inflation
and distorting market "signals" became the unceasing keynote address of the
early anti-Keynesian intellectual movement. In the invective of Friedrich
Hayek, one extremely vocal anti-Keynesian crusader of the time:
Joyce Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy. Toronto: Random House, Inc., 1988, pp. 32.
28 It is important to note in passing that the anti-Keynesian discourse found some limited 
political support following the OPEC oil "shock" of 1973 when the price of oil quadrupled 
overnight. Almost as quickly as the price of oil shot up, leaders in the West emerged to 
identify inflation as "public enemy number one." With the ensuing "wars on inflation " which 
prevailed during the rest of the 1970s, the ideas of the "new" economists were at least ensured a 
sympathetic political ear.
29 Norman B. Ture, "Keynes's Influence on Public Policy; A Conservative's View," 
Consequences of lohn Maynard Keynes, pp. 52.
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[T]he responsibility for current world-wide inflation, ... rests wholly and 
squarely with the economists ... who have embraced the teachings of Lord 
Keynes, What we are experiencing are simply the consequences of Lord Keynes.
It was on the advice and even urging of his pupils that governments everywhere 
have financed increasing parts of their expenditure by creating money on a scale 
which every reputable economist before Keynes would have predicted would 
cause precisely the sort of inflation we have got.^^
Thus, in the view of the anti-Keynesians', "endeavours to prolong the [post­
war] prosperity and to secure [Keynesian] full employment by means of the 
expansion of money and credit, in the end created a world-wide inflationary 
development.
As for correcting the inflationary problems which following Keynes's 
"teachings" for forty years have inevitably  caused, the counter­
revolutionaries contend that the world has been forced into a regrettable, but 
necessary, period of extremely painful disinflation involving monetary and 
fiscal contraction, austerity and high unemployment. Hayek, for instance, 
maintains without regret that, "we m ust face the fact that in the present 
situation merely to stop inflation or even to slow down its rate will produce 
substantial unemployment."32 Since the counter-revolutionaries believe that 
"inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon,"33 they would 
have us believe that today's most pressing economic problems -  i.e., 
unemployment, inflation, price and currency volatility, etc. -  can only be 
solved through fiscal and monetary policies that tightly restrict demand. 
Thus, the "problem" identified by Keynes and his disciples -  namely that of 
demand insufficiency -  is now argued by the anti-Keynesians to be the
3^ Friedrich von Hayek, N ew Studies In Philosophy. Politics. Economics and the_History of 
Ideas, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985, pp. 192.
31 Ibid., pp. 131.
32 Ibid., pp. 193.
33 Milton Friedman, "Tlie Counter-Revolution in Monetary Theory," London: The Institute of 
Economic Affairs Occasional Paper Series #33,1970, pp. 24.
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problem! In their opinion, there is simply too much dem and in the 
economy. Hence, inflation's "vicious circle can be broken only by people 
contenting themselves with a somewhat lower real buying power than that 
which they have been vainly chasing for so long. "3̂  Incredulously, in the 
counsel of Hayek and others of his ilk, government authorities are advised to 
contract economic activity in order to control inflation.
But it was not just "Keynesian inflation" that the monetarist counter­
revolution singled out for attack. Counter-revolutionary economists like 
Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, for instance, took specific offense to 
Keynes's argum ents that the depression of the 1930s was caused by 
unregulated m arket forces, that private free-enterprize capitalism  is 
inherently unstable and that, therefore, government had to intervene to keep 
things on an even keel. In the historical revisionism of these intellectuals, 
governm ent overinvolvem ent in  the m arketplace, not the m arket 
mechanism per se , can be held responsible for causing the Great Depression. 
The contemporary lesson to be drawn is simple: government should get out 
of the marketplace and leave the running of the economy to little 
understood, but widely held to be, "magical" market forces.
The Classical Intellectual Roots of the Counter-Revolution
In terms of originality, there is precious little that is "new" in the 
thinking of the counter-revolutionary's anti-Keynesian discourse. In fact, 
most of the ideas of contemporary organic intellectuals trace their intellectual 
roots back to the thinking of early nineteenth century British classical 
"liberal" economists and moral political philosophers. A particularly
Hayek, New Studies, pp. 195.
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fashionable classical economist now in vogue in rightist intellectual circles is 
Adam Smith, whose seminal political economy of Britain entitled An Inquiry 
Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, was first published in 
1776. Arguably, no other classical text has been more used -  or abused -  in 
the intellectual defense of the new right political economy perspective than 
Smith's Wealth of Nations.
It is precisely the popular perceptions of Adam Smith and other 
nineteenth century British "liberals" which the counter-revolutionary's 
intellectuals have selectively resurrected, corrupted and drawn together in 
asserting the intellectual justification of the moral and ethical superiority of 
free market capitalism over the Keynesian regulated variety. While the 
corruption of Adam Smith's ideas can only be hinted at here, suffice it to say 
that at the hands of contemporary economists like Hayek and Friedman, 
Smith's fairly complex and moral political economy has been reduced to a 
few catch phrases totally devoid of any of Smith's ethical considerations. To 
be certain, some of the "new economics" terminology is certainly a legacy of 
Adam Smith. Laissez-faire  , "division of labour," "comparative advantage," 
"invisible hand," etc., are all concepts that can be found elaborated in Smith's 
Wealth of Nations. However, it is a very crude and arbitrary representation 
of Smith's nuanced views that the counter-revolutionary discourse has 
selected for public perusal and consum ption. For instance, today 's 
economists selectively ignore the fact that Smith dismissed outright the idea 
of a completely free-trade regime as something of an utopianist dream. 
Smith believed that free trade would be a dangerous economic policy for 
Britain, since neither British "commerce" (Smith's term for capitalism) nor 
the British people were socially prepared to embrace its principles. Far from
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calling upon government to abdicate all its regulatory powers (the message
that the counter-revolution likes to emphasize). Smith actually  protested
against the position of the free-traders:
To expect,... that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great 
Britain, is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be 
established in it. [T]he prejudices of the public, [and] what is much more 
unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals, irresistible oppose
it.35
Thus, as Richard Teichgraeber points out, Smith believed that whatever
la is s e z - fa ir e 's  considerable intellectual merits, it "ran far ahead of actual
social development in eighteenth-century Europe."^^ It is quite likely that we
today still are not socially prepared to embrace "freedom of trade."
Nevertheless, the chief message that influential economists tirelessly
propagate from Smith is this: in a free market order, the unrestrained pursuit
of individual economic gain ensures, through the mystical functions of the
"invisible hand," the greatest societal benefit. The passage from the W ealth
of Nations which chief economists at the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund ceaselessly recite -  and dogmatically implement -  reads:
[Ejvery Individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the 
society as great as he can. He generally, ... neither intends to promote the 
public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. (...] [Indeed] he intends 
only his own security;... he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in 
many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part 
of his intention. [...] By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of 
the society more effectually tfian when he really intends to promote it.^^
Individualist theorists of market-led development believe that self-interest
(ie. possessive individualism) is the un iversa l driving force motivating all
hum an activity. They also contend that the competitive structure of the
35 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Natures and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Richard 
Teichgraeber (ed.). New York; Random House, Inc., 1985, pp. 241.
36 Ibid., pp. xxxix.
37 Ibid., pp. 225.
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market provides the most socially efficient and harmonious means yet 
available to hum ankind for harnessing the dynam ics of egoistic 
accumulation. In this view, "the market provides a unique mechanism 
through which individuals, in pursuing their own ends, ... create wealth 
which benefits society in general as well as themselves in particular."38 Thus, 
if only individuals would submit themselves to be guided by so-called abstract 
"market signals," rather than the heavy hand of the state, the argument runs, 
society v.muld be better served. Because government intervention in the 
economy "distorts” or "masks" market signals that would otherwise prevail 
in a free-market economy, in order to restore the competitive arrangement 
(ie. "get prices right") government should get out of the marketplace. In 
other words, the ideas of Keynes and the practice of Keynesianism must 
perish. The political economic offensive of the new right is trying to ensure 
just that.
III. Tlie Political Economy of the New Right
"... the planet lurches rightward as ideologies engage." [Bruce Cockburn]
Gramscian political economy asserts that ideas are capable of becoming
materialist forces. Yet Gramsci was not naive enough to believe that ideas
alone, no matter how revolutionary, would ever fundamentally change the
world. For Gramsci, intellectuals were mere pedants if their ideas were not
"dial tically" connected to the "laws" of historical materialism:
The intellectual's error consists in believing that one can know without 
understanding and even more without feeling and being impassioned... [But] the 
intellectual can [not] be an intellectual ... if  distinct and separate Àom the
Ben Crow et. al., Survival and Change in the Third World. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1988, pp. 73.
Bruce Cockburn, from the song, "The Trouble With Normal,"
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people-nation, that is, without feeling the elementary passions of the people,
I nderstanding them in the particular historical situation and connecting them 
talectically to the laws of history and to a superior conception of the world...
3]ne cannot make politks-history without passion, without the sentimental 
connection between intellectuals and people-nation. In the afisence of such a 
nexus the relations between the intellectual and the people-nation are, or are 
reduced to, relationships of purely bureaucratic and formal order; the 
intellectuals become a caste... [I]f the relationship between intellectuals and 
people-nation, between the leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled, is 
provided by an organic cohesion  in which fecling-passion  becom es 
understanding and thence knowledge ... then and only then is the relationship 
one of representation. Only then can there take place an exchange of individual 
elements between the rulers and ruled, leaders and led, and can the shared life 
be realized which alone is a social force -  with the creation of the historical 
bloc."^  ̂ [emphasis added]
Gramsci understood that in the process of constructing a historical bloc there
must be an "organic" or intrinsic union between theory and political praxis -
i.e., between intellectuals and politicians. In a hegemonic bloc, r 'unomic and
political social forces mutually interact and naturally reinforce one another.
However, since these social forces are constantly evolving within dynamic
historical materialist param eters, the support of organic intellectuals is
enlisted to create a cohesive ideological link between the social bloc's political
and economic structures.
In the case of the political economy of the new right, anti-Keynesian
intellectuals have provided the theoretical coherence and ideological defense
necessary for the political right's project of restructuring capitalist hegemony
along pro-market lines. The counter-revolutionary's revival and refinement
of classical economic theory have resulted in the the demise of Keynesianism
and the dominance of monetarism. While it is ironic that classical economic
principles once discredited by Keynes are currently reinstated with a renewed
vengeance by the political right, it is nonetheless indicative of Gramsci's
assertion that the intellectual's development of theory and ideas tends to
Gramsci, ' Problems of Marxism," pp. 418.
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complement and reinforce the changing balance of political and economic 
forces. In the current conjuncture, classical free-market ideas and principles 
have once again become new pow erful m aterial forces capable of 
restructuring the global economy.
The Rise of the New Right
A number of factors conspired in the 1970s and early 80s to bring the
new right to political power. Patricia Marchak in The Integrated Circus: The
New Right and Restructuring of Global Markets, advances the thesis that;
... the new right captured a post-hegemonic global economy in which the 
particular forms of mass production advanced in the steel age were in decline 
and the new technologies were not fully implemented. It captured a time at 
which an elite of the dominant corporate world was consciously striving to 
reorganize production, the labour force, and Its own relationships to nation­
state governments.^^
In Marchak's view, the rise of the new right can be explained by four critical 
conjunctures affecting the contemporary global political economy. These four 
specific conjunctures include: i) the relative decline of American supremacy; 
ii) the rise of Japan and a united Europe; iii) the introduction of revolutionary 
and cost-cutting technologies in the production process and iv) the increa. 
mobility of international, especially financial, capital,
Marchak's concern in The Integrated Circus is not so much with how 
the new right was able to "capture" a "post-[US] hegemonic" global political 
economy. Rather, her concern -  and ultimately her thesis -  relies on 
illustrating the crucial link between the timing of the rise of the new right 
and the materialist forces it unleashed. In Marchak's view, the new right has 
"provided the ideological basis for a massive restructuring of industry and
Patricia Marchak, The Integrated Circus: The New Right and the Restructuring of Global 
Markets. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991, pp. 111.
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labour in all countries, and it provided the rationale for the dismantling of
the Keynesian welfare state in the industrialized countries." *- Hence, "what
matters about the new right is that it emerged as a social movement when it
did, [and] that its umbrella provided the protection for a swift restructuring of
the economies and governments of industrial countries."-*^
Important as Marchak's political economy insights are in explaining
the rise of the new right, it is also imperative to note that rightist political
forces and free-market ideas gained legitimacy in a global political economy
characterized by intensive North-South, East-West and intra-capitalist
conflict. In particular, the inability of the United States to lead the non-
Communist world following American military defeat in Vietnam caused
the floodgates of world social unrest to open, leading to a cascade of
potentially threatening counter-hegem onic attacks against capitalism
throughout the 1970s. The OPEC oil and Watergate "shocks," in addition to
the South's call for a redistribution of global wealth -  the New International
Economic Order in the mid-1970s -  to be followed in close sequence by more
American humiliations in the late 1970s including; Iran (hostage crisis);
Afghanistan (Soviet invasion); and Nicaragua (Sandinista revolution); drove
a strong message home to capitalism's leaders of the time that the v/orld was
rapidly spiraling out of their control. As the Marxist scholar Giovanni
Arrighi argues, a hostile socio-political em 'ironm ent invariably creates its
own demand for social order, conformity and discipline. Thus, as
systemic chaos increases, the demand for 'order' -- the old order, a new order -- 
tends to become more and more general among rulers or among subjects or among 
both. Whichever [social group) is in a position to satisfy this system-wide
'^^Patricia Marchak, The Integrated Circus, pp. 253. 
43lbid., pp. 103.
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demand [for order] is thus presented with the opportunity of becoming
heg em o n ic .^
It is precisely that instinctive urge for systemic order identified by Arrighi 
which the ultra-conservative wing of the new right movement during the 
70s and early 80s insidiously manipulated in order to further its own political, 
class, moral, cultural, and in some instances, religious interests. To pu t it 
simply, the coalition of rightist forces collected under the new right banner 
was able to recognize, as well as meet, a system-wide demand for order. The 
populist moral appeal of fundamental conservative values and traditions 
centring on the family, religion and state, is thus a crucial determinant in 
helping us explain and understand the reason how the new right was able to 
capture a global political economy in crisis. Thus characterized, Gramsci's 
insights into the role political culture, ideas and ideological structures play in 
re-establishing bourgeois social and political control in and through a crisis of 
hegemony are absolutely essential.
The "Organic'* Ideologies of the New Right
The new right's economic philosophy and political praxis blends a 
seemingly paradoxical mix of neo-libertarian and neo-authoritarian  
tendencies. Inspired by the classical economic thought of Adam Smith in 
particular, and nineteenth century British liberalism more generally, new 
right economists are persuasive advocates of the economic and ethical 
superiority of free markets over collectivist government control. Pro-market 
neo-classcial economists publicly proclaim the moral virtues of possessive 
individualism, freedom of choice, market security, la is sez - fa ire  capitalism 
and minimalist goveriunent. In the political economy of the new right, these
Giovanni Arrighi, "The Three Hegemonies of Historical Capitalism," pp. 369.
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neo-classical (or neo-liberal) economic principles and ideas are organically 
integrated with the populist politics of neo-conservatism. Neo-conservative 
politics emphasize social authoritarianism , disciplined society, hierarchy, 
patriarchy, duty, and subordination to the nation-state. Thus, the new right 
political economy combines political doctrines of social collective conformity 
and authoritarianism (neo-conservatism) with neo-classical economics (neo­
liberalism).
To hold this unsettling political economy alliance of social forces
together requires the indeterminable support of the new right's intelligentsia.
As Alan Swingewood points out, the task of the new right’s organic
intellectuals has been to fuse classical economic theory with the radical
adversarial politics of neo-conservatism. Thus,
... for the ideas of the new right to become effective required a mode of popular 
legitimation, the active consent of the masses, [and] the construction of a 
political populism. Conservatism has now been cast into a new mold in which 
ideas become material forces as they seize hold o f subordinate strata. Thus the 
task of the new Conservative intellectuals ... is nothing less than the 
construction of a totalizing theory of relevance to the study of politics, history, 
architecture, m orality, socio logy  [and, may w e add, developm ent 
economjcs?].'^^
W hile an unsettling political economy alliance, the new right has 
nonetheless proven that neo-classical tenets of la issez-fa ire  capitalism and 
"traditional" conservative [read patriarchal] family and religious mores are 
inextricably connected, naturally sustaining and mutually reinforcing. In the 
American context, the ultra-conservative politician Jesse Helms vehemently 
asserts:
"̂ 5 Alan Swingewood, "Intellectuals and the Construction of Consensus in Postwar England," 
Intellectuals in Liberal Democracies: Political Influence and Social Invulvemenl, Alain Ci. 
Gagnon (ed.). New York; Praeger Publishers, 1987, pp. 98.
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[ü]ur first priority in holding back the waves of statism that threaten to engulf 
us all must be to renew the honor and dignity and prestige of the family. The 
family has prior right to that of any government. Almighty God is the author 
of the family and the Lord Jesus Himself grew up subject to his human 
household,
Amen, Jesse!
The new right is clear that free market rules and morals guiding 
capitalist accumulation are for the world of the economy and men only; in 
the household subordination to God, the nation and [white] male authority 
prevails:
The parts of classic liberalism they [the new right] approve are for men, not 
women. They think that the family should be run by men according to custom...
[...] They fear that the very kind of selfish individualism and instrumentality 
that they admire in the economy will invade the family, sexual relations, and 
all situations of warmth and comfort... [T]hey want to recapture an idealized  
family of the past, exalting the virtues of individualism  for men in  the 
marketplace.'^^ [emphasis added]
Thus, the new right is pro-market and pro-[nuclear] family. However, neo­
liberal individualism is deemed suitable for males only; restrictions on 
women to freely choose abortion are routinely denied. Freedom only goes so 
far with the new right.
The apparent libertarian-authoritarian contradictions pervasive in the 
new right political economy can be reconciled so long as the political system 
continues to deteriorate and the "new politics" of apathy, cynicism and 
disaffection inspired by the new right prevail. For example, while Thatcher’s 
social austerity and retrenchment policies were designed to sever the state 
from its traditional welfare providing role, as an  organic ideology 
"Thatcherism" could be defended by appealing to popular nationalist 
sentiments within British political culture. So despite contracting the welfare
It'sse Helms, cited in Allen Hunter, "The Ideology of the New Right,"
Sector: A Reader, Martha Cameron (ed.). New York: Monthly Review Press, pp. 318. 
*̂ 7 Ibid,, pp. 327.
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State, Thatcher managed to exude a popular image that she was making the 
British state stronger, The immensely popular Falklands "war" demonstrated 
to Britons and the world that she would not be pushed around; British values 
and extra-territorial "rights" would not be compromised. Mythically, her 
outwardly public "Iron Lady" demeanour personified the popular aspirations 
of "common" British folk. Mrs. Thatcher in fact became a metaphor for the 
nation. Her ideological abhorrence to anything "continental" and the 
"Europe 1992" enterprize, while ultimately costing her job as prime minister, 
nevertheless appealed to deeply embedded currents of isolationist thought 
within British political culture. On another level, Thatcher's much-touted 
provincialism and middle-class roots (Thatcher is the daughter of a milk 
man), in a perverse way closely parallels the physical embodiment of 
Gramsci's "new" intellectual, whose political practices would be firmly 
grounded in the practical real-world experiences and struggle of everyday life; 
"the mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, 
... but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, organizer, 
'perm anent persuader.'"4® From a Gramscian perspective, Thatcher, like 
Reagan, is an organic "intellectual."
The Moral Crusade of the New Right
While much has been written, in the Marxist tradition especially, about 
the new right's economic and political "revolutions," very little critical 
attention has focused on Gramsci's "ethico-political" or moral sphere. 
Indeed, too much political economy writing either marginalizes a n d /o r  
ignores the spheres of ideology and culture, while over-determining the
Gramsci, "The Intellectuals," pp. 10.
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economic in explanations of socio-historical change. However, from a 
Gramscian view-point, the new right is as much an attempt to craft a new 
moral political-cultural order as it is an attem pt to create a new type of 
political economy. As first generation spiritual guides of the new right 
movement, for example, both Thatcher and Reagan vigorously promoted a 
very specific moral vision of national and international society. For his part 
in the movement, Reagan's rhetorical railings against the "oppressiveness of 
bigness," especially big government and big labour (but not big military), and 
the "excesses of democracy" -  i.e., civil rights, welfare, tolerance — were 
relatively successful in drawing the middle [white male working] classes of 
America together in alliance against the extremes from above (bloated 
bureaucracies, unions, etc.) and from below (the poor, welfare recipients, the 
indolent, blacks and other m inorities, etc.). The rhetorical appeal to 
fundam ental conservative values, free-m arkets, and anti-com m unist 
sentiments sounded particularly responsive chords in middle-class America. 
The white middling-classes welcomed a leader who would finally champion 
the cause of the so-called "little guy," but who was also big and strong enough 
to stand up and do America proud in the insidious battle against the Soviet 
"evil empire." They supported Reagan's inane, and by all accounts, 
unattainable, "star wars" initiative on the mythic belief that it is America's 
historical mission to destroy the world communist movement, and therefore 
save the world from itself. During Reagan's first term in office, a "second 
cold war" was vigourously reinstated. Ludicrous "domino theories" were re­
contrived by the boys in the Pentagon; only this time the target was Central 
America. If Nicaragua was allowed to remain communist, so the theory this 
time went, then the whole region was imperiled by the communist scourge.
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In step with the political mood in Washington, popular Hollywood 
movies like "Red Dawn" and "Rambo" reinforced America's legitimizing 
myths by constantly portraying dom inant themes in American culture 
including its secular ideology (competitive individualism), civil religion 
(Judeo-Christianity) and technological superiority (particularly in high-tech 
weaponry) as man's, God's and capitalism's ways, respectively. Young, white, 
upwardly mobile professionals and republicans alike felt proud -  instead of 
guilty — about instilling a new culture of greed, individualism and rampant 
consumerism.
In short, the new right "morality" in America was [is] a conscious
attempt to remobilize powerful elements within American political culture,
and therefore contribute to an internal revitalization of American hegemony
in the Gramscian sense:
[Tjhe virtues of the market, of rugged individualism and the capacity of 
Americans to use their skills and vitality to reach and to expand the 'highest 
frontiers' of technological developm ent... contributed to attempts to reconstruct 
belief in 'American exceptionalism. '49
But, of course, the internal politico-cultural revitalization of American
hegemony is subject to the objective constraints and potentialities prevailing
in the larger global political economy complex. In relative terms, America's
position in the world economy is eroding and questions are beginning to be
raised about America's legitimizing beliefs:
Among the difficulties with America's secular legitimating myths is the fact 
that these myths depend on a certain degree of supremacy in the world. 
Particularly the pragmatic 'rich-is-right' ideology works only if America can 
continue to dramatize its wealth and power relative to all other nations in the 
world community. The capacity to maintain the degree of supremacy has by all 
indications eroded seriously in the decades since World War II. (...) Gone is the
49 Stephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political Economy; Perspectives. Problems and 
Practices. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988, pp. 349.
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confidence that America can shape the world in its own design. Gone too is the 
certainty that America can achieve everything it desires within its own  
borders, And underneath these uncertainties questions have begun to be raised 
about the myths which U.S, hegemony in the world has been legitimized.^*^
Even America, then, is not immune to the forces prevailing in the global 
economy.
The Global Economy and the New Right
The rise of the new right, perhaps more than any other single factor, is
a response to the rising power and interests of international capital in the
global political economy. Increasingly, the progressive internationalization of
production and global integration of financial markets [to be discussed in
greater detail in Chapter Four] dictate that states must adjust their domestic
policies to the exigencies of the world marketplace. In practice, the domestic
"adjustment" process means subordinating national regulations to the rules
and norms prevailing in a highly integrated global economy. As Philip
McMichael and David Myhre argue, the changing nature of international
production is irrevocably transforming not only the form of the state, but the
very nature of the state system itself:
[Tjhe transformation of the nation-state and the state system [is] a response to 
the current crisis of global economy. [T]he transformation expresses a new phase 
in the political development of capital. Capital is overcoming the constraints 
of national economic organization, subordinating it to global commodity 
markets (in producer and consumer goods, money, and sometimes labour) that 
cross national boundaries. The historical foundations of the nation-state ... are 
eroding. One consequence is the emerging 'transnational-state,' in which 
domestic social and political relations are increasingly shaped by global 
capital circuits.^^
Robert Wuthnow, "America's Legitimating Myths: Continuity and Crisis," A m erica's 
Changing Role in the World-System. pp. 240.
Philip Me Michael and David Myhre, "Global Regulation vs. the Nation-State: Agro-Food 
Systems and the New Politics of Capital," Review of Radical Political Economics. 22:1, (Spring 
1990), pp. 59.
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The progressive "transnationalization" of the global economy has 
demanded that capitalist leaders redeploy the powers of the nation-state and 
national economy on an international scale in order to secure market share, 
and thereby ensure that the state is globally competitive v is-a -v is  other states. 
Thus, in the fierce battle to secure investment opportunities and /o r maintain 
a competitive edge in a more diversified and integrated but leaner and 
m eaner business environm ent, states are com pelled, especially in 
recessionary periods, to provide capital with the most lucrative business 
climate possible. Among other measures, these investm ent incentives 
frequently entail capital gains tax breaks, covering start-up and relocation 
costs, ensuring a low cost and docile labour force, subsidies, and pollution 
breaks. In this manner, the "transnational-state" which the new right has 
engineered, effectively enhances what Stephen Gill and David Law refer to as 
the "structural power of international capital," so much so in fact that Gill 
and Law claim that, the "dialectical balance betw een 'national' and 
'transnational' forces appears to have tilted in favour of the latter."‘'’2 Even 
the more rhetorically "nationalist" new right regimes, such as the United 
States under Reagan and Great Britain under Thatcher, have in fact enhanced 
the power of international capital relative to national capital and organized 
labour by privatizing and /o r deregulating key national industries, especially 
in banking. (For her part, Thatcher denounced national industries as 
"socialist.") Thus, in the words of Manfred Bienefeld, the "transnational- 
state" has become the "executive com m ittee for the facilitation of
52 Stephen Gill and David Law, "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital," 
International Studies Quarterly. 33:4, (December 1989), pp. 493.
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international capital/ as the state plays an intermediary brokering role 
between international capital and labour.
Leading this emerging "transnational-state," of course, is the new right. 
The creation of this type of "hyper-liberal" state (and state system) has 
demanded the dismantling of national barriers to investment and trade. In 
practice, dism antling national trade and investm ent barriers means 
dismantling the national welfare state and reinstating a self-regulating 
market order over a Keynesian regulated one. In practice, it means that 
people must submit themselves for "adjustment" to the market, not vice- 
versa. It means disciplinarian neo-liberalism.
The New Right's Attack on the Welfare State
In general, neo-conservative politicians and neo-liberal economic 
policy favour initiatives that would substantially reduce both the size and 
scope of government involvement in the private capitalist economy. Since 
the private market is purported to be a more efficient allocator of goods and 
services than is the state, the obvious political "solution" to present economic 
difficulties is to get government out of the marketplace. The economist 
Norm an Ture provides a useful sum m ary of neo-conservative policy 
objectives;
The conservative’s basic policy objective is to improve the efficiency of market 
performance. For the most part, the conservative identifies the impediment to 
efficient market performance as one or another government intrusion, whether 
in the form of purchases of goods and services, transfer payments, regulations, 
tax laws, or monetary actions. Virtually all of these intrusions can be expressed 
in terms of ... the way in which they distort the relative costs and prices that 
would otherwise prevail. Good public economic policy calls for reducing the 
government's presence in  the private marketplace, for correcting the relative
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price and cost distortions that g o v e rn m en t  actions and policies entail.^^ 
[emphasis added]
In the conservative's opinion, therefore, "there is nothing wrong ... that a 
dose of smaller and less intrusive governm ent would not cure."^ 
Accordingly, a good healthy dose of the market is prescribed as a panacea for 
everything that ails today's troubled economies.
In accordance w ith the policy objectives of neo-conservatism, the 
political platform of the right has been primarily aimed at dismantling the 
Keynesian welfare state, whether in the North or the South. For the assault 
against state capitalism, the right's intellectuals have had to develop a more 
convincing, but not necessarily more sophisticated, rigourous or coherent 
economic theory, than Keynesianism,
In their ideological battle to publicly discredit Keynesianism, the "new 
economists" have tenaciously seized on to the other half of the economic 
equation which Keynes is rebuked for having overlooked — the supply-side. 
The "theory" behind "supply-side" (or monetarist) economics is crude, but 
simple. Monetarists contend that the only macroeconomic policy that will 
yield consistent results is one that is based on a slow, steady and predictable 
growth of the quantity of the money supply. In contrast to Keynesian 
dem and-side economics, "supply-siders" place an explicit and renewed 
emphasis on money quantity. Since inflation is thought to be caused by 
"excessive" increases in money supply and wages -  leading in tandem to 
higher prices (i.e., inflation) *- the new economics relies heavily on monetary 
and fiscal policies that will, in theory, "squeeze" inflationary dem and
53 Norman B, Ture, "Keynes's Influence on Public Policy: A Conservative's View," pp. 52-53.
54 Milton Friedman. Politics and Tyranny; Lessons in Pursuit of Freedom. San Francisco: Pacific 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984, pp. 36.
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pressures out of the system. Theoretically, by tightly curbing the money 
supply, keeping interest rates high, reducing public spending and holding 
down wages, inflation will be checked, and, eventually, market-determined 
prices restored, The monetarist orthodoxy maintains, therefore, that by 
prudently controlling the supply of inputs into the system, especially the 
quantity of money issued, the economy will be placed on a new -- albeit 
transfo^med -  growth path. Thus, the best anti-inflationary medicine for 
today's troubled economy is one that encourages government fiscal restraint - 
- i.e., one that adopts a painful disinflati .n approach, Consequently, public 
government spending during a recession -  once the orthodox Keynesian 
approach for creating employment and stimulating demand in an economic 
downturn — is generally frowned upon by the monetarist orthodoxy.55
In refining classical economic theory and by placing a more explicit 
emphasis on the supply-side of the capitalist economic cquatio.,, the 
monetarists have created the proper ideological climate and defense necessary 
for capital's offensi- j against the Keynesian welfare state. M onetarist 
disinflationary policies, which are designed to contract economic activity and 
! *■ jnch the welfare state, also speak in particularly appealing terms to 
"profit-squeezed" businesses. In their efforts to "rationalize," "down-size" 
and "restructure" industry -  capital's euphemisms for firing workers -  
leaders of the corporate world demand that state spending on welfare
55 Bob Rae's Ontario New Democratic Party, for instance, recently felt the full wrath -  and 
power -- of the business and federal political communities when his party tried to introduce an 
orthodox Keynesian plan aimed at reinvigorating an ailing Ontarion economy in January 1992. 
Immediately after Rae announced that he would be increasing Ontario’s deficit by some $8 
billion in order to fight the recession, Ontario's credit rating plummeted, provoking business 
rebuke and federal conservative ridicule of Rae's Keynesian plan. In obvious disgust, Rae 
tl'.rew up his hands and exclaimed in January 17th's Globe and Mail, "so much for Keynes!" 
[Rae's social democratic party is now, like every one else, embarking on a "bold new plan" to 
reduce the deficit.]
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program s and g overn m en t regu la tion  (in c lu d in g  taxation) o f b u sin ess be
scaled back a n d /o r  relaxed in order to re-focus attention on the profitability of
b u s in e ss  in  eco n o m ic  cr is is . A tta ck in g  th e  s ta te , p articu lar ly  the
u n resp on sive bureaucracies of governm en t, has been  a crucial w eap on  for
capital in eroding support for the regulatory and socia l-w age elem ents of the
K eynesian w elfare state,
The new  right (and big b u sin ess) b e liev e  that econ om ic revitalization
requires a cutback on  state serv ices , curta iling  g overn m en t regulation  of
business and a return to a conservative work ethic, A llen  H unter explains;
In their arguments for increasing worker productivity, many of the new right's 
social and economic views connect. Many conservatives ... argue that a welfare 
system that supports those who do not work fails to provide the coercive 
incentives that 'encourage' worker productivity. They are convinced that 
revitalizing the market and worker productivity requires a renewed cultural 
emphasis on self-restraint and hard work, tax incentives for capital, and a 
relaxation of environmental, health and safety regulations.^^
To aid  in the a ssa u lt a g a in st the w e lfa re  sta te , so c ia lly  co n serv a tiv e
in te llec tu a ls  freq uently  p ortray w elfa re  rec ip ien ts  as la zy , in d o len t and
opportunistic. W illiam  R usher com m ents.
The economic conservative is dedicated to the proposition tliat energies of men 
are the root source of all real wealth, and hence that work is one of society's 
highest values. But the social conservative, too, is a believer in the virtue and 
value of work. He is no free-loader; on the contrary he is inclined to be 
contemptuous, if not downright resentful, of social parasites who make a career 
out of government money -  be they welfare payments or academic grants.^^
K eyn esian  w elfare econ om ics, w h ich  in the p ast has offered  som e
lim ited  protection to the under-classes from  the w orst depridations of capital,
is n o w  considered  as an  "abuse of dem ocracy" by the right's in telligentsia .
The right's in te llectu a ls assert that the m arket m ech an ism  has "magical"
5b Allen Hunter, "The Ideology of the New Kight," pp. 310.
57 William Rusher cited in Allen Hunter's, "The Ideology of the New Right, " pp. 317.
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powers, which allows it to socially allocate goods and services in a more 
rational, cost-effective and efficacious manner than the state. In this view, 
the "impartial rationality" of the competitive market mechanism is believed 
to ensure that those persons who take risks, those who work hard and those 
who invest skillfully in their own hum an capital will be judiciously 
rewarded. Indeed, the great fecundity of the "impersonal" free-market 
economy is that all persons irrespective of race, skin colour, gender, sexual 
orientation, ethnicity, class or linguistic background can compete on an equal 
non-discriminatory basis. The market system is thus "presented as a neutral 
entity, a mode of human interaction that, like the family, is God-given and 
outside history."^* In the view of the neo-conservative, the market is 
society's "great leveler." If everyone is created equal in the eyes of the 
benevolent market, then there is little need for welfare programs which 
advantage one social group at the expense of all o th e rs .B e s id e s , the right's 
intellectuals tells us, in these hard economic times we can no longer afford 
"costly" welfare programs.
In the final reckoning, the right's intellectuals blame not the 
individual for taking advantage of the welfare system, but the state for 
providing welfare services in the first place:
The right opposes functions of the state that it views as hostile to maucet 
forces. 1...] In destroying the market incentive among workers, and capitalists 
alike, the state has suppressed the dynamism of the economy, stifled the 
development of the nation's riches, rewarded the indolent, and punished the 
industrious. The state alone is blamed for inflation (monetary and fiscal 
policies), collapse of the work ethic and productivity (welfare policies that
Allen Hunter, "The Ideology of the New Right," pp. 319.
Of course, what never fails to elude those who advocate the "fecundity" of the market is 
that capitalism's systemic racist, patriarchical and class differentiated biases effectively 
deny any notion that all peoples in all places are created "equal" In the eyes of the market. 
Some people [e.g. white, affluent, Anglo-Saxon maies] are created more equal than others.
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reward the unproductive), and the decline of industrial efficiency (over- 
regulation by government). (T]he welfare state is charged with interfering in 
the private lives of 'the people,' It has taken away from people the right and 
ability to regulate their own lives, the socialization of their children, the 
integrity of the educational process, the stability of the traditional nuclear 
family. The state has forced on people undesired soi al changes.
On the 'deological front, then, the various new right experiments have
rigorously mounted a campaign denouncing any type of state interference in
the marketplace as an unwarranted "intrusion" into the private lives of it.-,
citizenry.
The new right attem pts to achieve its goals of contracting the 
Keynesian welfare stale, relaxing government regulation of business and 
reducing the social wage through a battery of privatization, deregulation, 
desocialization and desubsidization policy initiatives, Invariably, these 
initiatives designed to contract the welfare state are defended otr one of three 
inter-related neo-liberal principles: i) that state regulatory mechanisms 
impede, and therefore distort, the natural functioning of the rnarket order; ii) 
that competition provides the most beneficial social outcome and iii) that 
government intervention restricts individual freedom. Thus, the new right's 
attack on the welfare state, as Allen H unter describes, combines the 
intellectual coherency and rigour of the cultural and economic concerns of 
the social conservative:
[Tjhe [new right] opposes the liberalism of the welfare state, which they 
associate with collectivism. They attack state interventionism us inconsistent 
with those principles of classic liberalism that they do accept, and as 
subversive of capitalist and traditional social relations. [...] They argue that 
welfare liberalism is replacing equality of opportunity with equality of 
outcome. It [the welfare state] is thereby interfering with economic and ethical 
features of the market in the name of a specious egalitarianism.^^
60 Allen Hunter, "The Ideology of the New Right," pp. 325.
61 Ibid., pp. 324.
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The Moralistic Defense of Neo-Liberalism
The new right's intelligentsia primarily defends its demand that 
government "get out of the marketplace" (and out of the welfare business 
too) on dubious moralistic grounds that governm ent interventionism  
restricts the pursuit of individual freedom. At the very core of the right's 
intellectual's defense of non-interventionism is precisely the paradoxical 
question of what the new right's organic intellectuals mean by "liberalism." 
In tracing the intellectual roots of modern liberalism to the moral political 
philosophers of the nineteenth century, Hayek m aintains that the "liberal 
dem and for freedom is ... a demand for the removal of all man-made 
obstacles to individual efforts, not a claim that the community or the state 
should supply particular g o o d s . this contorted reckoning, n e o ­
liberalism  is thus defined as an absence or relative lack of governm ent 
involvement in the private market economy. Characterized such, "the [free] 
market order ... is [therefore] the foundation of a liberal s y s t e m . "̂ 3
For the right's intelligentsia, a liberal capitalist order is to be juxtaposed 
against, and differentiated from, a totalitarian order (e.g., communism). In a 
totalitarian order, governm ent monopolizes all economic activity, and, 
therefore, totalitarian regimes restrict personal freedoms. These individual 
freedoms of a "liberal" capitalist order -  i.e., freedom of speech, freedom of 
political association, freedom of press and freedom from arbitrary coercion -  
are thus contrived by the right to emanate naturally from a free-market 
capitalist economy. In other words, an individual’s "freedom to choose" in 
the economy necessarily ensures personal freedom s which are usually
^2 Hayek, New-Studies. pp. 134. 
^  Ibid,, pp. 147.
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associated with "liberal" capitalist democracy. Therefore, argi.iing on classical 
nineteenth century philosophical and moral grounds, new [authoritariajiJ 
right politicians can incredulously contend that they are "liberals" because 
they are ideologically opposed to government interventionism, which is 
believed to threaten the preservation of freedom!
The New Right as a "Fraudulent Hegemony"
Despite the right's rhetorical ethical and moral appeals favouring a
minimalist state, in many key sectors the state under the new right has
become bigger not smaller, stronger not weaker, and certainly more active in
economic affairs than ever before. Thus, while the underlying political
objective of neo-conservative economic policy is a«'guably to reduce the role
of the state in the private capitalist economy, the "successful" policy
im plem entation of neo-liberalism actuaUy requires the very heavy hand of
the state. In fact, even as the various new right experiments busy themselves
privatizing, deregulating, desubsidizing and desocializing the Keynesian
welfare state, the state has paradoxically become omnipresent:
... despite the ideological implications of the discourse of anti-statism, the 
[new right's] state is a strong state whose intervention penetrates society 
deeply. The decentralization and flexibilization of state apparatuses and 
enhanced repressive regulation appear as a further move of the state i ; > 
society in ail its ramifications. The [new right] promotes a far more intensif'.va 
statificatlon of society
It is ironic indeed that in the austere 1980s, contraction of the welfare state has 
involved alarming cutbacks in virtually all the social services formally 
ensured by the state, including health and education, while the state's
Werner Bonefeld, "Reformulation of State Theory," Capital and Class, 33, (Winter 1937],
pp. 120.
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coercive and legislative branches -- i,e., military, courts, judiciary, police, etc. -  
have remained more or less in tact.
The seeming contradiction between neo-liberal theory on the one hand 
-  which demands that the state get out of the private marketplace -  and neo­
conservative practice on the other -  which brings the state back in all its 
coercive ramifications -- is in reality perfectly consistent with the established 
theoretical defects in classic liberalism theory. As Gramsci tells us, classical 
liberal political economy, associated with Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John 
Stuart Mill, among others, assumes that there is a fundamental distribution 
of economic and political powers which clearly distinguish civil society 
(economic) as separate from state society (political). In reality, as Gramsci 
makes clear, political and civil society cannot be separated; the spheres of force 
and consent are inextricably interwoven:
The ideas of the Free Trade movement are based on a theoretical error whose 
practical origin is not hard to identify; they are based on a distinction between 
political society and civil society... Thus it is asserted that economic activity 
belongs to civil society, and that the State must not intervene to regulate it. But 
since in actual reality civil society and State are one and the same, it must be 
made clear that l a i s s e z - f a i r e  is a form of State 'regulation', introduced and 
maintained by leg islative and coercive m eans. It is a deliberate policy, 
conscious of its own ends... Consequently, la i s s e z - fa i r e  liberalism is a political 
programme, designed to change -- in so far as it is victorious a State's leading 
personnel, and to change the economic programme o f the State itself -  in other 
words the distribution of the national income.^^ [emphasis added]
Thus, ns Gramsci would have been led to expect, the implementation of the
neo-libera! corporate agenda necessarily involves strong state regulation —
and coercion — as national income is red istribu ted  via free trade,
privatization, deregulation, etc., to the upper echelons of the private ruling
class. Consequently, neo-liberalism, in its present form anyway, undeniably
Gramsci, "The Modern Prince," pp. 160.
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requires the social authoritarian politics of neo-conservatism in order to 
"successfully'' implement the repressive logistics of an economic programme 
which is designed to reassert the power of capital, especially international 
capital, over national citizenries and labour. In my opinion, this point about 
neo-liberalism cannot be emphasized enough.
In point of fact, then, "neo-liberalism" is an intensely conservative  
political economic philosophy. It is conservative not only because its 
proponents favour further strengthening the existing [status quo] structures 
and mechanisms of bourgeois social and political control [i.e. the capitalist 
private market]. But also conservative because to re-instate a self-regulating 
market order over a Keynesian interventionist one -  which is arguably what 
the new right intellectual and political counter-revolution is all about -  
requires a strong, capable and authoritarian political medium. The fact rhat 
human beings are forced to "adjust" (against their will in most cases) to the 
dictates of an increasingly inflexible international marketplace is proof of the 
conservatism (not to mention brutality) of disciplinarian neo-liberalism.
From a Gramscian perspective, the political right's reliance on coercion 
to implem ent its economic programme underscores the fragility -  and 
bankruptcy — of neo-liberal market hegemony. As Gramsci notes, "between 
consent and force stands corruption/fraud (which is characteristic of certain 
situations when it is hard to exercise the hegemonic function)...[Tjhe exercise 
of hegem ony [becomes] perm anently difficult and a l e a t o r y . U s i n g  
Gramsci's criteria, the new right is a "fraudulent hegemony" because 
consensus, central to the exercise of legitimate rule, has broken down. 
Especially since the Persian Gulf War, (but also apparent in US military
Gramsci, "Notes on Italian History," pp. 80.
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interventions in Grenada, Nicaragua and Panama) the coercive and corrupt 
aspects of new right rule have come increasingly and predominantly to the 
fore. While it is certainly true that there is an emerging world-wide "market 
consensus" in the "new world order," in the final analysis this evolving  
order has been, and will continue to be in the future, premised on and 
guaranteed by the preponderant power of the state, not the market. The 
politics of the new right are definitely less consensual today than in the post- 
1945 corporatist Keynesian era.
Reorganizing Production, Reorganizing Consent in a "Post-Fordist" Era
The new right's attem pt to reorganize mass consent around a 
fundamentally transm uted economic nucleus signifies a thorough break 
from the corporatist Keynesian past. In the classical "Fordist" era, which was 
just beginning to make its appearance in America in Gramsci's day, 
capitalism's business and political leaders attempted to organize worker 
consent around national production through a blending of force and 
persuasion. As Gramsci saw it then, Henry Ford's "revolutionary" social 
experiments in labour discipline (eg., controlling the moral lives of his 
w orkers through sexual and alcohol abstinence) and industria l 
rationalization efforts (eg,, introduction of moving assembly-line production) 
were perceived as an attempt
to rationalize production and labour by a skilful combination of force ... and
persuasion thus making the whole life of the nation revolve around production.
Hegemony here is born in the factory
Gramsci m aintained that "in America [industrial] rationalization has 
determined the need to elaborate a new type of man suited to the new type of
Gramsci, "Americanism and Fordism," pp. 285.
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work and productive p r o c e s s / a n d  thus, "Americanization requires a 
particular environment, a particular social structure ... and a certain type of 
S tate."6  ̂ In crude terms, Gramsci's "new type of man" would become the 
industrial proletariat; the "new type of work" assembly-line based; and the 
"certain type of state" was the Keynesian welfare state.
Gramsci's prison notes on "Americanism and Fordism" prefigure the 
rise of a social structure of c. nitalist accumulation and regulation which 
would provide the basis for the global organization of consent in the post- 
World War II era. It is precisely the hegemonic crisis and dissolution of this 
post-1945 "Fordist" social bloc which we are presently experiencing. The 
economic, social and technical limits of Fordism have been reached; the 
Fordist model, seen as a regime of capitalist production, accumulation and 
regulation, has been exhausted, (except perhaps in the socially rigid political 
economies of Taiwan and South Korea). In this context, the rise of the new 
right political economy perspective in the North can be viewed as an attempt 
to create a new, "post-Fordist" model of global capitalist accumulation and 
social regulation. Consequently, the social bargain struck between capital, 
labour and the welfare state in the post-war era -  higher wages for increases 
in productivity -  is being nullified by the new right's counter-revolution. 
With the rise of the new right, we are in fact witnessing the "rupture of the 
Keynesian compromise" as the various new right experiments attempt to free
Gramsci, "Americanism and Fordism,", pp. 286. 
69 Ibid., pp. 293.
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"accumulation from the fetters of democracy."7̂1 Paraphrasing Gramsci, the 
old capitalist order is dying and the new is struggling to be born,
Since the end of World War II, the evolution of the world economy 
has involved a gradual sectorial shift away from traditional "Fordist" mass- 
production assembly-line based manufacturing towards more knowledge- 
intensive and service-oriented industrial systems and technologies. Just a 
few decades ago, the "leading" dynamic sectors in the economy were housing, 
automobiles and durable consumer goods. Based on recent trends, however, 
the four "engines of growth" in the "advanced" market economies are likely 
to be: computers and semiconductors (eg. software, electronic components, 
information services); instrum entation  (eg. engineering and scientific 
in strum ents, inc lud ing  env ironm en ta l and po llu tion  m onitoring  
equipment); health and medical (eg. medical care, bio-technology products, 
medicines and drugs); and communications and telecommunications (eg. 
radio and microwave technologies, entertainment, high-tech military missile 
guidance systems and civilian aero-space technologies).^^
The gradual eclipse of traditional mass-production industries by the 
new "engines of growth," as well as the introduction of revolutionary 
technological processes into the workplace over the past two decades, have 
radically transformed the way work is organized at the shop-fioor level. To 
stay globally competitive, and in order to meet more diversified product 
demand, today's capitalists increasingly need not only more flexible and 
efficient machines, but also more flexible and efficient workers. Accordingly,
William Carroll, "Restructuring Capital, Reorganizing Consent: Gramsci, Political Economy, 
and Canada," The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology. 27:3, (August 1990), pp. 
395.
See, Globe and Mail. "Tilting At Smokestacks," July 20,1991, pp. B18.
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the methods of doing work are being radically restructured, in most cases 
involving a shift away from Fordism's traditionally rigid mass-production 
line techniques to more decentralized, autonomous and flexible "team- 
oriented" production approaches. Thus, in contrast to Fordism's blatant "t/c- 
s k i l l i n g "  of the labour process through patterning assembly-line type jobs 
which are monotonous, repetitive, socially and psychologically alienating 
contem porary high-tech production requires that workers be highly 
technically-skilled and involved in all aspects of production, from initial 
conception through to final execution. As Robert Cox contends, "the 
reunification of conception and execution that had been severed by Fordism 
... do seem to herald the end of Fordism that had been the industrial dynamic 
throughout most of the twentieth century."72
While some "revisionist" political economists see potentially human 
emancipatory elements in the technological dynamics propelling the new 
industries of the 1990s, there is also no denying the fact that contemporary 
industrial restructuring efforts are capital's response to declining productivity 
and falling rates of profit across nearly all sectors of economic activity. In the 
new fdgh-tech industries, for instance, through various profit-sharing and so- 
called "job-enrichment" schemes including, "Quality Circles," job-rotation, 
"Just-On-Time" production and so forth, the "post-Fordist" worker has been 
encouraged to identify h is/her interests with that of their employer's rather 
than traditional forms of union solidarity. Furthermore, the fastest growing 
sector in the contemporary world economy -  the service sector -  which in 
1987 accounted for 57% of total global economic activity, continues in the
72 Robert Cox, Production. Power and World Order:-SociaLFurces in the Makin}; of .History. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, pp. 345.
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classic Fordist tradition of patterning jobs which are virtually devoid of any 
intellectual or individual artisan creativity. However, unlike the jobs in the 
classical Fordist era, employment in today's service industry tends to be 
pathetically unorganized, improperly regulated and poorly renum erated. 
These tendencies, in conjunction with business's preference for hiring part- 
time, casual and /o r "cost-free" forms of l a b o u r , 73 as well as the progressive 
feminization of the work-place and escalation of double-waged families, have 
had the double effect of depressing real wages while m aintaining an 
"adequate" profit level for "squeezed" businesses.
In "new" capital's stepped-up assault against labour via industrial 
"restructuring" initiatives, unions have been identified by the counter­
revolutionaries as public enemy "number one," feared not only by the bosses, 
but by the workers themselves. Unions are criticized for demanding too 
much, wanting too much or simply for being just downright selfish. In fact, it 
has been traditionally highly-paid and highly-organized forms of labour 
which have born the brunt of the counter-revolution's assault. At the firm 
level, threats of disinvestm ent, relocation, closedown and dismissal are 
important weapons in capital's aggressive assault on labour. At the point of 
production, on the other hand, workers have been encouraged (coerced?) to 
share in the "sacrifice" today for a greater and more prosperous tomorrow. In 
a desperate attempt to save their own job, many working-class people today 
will support freezes or cutbacks in their own wages. A noxious consensus has 
developed among working people generally that state social services -  the
73 "Cost-free" labour is that component of labour power which the employer receives free of 
charge from the worker. The reproduction of labour power is becoming more and more the 
responsibility of the family in the economic crisis since employers are providing relatively less 
"fringe" benefits (eg., health care insurance, clothing and housing allowances, unemployment or 
pension benefits, etc.,) to their workers. The "social-wage" is thus declining.
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very same services which tb'e labour movement won through bitter struggles 
with capital in the post-war era -  should be pared back in order to bring huge 
government deficits and inflation back under control. Workers are told by 
government leaders that the country’s public debt jeopardizes their children's 
future -  and they believe it. Workers are encouraged to accept "voluntary" 
cuts in their pay -• and they do. Workers are asked to tighten their belts and 
ac*’ fiscally conservative and things will get better -  but they never do. 
Meantime, governments everywhere effectively absolve themselves from 
any social responsibility of providing for their citizens welfare by citing two 
innocuous yet somehow sinister global bogeymen -  the international 
competition and indebtedness. The blame for economic woe is always 
directed outward, never inward.
It is not surprising to find, then, given capital's and the right's 
ideological offensives, that union membership and its historical correlate -- 
the labour political movement -  are precipitously declining in nearly every 
industrialized democracy. By fragmenting the working-class movement 
through breaking labour's collective bargaining and resistance power, and 
also by reorganizing consent around the new industries, the hegemony (albeit 
"fraudulent") of the new right is being constructed. Consequently, the social 
forces unleashed by the new right are in ascendance, while the Keynesian 
welfare state and its labour correlate are on the defensive. Everywhere, in 
fact, the left is in global retreat suffering from acute intellectual and political 
sclerosis.
Conclusion to the Political Economy of the New Right
If the strong integrative capitalist ideology of the post-war era was 
Keynesianism, then the contemporary integrative ideology is monetarism.
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From a Gramscian perspective, monetarist dominance demonstrates that the 
new right's organic intellectuals have successfully trium phed over the 
traditional orthodoxy of the Keynesian state managers; the monetarists 
Friedman and Hayek have won the all-important "battle of the ideas" against 
the high-priests of Keynesian orthodoxy. As an ideology and as a state 
economic policy. Keynesianism has been completely discredited by the right's 
intellectuals. As testament to this fact, a 10% unemployment rate in the 
industrial democracies, unthinkable just a couple of decades ago, is now 
considered norm al, and indeed, "natural" for a properly functioning 
economy. "Full employment," except to be criticized, is a slogan rarely 
uttered in public places anymore. Monetarist supply-side "wars" are now 
waged on all levels of economic and political policy decision-making, and 
against everything from inflation, to poverty, to even most incredibly, drugs. 
The "common-sense" of not spending more than you have prevails, and 
intervention in the economy is now regarded as taboo by the prevailing 
orthodoxy. Keynes is dead and the Mulroney, Bush, Major et. al. entourage is 
now considered advised.
IV. The Retreat of the Intellectuals
The old intellectual and moral leaders of society feel the ground slipping from 
under their feet ... for the particular form of civilization, culture and morality 
which they represented is decomposing. [Antonio Gramsci]
The rightward realignment of the global political economy in the past 
decade and a half has been accompanied by a similar gravitation to the right 
by many leftist intellectuals, labour political parties and formerly communist- 
controlled societies. The world-wide decline of the working-class movement
Gramsci, "State and Civil Society," pp. 242.
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and the Keynesian welfare state, coupled with the collapse of East European 
and Soviet [centrally-planned] communism and the rising power of 
international capital in the 1980s, have precipitated a profound leftist 
intellectual and praxis crisis, Regrettably for the left only China, Cuba and a 
few other "hold-outs" still espouse in the early 1990s to follow principles of a 
socialist creed, however defined or defended in theory and /o r practice.
There is little doubt that many on the left were caught totally 
unprepared by the "revolutionary" onslaught of the right's global offensive 
in the 80s;
The left had settled for Keynesian solutions even though it thought them  
inadequate. It had concentrated on reforms and expansion of welfare systems. It 
had not anticipated the impact of restructuring, and it had not developed an 
international strategy to cope with massive social change. Now It found itself 
on the defensive, trying to save the remnants of the welfare state. For the first 
time since the war, the left appeared to be the defender of tradition and the 
right appeared radical and innovative.^^ [emphasis added]
As Marchak argues, unable to counter the new right’s restructuring project
either intellectually or practically, a disoriented left was left "to defend the
welfare state and try to make public the flaws in the new right's agenda."^^
The left's contemporary defense of the welfare state is extremely ironic given
that just over a decade or so ago the left was vehemently attacking what today
they so vehemently defend:
Less than a decade ago the parameters of discussion of the world economy 
would have been different. It would have been necessary [for the left] to make a 
critique of the still influential Keynesian paradigm, and there were general 
illusions about the potential for socialist parties to effect radical change. ...
[But] the orthodox capitalist ideology is now so pervasive that few people any 
longer even conceive of other than a capitalist future, including branches of the 
socialist parties and many in those nations that call themselves socialist.^^
Marchak, The integrated Circus, pp. 258. 
ibid., pp. 115.
^  Joyce Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy, pp. 349.
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The right's global neutralization of its political opponents (traditional 
and non-traditional) would suggest that the its intellectual and political 
control now runs very deep — so deep in fact that it has prompted a paralysis 
in nearly all non-conformist modes of critical thinking and praxis. As a 
m atter of fact, neo-liberal market hegemony closely approximates Stephen 
Lukes's portrayal of the deepest level of power -  the third dimensional level. 
According to Lukes's Power: A Radical View, the third dimensional level of 
power is the most "effective and insidious use of power" because, unlike the 
first two levels where conflict is both overt and pervasive, in the third level, 
societal conflict is effectively prevented from arising in the first place. Hence 
for Lukes, "the proper object of investigation [of third level power] is not 
political activity but political inactivity."̂ 8 The political inactivity of the left 
would indeed suggest that market hegemony has reached Lukes's deepest, 
most insidious use of power.
The left cannot be totally exculpated from helping to contribute to its 
own demise. Much of the blame for the present dislocation in leftist 
intellectual thought and political culture lies precisely in the left's inability to 
anticipate, and therefore prepare, its own defences for capital's onslaught in 
the 1980s. Although monetarists were largely out of sight before the rise of 
Reagan and Thatcher, as Marc Blecher notes from Gramsci, "the struggle to 
erect a counter-hegemony is an extremely difficult, complex and time- 
consuming affair during which one must expect the unexpected''^^ [emphasis 
added].
^8 Stephen Lukes, Power: A Radical View. New York: MacMillan, pp. 21.
Marc Blecher, "China's Struggle for a New Hegemony," Socialist Review. 19:2, (April-June 
1989), pp. 13.
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The lack of foresight on the left's behalf, I would suggest, is rooted in 
the pervasive and crippling eoonomism which has dominated leftist political 
praxis and analysis for the past seventy-five years. The left's heroic industrial 
[white male] working-class as saviour of revolutionary Stalimst Marxism has 
proven a historic dead end. It will have to be thoroughly discarded if the left 
is to regain some political respectability. Furthermore, the idea that the 
ultimate goal of the socialist enterprize is to capture national state power has 
been thoroughly compromised in an era of truly tran sna tiona l capitalism. 
What the 1989 "revolutions" in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
highlight, in fact, is Gramsci's great insight that hegemony cannot be imposed 
on civil society, but most grow organically from it. The Gramscian project of 
constructing a new hegemony is not about constructing a new state. Rather, it 
is all about constructing a new intellectual, cultural and moral order. The left 
has much to learn from Gramsci and much to unlearn about Stalinism.
But what is perhaps even more astounding than the lack of the left's 
foresight is the fact that many of its members are now retreating precisely at 
the moment when their critical voice and politics are most urgently needed. 
James Petras, one Marxist scholar who still rem ains true to his colours 
contends:
The world-wide retreat of the intellectuals is intim ately related to the 
declining power of the working class movement and the rising power of capital - 
• in the cultural as well as economic sphere. Intellectuals are very sensitive to 
changes in power. [...] The fundamental paradox of our time, however, is that 
the tilts in power are not accompanied by the consolidation and expansion of 
capitalist economic and social systems: the fragility of western economies, the 
disintegration of the inner cities, the volatility o f the financial markets, the 
polarization of classes and regions of the world economy, the destruction of the
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environment ail speak to the failure of capitalism to solve any of the basic 
problems posed by Marxism.^
James Petras's "lament" illustrates Gramsci's assertion that intellectuals are
no t a social category independent of class; intellectuals are, rather, very
susceptible to changes in power. Intellectuals, in fact, remain a decisive force
behind the legitim ation (or delegitim ization) of political iiistitutions.
Unfortunately, however, at this particular conjuncture more intellectuals
seem to be employed in serving the status quo than subjecting it to critical
scrutiny.
But it is not just leftist intellectuals and labour who have been 
succumbing to the rising power of capital. In fact, nowhere is the gravitation 
from left to right more astounding (or contradictory) than in the [former] 
Soviet Union. The collapse and disintegration of Czarist Russia has been 
heralded by many capitalist ideologues as a trium ph of western liberal 
democratic politics, western ideas [and ideals] and above all, as a triumph of 
western [market] economic principles and practices. Capitalist apologists have 
claimed to have won the historic struggle against the very idea of 
communism: the "end of history" and "the end of ideology" are widely 
proclaimed as Marxist Socialism, not Bourgeois Capitalism, is consigned to 
the dustbin of history.
While these ideological pronouncements appear rather forced -- if not 
prem ature, historically ignorant and greatly exaggerated*^ -  they are
*0 james Pefras, "The Retreat of the Intellectuals," Economic and Political Weekly. 35:38, 
(September 22,1990), pp. 2155.
Anthony Arblaster observes: "It is possible to argue, and it is now being argued, that the 
entire Bolshevik-Communist project or experiment was an historical blind alley or mistake; 
and that particular strategy for socialism is now finally discredited and destroyed. But it is a 
vast leap, conceptually and historically, to move from that specific conclusion to the far more 
sweeping assertion that socialism itself, the idea and the ideal, is now dead, finished, and
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nonetheless "vindicated' by the uncritical and hasty acceptance by Soviet and 
East European advocates of market "reform." In their frenzied drive to 
become more like the West, "radical" market reformers have rightly shunted 
one form of domination only to replace it with another. Like the communist 
system before it, the "liberalization" of prices -  generally involving h igher 
costs -» are autocratically decreed from above. Furthermore, there appears to 
be little recognition of the fact in the newly established Soviet Republics, that 
markets do not work "magically," or for that matter, rationally, and that they 
cannot be constructed overnight. The W est's m uch-envied "liberal 
democracies" are the product of decades, in some cases, centuries of struggle 
and political accommodation between capital, labour and the state. Yet the 
kind of capitalism now being introduced in the East (not to mention the 
South), typically involving painful monetarist economic "shock" therapy, is 
raw, punitive and primitive by any stretch of the feebled imagination. If 
there is such a thing as a Fascist "counter-revolution," then it may well have 
reached an apex in the free-market decrees of Boris Yeltsin. In their present 
head-long rush to embrace the virtues of an illusory self-regulating market 
economy, it would bode the reformers well in the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe to heed Polanyi's im ploring w arning in  the G r e a t  
T ransfo rm ation  where he cautions that the market may be a wonderful 
servant, but it is all too often a cruel and unforgiving master.
With nearly all other socio-economic alternatives exhausted, neo­
liberal hegemony is being constructed and premised on a "no alternative" to 
capitalism ticket. Thus, for example, the International Monetary Fund and
buried under the rubble of Eastern Europe." See Anthony Arblaster, "The Death of Socialism 
Again," The Political Quarterly. 62:1, (January>March 1991), pp. 48.
9 9
World Bank's structural adjustment programme, which in essence is the 
reassertion of capital over labour, has been presented to debt-ravaged Third 
W orld political economies by Northern debt collectors precisely on the 
ground that there is no alternative but for Third World countries to adjust to 
the dictates of the "magical" international market-place. Global market 
discipline is replacing Keynesian compromise.
V. The End of Development
The fundamental problem of the lesser developed countries is that they have 
been centrally governmentally directed, controlled, and regulated societies.
[Milton Friedman]
The seem ing death of the developm ent debate in the industrial world 
represents an enormous travesty. [Robin Broad et. al.j
The countries and peoples in the developing world have not been 
spared the effects of the counter-revolutionary's intellectual and political 
assault. Arguably, now here have the neo-classical ideas of rightist 
intellectuals been more zealously or more rigourously applied than in the 
developing world. Consequently, the critical North-South development 
debate in the industrialized world has been stifled as "adjustment" replaced 
developm ent in the 1980s. The Third World Structural Adjustm ent 
Programme is quite possibly the crowning achievement of the reckless neo­
liberal enterprize.
Milton Friedman, Politics and Tyranny, pp. 37.
Robin Broad et. al., "Development: The Market Is Not Enough," Foreign Policy. 81, (Winter 
1990-91), pp. 162.
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The Structural Adjustment Programme
The Structural Adjustment Programme (or SAP) refers to a prescribed 
package of economic stabilization and austerity measures carried out under 
the auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its collaborating 
Washington-based institution, the World Bank. According to the Bank and 
Fund, the programme has both short and long-term objectives. In the short­
term, structural adjustment is designed to aid severely "debt-distressed" 
political economies stabilize their balance of paym ent problems. In the 
longer-term, structural adjustm ent seeks to re-integrate adjusting Third 
World states into a more favourable position in the international division of 
labour by reviving export commodity production.
In essence, the Bank and Fund’s SAP programme is a reflection of the 
dominance of the neo-classical or "neo-liberal model" of development. 
While the programme has evolved over the course of the 1980s and 90s, the 
principal components or "conditions" of the programme invariably contain 
the following broad set of neo-liberal theoretical and policy initiatives, first 
identified in the World Bank's 1981 report entitled. Accelerated Development 
■in Syb:S ah ara n..Afr.iga.;.An  Agenda-.fgr.Ac.tifln.^'*
Currency Devaluation: According to the Bank and Fund, overvalued 
exchange rates have resulted in Third World trade regimes which are biased 
against exports. The prescriptive measure advocated to restore a balance
The 1981 "Berg" Report (after the name of its author) can be viewed as the vanguard 
document guiding the new right's official "adjustment" policy for Third World development. 
The Berg Report identified a series of domestic factors supposedly contributing to festering 
underdevelopment in the Africa. Highlighted in the Berg Report's explanation of Third World 
underdevelopm ent are: i) implementation of "misguided" macroeconomic policies; ii) 
"inefficiency" in resource utilization; ill) "overinvolvement" of the state in the economy and 
iv) "malignant" and "endemic" corruption and abuse of political power. The Berg Report was 
thus the new right's original intellectual synthesis and catalyst of a pro-market movement in 
the development orthodoxy, which since has been identified as the "Washington consensus."
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against exports. The prescriptive measu advocated to restore a balance 
between exports and imports and also to stabilize short-term balance of 
paym ent problems typically involves some sort of m onetarist "shock 
therapy," usually including massive currency devaluations (sometimes in the 
order of 100% or more).
R estoration of M arket M echanism s; The prevailing orthodoxy 
maintains that overinvolvement of the state in the economy (both public and 
private) has resulted in the market receiving "distorted" signals. Among 
other things, the state's distortion of market signals has been implicated in 
contributing to persistent government deficits; overvalued exchange rates; 
biased trade regimes; excessive reliance on foreign borrowing and inefficiency 
of production. Accordingly, to send the "correct" market-determined signals 
(ie. "get prices right"), the state must get out, or significantly reduce, its role in 
the marketplace. Prescriptive measures designed to elicit that desired effect 
typically include a comprehensive conditionality package consisting of trade 
liberalizations, phasing out of tariffs and government subsidies.
Demand Management Measures: Demand management measures are 
designed to deflate domestic demand in order to control inflation which, in 
some countries, is running at well over 100%. In monetarist theory, 
deliberately engineering a contraction of domestic economic activity will lead 
to lower rates of inflation. Invariably austerity measures are part of the 
dem and management package. Typically, austerity m easures include: 
freezing or reducing wages; public service retrenchment; drastic cutbacks in 
state expenditures, including social welfare and public infrastructural 
schemes.
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P r iv a tiz a t io n :  Nearly all SAPs call for some privatization of 
"inefficient" state run  industries. The principal rationale behind 
privatization is that the private sector will be able to increase efficiency of 
production, especially in the Third World's large parastatal sector.
Poverty Alleviation Schemes: Measures introduced here are the most 
recent additions to lender conditionality. Under pressure and at the bequest 
of its critics (most notably UNICEF and UNDP), the Bank and Fund have had 
to provide some assurance that the "social costs" of adjustment upon the 
poor and other "vulnerable groups" will be m itigated in the course of 
implementation. Poverty alleviation schemes are an attem pt to give the 
adjustment package a "human face."85
In summary, the goals of the neo-liberal model for Third World 
development are: i) decrease government fiscal deficits; ii) reduce inflation; 
iii) encourage exports; iv) phase out national barriers to trade and 
investment and iv) increase gross domestic product. As for the effectiveness 
of SAP, perhaps the most telling testament to its failure is evidenced by the 
fact that the Third World's debt burden and marginalization in the world 
economy have increased alm ost in direct and timed proportion to the 
number of political economies that undertook the programme in the 1980s. 
In a highly polemically charged condemnation of SAP, one radical writer 
contends:
In particular, see UNICEF, Adjustment With a Human Face Volume I: Protecting the  
Vulnerable and Promoting Growth. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. For UNICEF, 
adjustment with a human face entails, "the need for the human implications of an adjustment 
policy to be made an integral part of adjustment policy as a whole, not to be treated as an 
additional welfare component" (pp. 3). UNICEF's criticism o f IMF adjustment policies has been 
instrumental in forcing the Fund and Bank to at least consider the "human dimensions" of 
adjustment and development.
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These [structural adjustment] policies ... have not worked. On the contrary, 
they culminated in riots; tl>e erosion of the credibility of government, its agents 
and agencies; confusion; malnutrition; high divorce rates; prostitution crime 
wave, hunger and death. The adjustment programme which has been profitable 
for criminals, drug pushers, currency traffickers, and top military men, 
speculators and pimps, has led to political instability, coups, counter-coups, 
increasing debts, inflation, massive decline in real wages, the virtual 
elimination of the m iddle classes, the near total destruction of small 
businessmen who lack foreign exchange; and a degree of de-industrialization.^^
On a less polemical note, even the World Bank has compromisingly admitted
that the 1980s were a "lost decade" of development for Africa south of the
Sahara as hum an welfare gains of the three previous UN development
decades were virtually wiped out in the crisis-ridden 1980s.*^ In fact,
contracting economies in sub-Saharan Africa during the 1980s have prompted
the cynical response that Africa, under the structural adjustment regime, is
really adjusting to poverty. Timothy Shaw, for instance, has argued that,
the current condition [in Africa] is not merely a short term disaster of drought, 
debt, refugees, and decline; rather it is the stark early warning of a long-term 
movement toward peripheralization and impoverishment: Africa’s apparent 
lot in the New International Division of Labour.^®
It is ironical, but perhaps not at all coincidental, that the focus of the World
Bank's 1990 World Development Report was poverty.
SAP: Where Did It Come From?
The Third W orld structural adjustm ent program m e is largely a 
product of the new right's political, intellectual and ideological gains made in 
the First World during the 1980s. These gains include: i) a successful assault
Julius Ihonvbere, "Africa's Historical Experience and the Basis of Poverty, Instability and 
Peripheralization in the Global System, " paper delivered at the workshop sponsored by the 
Social Science Research Council on Structural Adjustment and Prospects for Peace in Africa, 
Park Plaza Hotel: Toronto, October 26-27 1990, pp. 35.
World Bank, World Development Report 1990. Washington: World Bank, 1990.
Timothy Shaw, "African Development and the New International Division of Labour, " 
Economic Crisis in Africa: African Perspectives on Development Problems and Potentials. Tim 
Shaw and Adebayo Adedeji (eds.), Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., pp. 270.
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on the welfare state in the centre; ii) a concerted move toward widespread 
financial deregulation and increased market emphasis in the periphery and 
iii) a considerably reduced expectation that the state should be guantor of basic 
needs or play a major role ensuring economic equity.
As "he authors of "Development: The Market Is Not Enough" note, the 
neo-liberal programme is premised upon three supposed "lessons" draw n 
from the experience of both the developing and developed world during the 
past decade. These include: i) the perception that the newly industrializing 
countries (NlCs) of East Asia -  Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and Hong 
Kong — represent viable and replicable m odels of export-oriented 
development for other Third W orld countries; ii) that socialist command 
economies failed principally because they did not use market mechanisms 
and iii) that export and m arket-oriented structural adjustm ent reforms 
implemented in much of the developing world in the 1980s have laid the 
groundwork for successful "take-off" of these economies into the much- 
envied elite NIC club.89
Critics of the neo-liberal m odel of developm ent have taken its 
designers to task over the dubious and sometimes specious "lessons" upon 
which its tenets are theoretically derived and practically based. Critics have 
taken particular exception to the orthodoxy's claim that the NICs of South- 
East Asia represent viable and replicable models of market and export- 
oriented development for the rest of the developing world. Contrary to the 
IMF's belief that the NICs have been able to achieve extraordinary rates of 
economic growth because they have used m arket mechanisms to some 
wondrous advantage, Nigel Harris in The End of the Third World: N ew ly
See, Robin Broad et. al., "Development: The Market Is Not 'Enough," 144-162.
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Industrializing Countries and the Decline of an Ideology argues that in fact, 
"in the newly industrializing countries, state capitalism  [is] everywhere 
supreme"^^ [emphasis added]. Harris shows that the NIC state (except for the 
possible exception of Honk Kong) is an extremely interventionist one whose 
structures penetrate all aspects of society very deeply. Harris links the NlCs’s 
"success" inextricably to high rates of private capital accumulation, state- 
controlled investm ent and carefully planned agro-industrial expansion. 
However, if the World Bank and IMF had it their way, the activities of the 
"developmentalist state" in the Third World would be significantly curtailed. 
For example, under the structural adjustment regime "infant" industries in 
the Third World would not be afforded the same nurturing benefits such as 
special tariffs, quotas or state subsidies which the early First W orld 
industrializers used to protect their fledgling industries from foreign 
com petition in the vulnerable stages of early growth. As "late-late 
industrializers," Third W orld countries are expected to compete without 
special protection am ongst not only them selves, but against political 
economies in the North which have had the advantage of industrializing for 
over 250 years!
M oreover, as Harris m akes poignantly clear, the special set of 
circumstances which helped contribute to the NIC "success" story in the 1980s 
are unlikely to be replicated in historical time and space anywhere else in the 
Third World. Harris argues, for instance, that the Taiwanese and South 
Korean state largely eliminated private mega land-holders by the early 1950s, 
which allowed the state to gradually use its monopoly in agricultural
Nigel Harris, The End of the Third World: N ewly Industrializing Countries and the Decline 
of an Ideology. Markham: Penguin Books Canada Ltd., 1988, pp. 163.
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production (and surplus) to fuel later industrial expansion. Furthermore, the 
intensely im portant geo-strategical position the NICs occupy brought 
immense US economic and military aid to the area, as they were to become 
America's first line of defense against the spread of communism in South- 
East Asia. Finally, more contemporaneous, the NICs have profited greatly 
from being situated next door to some of the fastest growing mega-economies 
(particularly China and Japan) in the contemporary world economy. Surely 
t̂ he special set of socio-historical experiences which culminated in the 
miracle economies" in South-East Asia is unique, and not at all translatable 
to the vastly different experiences of the rest of the developing world.
The political, economic and ecological sustainability of the NIC export 
model is also beginning to come under serious critical scrutiny, especially as 
Southeast-Asian economies begin to show signs of vulnerability in a 
contracting global economy. It is now undeniably apparent that the NIC 
economies, particularly South Korea and Taiwan, have been able to sustain 
extraordinarily high rates of economic growth by progressively working their 
populations into the ground while totally neglecting sound ecological 
principles. By all estimations. South Korea and Taiwan have coe^ cive labour 
codes, which are backed up by authoritarian state structures. Taiwan and 
South Korea are hardly enviable or exemplary "development" models for 
replication! And they most definitely are not successful because they used the 
market mechanism to any great "comparative advantage!"
Despite the questionable neo-liberal grounds upon which the structural 
adjustment programme is currently premised and practiced, there is an 
emerging -  and largely unc'^ntested -  global consensus that the 
réintroduction of capitalist relations in the periphery and "rolling back" the
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developmentalist state there will (magically?) stimulate private capital 
accumulation, leading to renewed investment and higher rates of economic 
growth. Even leftist writers repeatedly consigned themselves to making 
statements in the 1980s such as "adjustment is unavoidable" or "adjustment 
is clearly necessary;" though admittedly following with the trailers, in the case 
of the former, "but the approaches of the Bank and Fund are not necessarily 
in the best interest of the countries which are increasingly in bondage to these 
agencies"9i and the latter, "the issue, ... is not whether to adjust or not, but 
how,"^2 respectively. Nevertheless, in response to debilitating and mounting 
external debt (which at last count stood at US $1.3 trillion for the developing 
world alone), rising domestic turmoil, unrelentless international pressure, 
and, as a last ditch effort to obtain some precious foreign exchange, leaders 
from the developing world have turned e n - m a s s e  to the Bank and Fund 
orthodoxy for a quick "fix" to their so-called "structural" problems. However, 
as we shall presently discover, the IMF pill is often worse than the disease it 
seeks to remedy.
Reform for Whom?
Both the Bank and Fund are proscribed by their charters not to become 
involved in the domestic politics of the host country. Yet, the host country's 
extensive surrender of economic sovereignty to the Bank and Fund that 
structural adjustm ent invariably involves takes these institutions well 
beyond the technically neutral and non-interventionist role they are publicly 
disposed to claim for themselves and their policies. As a matter of fact,
Karl Levitt, "Debt, Adjustment and Development: Looking to the 1990s," 
Political Weekly. (July 21,1990), pp. 1593.
92 UNICEF, Adjustment With a Human Face, pp. 289.
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classifying economic reform as a "technical" matter is itself a political act. 
Upon investigation, "adjustment" and "reform" packages, though referenced 
throughout in purely technical and neutral terminologies, are not at all class 
neutral, nor benign economic policy. Indeed, fomenting the "magic of the 
marketplace" paradigm carries with it some serious ideological and class- 
biased luggage, as Kari Levitt contends:
The 'market magic' paradigm has proven remarkably seductive because it 
combines the logical coherence of neoclassical economics with the structure of 
power in the real world. It is appealing because it appears to offer a personal 
and individual solution to economic pressure. In reality, it is an instrument 
whereby the rich and the powerful impose on whole societies a set of values 
and 'rules of the game' which reinforce inequality and injustice and dismantle 
the capacity for social solidarity.^^
In a similar vein as Levitt, Bjorn Beckman argues that while at one 
level structural adjustment
is a matter of commonsense economics (getting balances right; not spending more 
than you h a v e)... at another, it has a distinct political and class orientation, 
encouraging private entrepreneurship, liberalizing markets, privatizing public 
enterprizes, restricting state intervention, and facilitating foreign private 
investment.^^
Inevitably, the restoration of m arket m echanism s can only serve to 
strengthen bourgeois forces in the developing world, especially considering 
that countervailing powers to capital (i.e., organized labour and labour 
political parties) are generally weak and underdeveloped in ihe periphery of 
the world capitalist system relative to metropolitan capitalism. Thus, Claude 
Ake's rather simple observation that SAPs "redistribute incomes and 
opportunities against labour in favour of capital,"95 generally holds because of
Kari Levitt, "Debt, Adjustment and Development" pp.l594.
Bjorn Beckman, "The Post-Colonial State: Crisis and Reconstruction," IDS Bulletin. (October 
1988), pp. 30.
Cited in Julius Ihonvbere, "Africa's Historical Experience and the Basis of Poverty, 
Instability and Peripheralization in the Global System," pp. 35.
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the nature (capitalist) of the reforms being introduced. Moreover, it bears 
noting that the interests of international capital lie in open markets, free flow 
of capital including profits, and reductions to barriers to trade and 
investment, all of which the IMF and Bank facilitate through conditionality 
reforms.
The non-neutrality of structural adjustment type reforms is perhaps 
best illustrated in the perverse class and gender distributions of the social 
costs of adjustment. UNICEF's 1987 sponsored study Adjustment With a 
Hum an Face points out quite explicitly that the brunt of austerity has been 
disproportionately borne by the popular classes, including "vulnerable 
groups" like rural wom en and children, whose social net is slashed by 
cutbacks in state welfare spending. The study asserts the obvious: unlike the 
rich, the poor are less able to shelter themselves from the ill social effects that 
are always associated with austerity measures. Anne Tickner, in her article, 
"On the Fringes of the W orld Economy: A Feminist Perspective," argues 
convincingly that,
the harsh effects of structural adjustment policies, imposed by the IMF on Third 
World debtor nations, fall disproportionately on women as providers of basic 
needs as social welfare programmes in areas of health, nutrition and housing 
are cut. When government subsidies or funds are no longer available, women in 
their role as unpaid homeworkers and care providers must often take up the 
provision of these basic welfare needs.^^ [emphasis added]
On the other side of the social equation, IMF-imposed deregulations on
investment and trade, in addition to privatization conditionalities, create a
business climate ripe for exploitation by certain international capitals and
well-placed elites w ithin Third World societies. In reference to the latter
^^Ann Tickner, "On the Fringes of the World Economy: A Feminist Perspective," A N ew  
International Political Economy: IPE Yearbook Volume 6. Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze (eds.), 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991, pp. 285.
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point, it can be argued that certain "collaborator" classes in Third World 
societies have benefited, however perversely , from  their country's 
indebtedness. If that is indeed the case. Southern elites are unlikely to turn 
on the interests of more powerful Northern bankers and industrialists; they 
will continue to make payments on loans they know they will never ever be 
able to pay back. The collaborating relationship between powerful Northern 
elites and dependent Southern elites underscores the fact that the 
international system is not only a state system, but it is also an international 
class system. While it may be a crude restating of the dependency perspective, 
it is nonetheless true that economic elites in the Third World have a vested 
interest in maintaining the very same international structures which cause 
Third World underdevelopment and dependency on the First World in the 
first place.
The question of reform for whom is all the more pressing and perverse 
in light of the net negative transfer of resources from the developing to the 
developed world in the 1980s. The 1989 United Nations World Economic 
Survey conservatively estimates the net transfer of resources from the 
developing to the developed world in 1988 at $46 billion ( U S ) . 9 7  As a matter 
of fact, the UN survey points out that since 1987 the IMF has been a net 
recipient of capital, taking in more money each year than it dispenses to each 
of the main developing country regions. So m uch for international 
Keynesianism!
To date, the Bank and Fund have been slow to recognize and respond 
to their "social" critics. While they are now much more keenly aware and
See United Nations, World Economic Survey 1989: Current Trends and Policies in the Wofld 
Economy. New York: United Nations, 1989.
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sensitive to the attack spearheaded by UNICEF (among others), their new­
found concern for the social costs of adjustment seems more rhetorical than 
real. Thus, even though the focus of the World Bank's 1990 W orld 
Development Report is explicitly "about poverty," nowhere in the report does 
it suggest that neo-liberal policies are antithetical to its strategy of alleviating 
poverty in the developing world. Hence, the Bank's two- pronged poverty 
alleviation strategy consisting of i) promoting the "productive use of the 
poor's most abundant asset -  labour" and ii) to "provide basic social services 
to the poor" is deemed to be "perfectly consistent" with the "longer term goal 
of economic restructuring."^® However, there is cause and need to be 
skeptical about a "perfectly consistent" strategy which restricts internal 
demand on the one hand, and on the other, calls upon developing countries 
to expand their productive use of labour. As Michel Chossudovsky argues,
the fight against poverty is incompatible with the basic premise of the 
economic stabilization and austerity measures: the latter compress real 
earnings and stifle internal demand particularly in the areas of consumer 
necessities and essential social services.^^
Moreover, it is just a preposterous presum ption on the Bank and Fund's
behalf that the more than seventy countries now pursuing SAP's orthodoxy
can, like the NICs of Southeast Asia, all export their way to success. Third
W orld states and their workers are in fact competing against each other,
saturating the world primary commodity market in a desperate attempt to
make the next interest payment. On average, the world price of Third World
98 See World Bank, World Development Report 19-90. pp. 3.
99 Michel Chossudovsky, "The Third World Structural Adjustment Programme," paper 
presented to the International Developm ent Studies Program, Saint Mary's University , 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, March, 1991, pp. 22.
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commodities and terms of trade have precipitously declined since the mid-
1980s. As the UN's World Economic Survey for 1990 reports,
[Bjelween 1980 and 1988, the real prices of non-fuel commodity exports from 
developing countries declined by some 40 per cent. Latin America's terms of 
trade fell by about 25 per cent; for West Asia and Africa, the terms of trade fell 
by 40 per cent. The transfer o f real income from Latin America, Africa and 
Western Asia towards their trading partners in  the developed countries was 
large.^^ [emphasis added]
The terms of trade between North and South are becoming more and more 
unfavourable to the South and more and more advantageous to the North. 
Problems which are in fact central to Third World development, including 
gyrating interest rates. N orthern protectionism  and cyclical changes in 
primary commodity prices are precisely problems that the South does not 
control, and that structural adjustment, either by design, or default, cannot or 
will not address.
Inherent, "Logical" and Festering Contradictions of SAP
Despite rhetorical claims by the Bank and Fund (and other apologists) 
that the introduction of m arket reform s in the periphery is directly 
responsible for contributing to the "redemocratization" wave said to be 
sweeping the developing world, it is far from an established fact that the 
Third World state and its leaders are ready to finally cede pride of place to 
purely market-determined and oriented development. In point of fact, there 
is growing evidence to support the case that the inherent contradictory logic 
of SAP promotes an even greater statification of Third World societies than 
pre-adjustment times. Thus, the "withering away" of the Third World state 
is illusory, at least in the short term. James Petras, tor example, unimpressed
United Nations, World Economic! Survey 1990! Current Trends and Policies in the World 
Economy. New York: United Nations, 1990, pp. 3.
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by the "redemocratization" process in the southern cone of Latin America, 
has argued that the "new democracies" emerging there during the 1980s are 
really not "new" at all since the military, judiciary and other socio-economic 
institu tions associated w ith the 1970s dictatorships rem ain virtually 
unchanged with the return to civil rule; It is merely a changing of the guard. 
Petras goes so far as to assert that the militaries in Latin America under 
regimes of structural adjustm ent, now operate through "legal" coercive 
channels. He contends that with austerity the class struggle in Latin America 
is being waged from above as capital, backed by the state and the international 
community at large, reasserts itself over labour. For Petras, SAP's repressive 
austerity measures require a repressive political apparatus for successful 
implementation. The reliance on coercion is thought to seriously jeopardize 
any hope of the emerging "new democracies" in Latin America reaching any 
kind of genuine and /o r lasting democratic consensus.i^^^
In a similar vein as Petras, but different context, Yusaf Bangura has 
argued the controversial thesis that in Africa the "monetarist strategy of crisis 
managem ent pushes the state towards more authoritarian policies." He 
suggests that,
the adjustment programme of contemporary monetarism ... throws up specific 
types of political regimes ranging from zero/one and controlled two party 
system s to m ilitary rule, c iv il/m ilita ry  dyarchy and corporate
representation. ̂ 02
The respected African marxist scholar Claude Ake concurs with Bangura, 
arguing th"t in the African context, "there is no way of implementing the
101 James Petras' argument here is extracted from an October 1990 talk given to the Saint 
Mary's Graduate International Development Studies Seminar entitled, "The Crisis of Liberal 
Democracy in Latin America."
102 Yusaf Bangura, "Structural Adjustment and the Political Question," Review oJ African 
P o l i t i c a l  Economy 37, (December 1986), pp. 24.
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structural adjustment programme without political r e p r e s s i o n " 0̂3 [emphasis 
added]. One of the perverse ironies of structural adjustment thus far in Africa 
is that while the adjusting state under dictate of international conditionality 
has been forced to make severe cutbacks in crucial social welfare expenditures, 
the coercive branches of the state — the state police, the secret police, the 
military, the paramilitary, the courts and their legislative bodies — have, if 
anything, been strengthened under regimes of adjustment. Thus violence 
procuring expenditures, despite contributing up to one-third or more of the 
balance of payment and debt problems in Africa, have actually increased, or at 
the very least, remained at pre-adjustment l e v e l s .  104
Nor are increased expenditures on the military and other coercive 
branches of the state necessarily antithetical to introducing disciplinary neo­
liberalism onto the periphery of the world capitalist system. In Africa, for 
instance, some traditional client-patron networks have been severed as a 
result of monetarist retrenchment and privatization initiatives. The loss of 
government patronage severely compromises the state's ability to buy crucial 
factional support and ensure the ethnic peace. Faced w ith a precarious 
political future, some of A frica’s leaders have resorted to using 
institutionalized forms of violence in order to remain, albeit clinging to 
power. Frequently, the adjusting state has had to rely on coercion to quell 
popular spontaneous insurrections that have been prompted by IMF-induced 
short-term currency and inflationary "shocks;" massive increases in basic 
food prices and public transportation costs as prices are "liberalized;" the
103 Cited in Julius Ihonvbere, "Africa's Historical Experience and the Basis of Poverty, 
instability and Peripheralization in the Global System," pp. 33.
104 Adebayo Adekanye, "Military Expenditure Under Regimes of Structural Adjustment in 
Africa," yet to be published paper, but informally related in conversation March 19P1.
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reduction or outright elimination of social welfare subsidies in critical sectors 
including, most alarmingly, education, health and public housing. In 
thinking, if not in practice, therefore, the Bank has apparently seemed to 
abandon any notion of the Keynesian-influenced reformism of the Basic 
Hum an Needs and New International Economic Order paradigms which 
were widely touted in the 1970s.
Furthermore, there is every added incentive for regimes pursuing the 
SAP initiatives to see the implementation of market reforms and v>elfare 
retrenchment through to their final and "logical" end, no matter the social 
costs involved. Since the quality and quantity of future loan and aid 
disbursem ents ("tranches" in the case of the IMF) are dependent upon 
whether the state in question is perceived to be a strong or weak "reformer" 
by the IMF, adjusting regimes are virtually compelled to carry out even the 
most repressive austerity measures against their own citizens lest funding 
taps run  dry. Moreover, bilateral official developm ent assistance is 
increasingly tied to IMF conditionalities which further ensures that the South 
dances to the tune piped by the Northern piper.
The implication of the inherent authoritarian tendencies of SAP, then, 
is that structural adjustment necessitates a strong and capable state apparatus 
if the neo-liberal project is to be fully realized in the developing world. Thus, 
far from reducing the "overbearing" role of the state, SAP has the tendency to 
continue or extend some forms of state interventionism (mostly coercion 
related). Consequently, the Bank and Fund's neo-liberal "orthodox paradox" 
is becoming a festering blight on the programme's horizon. As Thomas 
Biersteker puts it: "[Ejxternal agents are attempting to use what they consider 
the key obstacle to development -  the state -  as the primary weapon in their
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struggle to reform Third W orld political e c o n o m i e s . " h ) 5  The evidence 
accumulating whether in Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe or Asia, is 
that political economies most "successful" at implementing and ac tually  
carrying through on Bank and Fund policies are precisely those regimes 
which are a u t h o r i t a r i a n .  ^06 President Fujimori's suspension of Peru's 
constitution in April 1992 (in part defended on the grounds that he needs 
more central power to enforce his "liberal" market reforms) is just the latest 
in a depressing series of IMF-induced "adjustment coups."
The Bank and Fund have been extremely reluctant to respond to the 
contentious issue of whether their neo-liberal policies inherently support 
authoritarian tendencies in the developing world. The fact that international 
lenders have been recalcitrant up to this point to demand reductions in Third 
World rr litary spending, all the while vigorously promoting cuts in welfare 
spending, would lend credence to the argument that SAP is more likely to be 
successfully implemented in authoritarian settings than non-authoritarian 
o n e s .107 As a consequence, neo-liberalism's causal link between economic 
reform and expected political reform is entirely misplaced as draconian 
austerity measures, including the compression of internal demand, ensure a 
political situation intolerably subversive to popular democratic rights and 
social demands. It is a highly speculative matter indeed whether the Bank
105 Thomas Biersteker, "Reducing the Role of the State in the Economy; A Conceptual 
Exploration of IMF and World Bank Prescriptions," International Studies Quarterly. 34:4, 
(December 1990), pp. 488.
106 Many regimes under structural adjustment have experienced what the Bank and Fund refer 
to as "debtor fatigue." Often the programme is aborted in mid-stream as adjusting political 
economies are unable to sustain the harsh conditions attached to the programme.
107 It is perhaps instructive to note that Ghana under Rawlings and Chile under Pinochet, 
which are widely touted by the Bank and Fund as models of successful adjustment for the rest of 
the developing world, are also autlioritarian regimes.
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and Fund are really socially concerned about the "democracy question" in the 
Third World at all. As Bjorn Beckman has argued:
Repressive policies against workers and unions are standard features of the 
structural adjustment programmes. The World Bank and the IMF support such 
anti-democratic policies. By bolstering compliant regimes financially and 
managerially they enhance their capacity to override popular opposition.^08
Third World "Redemocratization" and the Global Political Economy
While the Bank and Fund have been slow to date to move on the 
democracy question in the developing world, the "rebirth" of popular 
democratic movements and the resuscitation of civil societies in Eastern 
Europe, the former Soviet Uriion and elsewhere have clearly put questions of 
["liberal"] democracy back on the political agendas of the developed world. As 
relations and tensions between East and West "normalize," the Bank and 
Fund have in fact found some political room in which to confront adjusting 
political economies with "democratic conditionalities," particularly human 
rights, as a pre-requisite for further international loan assistance and 
hum anitarian aid. Even still, as Maria Nzomo points out In reference to 
Africa, (but generally applicable to the rest of the developing world):
The call for democratization of [Third World] regimes at the international 
level is rather suspect on at least two grounds: (i) it assumes that [Third 
World's] problems are only due to domestic autocracy and do not also reflect the 
undemocratic nature of the international capitalist system and (ii) the timing 
for demanding political reform seems to conveniently coincide with a period 
when [the South] has ceased to be a priority region for western donors, with the 
end of the East-West ideological battles and the emergence of the more 
strategically placed Eastern Europe.^
108 Bjorn Beckman, "The Post-Colonial State: Crisis and Reconstruction," pp. 33.
109 Maria Nzomo, "Beyond the Structural Adjustment Programmes: Democracy, Gender Equity 
and Developm ent in Africa," paper presented at the Dalhousie University International 
Symposium Surviving at the Margins: Africa in the New International Divisions of Labour and 
Power, March 1991, pp. 38.
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Nzomo concludes her argument by contending that if the developed world is 
genuinely serious about the democracy question in the developing world, 
then surely "there is a compelling case for them to also initiate economic 
democratization of the international system."lfO The fact of the matter is that 
the question of redemocratization in the developing world is inseparable 
from wider debates concerning the undem ocratic nature of the North- 
South/rich-poor capitalist system. As Richard Sandbrook argues in the 
context of Latin America, "capitalism is far from an unmitigated blessing for 
... democracy.
Conclusion to the End of Development
The IMF and W orld Bank's structural adjustment program m e is 
essentially premised on two neo-classical economic tenets: an economic 
growth strategy predicated on the resuscitation of export-led growth, and a 
minim alist state. Regarding the latter point, neo-liberalism 's "logic" 
inevitably pushes the Third World state towards more, not less, statification 
of society under regimes of adjustment. SAP and statification are all the more 
perversely ironic when one considers the increased military expenditures the 
adjusting state must expend in order to carry out the repressive logistics of the 
program m e. If the tren d  tow ards m ore sta tification  continues, 
redemocratization in the developing world will remain a tenuous enterprize 
at best.
As for the former category -  prom oting economic growth through 
revived extroverted growth -  the strategy is destined to fail. It is simply quite
Maria Nzomo, "Beyond the Structural Adjustment Programmes," pp, 39.
Richard Sandbrook, "Liberal Democracy in Africa: A Socialist-Revisionist Perspective," 
C .nadian journal of African .Studies. 22:2, (1988), pp. 257.
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ludicrous to think that one myopic and extremely inflexible package of 
market reforms can be universally applicable to the immense diversity of 
experiences of the developing world. The fact is, the plethora of states now 
pursuing the SAP project radically differ one from the other not only in the 
level and composition of indebtedness, but more importantly, in the type of 
political, cultural and religious orientations. Yet one SAP is said to cure all!
VI. Conclusion:
Whither the New Right, Or a Withering New Right?
In contrast to the post-war Keynesian demand-side transformation of 
global capitalist hegemony, contem porarj' transform ation of capitalist 
hegemony has taken on an explicitly supply-side, pro-market discursive. In 
the four decades since the end of the World War II, bourgeois economic 
theory -  and political praxis -  have in fact come full circle. Politically 
propelled by the rise of the new right in the early 1980s, a so-called monetarist 
"counter-revolution" in  econom ic theory has d isp laced  "Keynes’s 
revolution." Keynesianism's valiant, if ill-fated, attempt to create a more 
egalitarian capitalism through active state intervention in the economy has 
given way to a new right political economy perspective which ideologically 
shuns interventionism. In the global political economy of the new right, a 
kind of demented social Darwinism prevails on an international scale, as the 
new rules and values guiding capitalist accumulation in the 90s are those 
decreed not by the state, but those of an increasingly inflexible, repressive and 
dictatorial global marketplace. Perversely, people and countries alike are 
being forced against their will to "adjust" to a market mechanism that really 
is, as the right's intellectuals keep telling us, impersonal and impartial.
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Despite the tenacity of the right's intellectual and political offensive, 
fissures are beginning to emerge in the new right's global model of market- 
led development. According to Patricia M archak's argum ent in T he  
Integrated Circus: The New Right and Restructuring Global Market, the new 
right of the 1990s has appeared to have exhausted its popular appeal and 
political mandate. Marchak argues that the task of providing the moral, 
intellectual and political leadership for the period of radical global 
restructuring completed, the new right, a t least in its present form, is 
incapable of providing any innovative solutions to problems of planetary 
scope left in the wake of its own privatization, deregulation, desocialization 
and desubsidization policy initiatives. For global ecological, poverty, debt and 
militarization problems no lasting, let alone promissory solutions, have been 
offered. The moral and social disintegration of the hum an community as 
reflected in; increased rates of crime, drug and substance abuse in the First 
World; violent attacks against women and ethnic minorities; inner-city 
squalor; unem ploym ent; suicide; hom elessness and Third W orld 
immiserization all suggest a latent crisis of political leadership. The new 
right's politics of cynicism and apathy have filtered through to an 
increasingly disenchanted electorate: psychological disaffection, social 
alienation and political pessimism abound, ironically and especially so, in the 
wealthier states.
So the world's honeymoon with the new right may in fact be coming 
to an ignominious end. The more noxious elements of the new right 
sensibility like Maggie Thatcher and Ronald Reagan are mercifully gone. 
And George Bush, despite "winning" the Gulf War, has not been able to 
guarantee the social peace at home -  or his re-election for that matter;
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There is already a postwar letdown; it is the morning after the Gulf war, and 
dazed Americans have turned off CNN and started looking aroo id, and are 
seeing the same miserable social and economic problems that they had before 2 
August. Unemployment, the economic recession, homelessness, failing schools, 
and violent crime have erased the euphoria of victory. The Cuif War may not 
have given George Bush what he needed for re-election.^
Fueled by twelve years of republican "benign neglect" of the domestic
economy, Bush is currently under severe political attack both from within
and outside his own party to realign the nation even more rightward and put
"America first" -- for a change. But as the American economy sputters, so too
do republican, and ultimately, the global political fortunes of the new right.
Bush's self-proclaimed "new world order," while still semantics in search of
substantial meaning, is in vital jeopardy of coming unstuck even before the
Pentagon has a chance to lace it with their own, assuredly frightening,
interpretation.
Thus, as simple as it is in theory to shift emphasis from the demand to 
the supply-side of the economic equation, in practice, the monetarist counter­
revolution has become a wholly problematic political policy to implement. 
The main political problem which continues to haunt the right is that present 
economic difficulties including unem ploym ent, inflation and chronic 
financial instability would seem to demand much more economic control by 
government, not less. Consequently, neo-liberalism's solutions to general 
socio-economic malaise -  "there is nothing wrong [with the economy] ... that 
a dose of smaller and less intrusive government would not cure"^^^ -  are 
becoming an increasingly harder political act to sell -  and an ever bitter one 
to swallow. In the all-out premeditated war against "Keynesian inflation," a
1^2 "Domestic Political Initiatives for the Gulf War," New Left Review. 187, (May/June 1991), 
pp. 78.
Milton Friedman, Politics and Tyranny, pp. 36.
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terrible social price has been exacted. To be sure, inflation and interest rates 
(at least in some states in the First World) are currently running at their 
lowest level in decades. But then so too are economic growth rates. Pre­
planned contraction of economic activity to control inflation does not come 
without its associated social and political costs. Despite constant assurances 
that things will get better, the global political economy of the new right has 
not delivered the promised goods. The right has not brought economic 
development, nor has it bro'ight an informed response to recession, having 
conveniently forgotten the lessons of Keynesianism. In fact, the only thing 
the right has brought is socio-economic malaise.
In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf fiasco, the fraudulent aspects of 
new right rule are coming increasingly to the fore. As Noam Chomsky 
bitterly suggests, there may still yet be some role for the new right to play in a 
leaner and meaner global political economy:
The political leadership in Washington and London have created economic and 
social catastrophes at home and have no idea how to deal with them, except to 
exploit their military power. Following the advice of the business press, they 
may try to turn their countries into mercenary states, serving as the global 
mafia, selling 'protection' to the rich, defending them against 'Third World 
threats' and demanding proper payment for the service.^
The new world order Bush promised is in fact rapidly disintegrating into a
perverse new global disorder where might increasingly equals the Right. The
neo-liberal "market consensus" is clearly underlined by the very heavy hand
of the state.
As for the future of "freedom of trade," what is in fact fast becoming 
iroitically and frightfully clear, especially since the end of the Persian Gulf 
War, is that while developing countries and formerly communist-ruled states
Noam Chomsky, The Guardian March 25,1991, pp. 12.
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in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union struggle under the ruthless 
mercenary dictate of foreign donors to implem ent the latest and most 
radicalized version of the IMF's package of market, austerity and political 
"reforms," the so-called "free world" (America in particular) is rapidly beating 
a hasty retreat from the principles which are supposed to guide international 
la is s e z - fa ir e  commerce. As a matter of fact, the Northern industrialized 
countries are quickly becoming the most "illiberal" of traders in the world 
economy today. Despite championing the morals of the "magic of the 
marketplace" in "getting prices right" in the international arena, at home the 
political right rarely practice what it preaches. The hypocrisy anu double­
standards are commonplace. In the United States, Bush entertains neo­
isolationist and neo-protectionist sentiments in a desperate bid for re-election. 
When beaten at their own competitive game Americans are quick to cry foul 
and "unfair." And even while the shenanigans in W ashington play 
themselves out with assuredly frightening consequences, especially for the 
export-dependent economies of South-East Asia, the rest of the industrialized 
world races to erect trading blocs which run counter to the letter and spirit of 
free trade.
To sum up: hegem ony at the w orld level has been radically 
restructured by the new intellectual and political right. A less consensual, 
more exclusionary, polarized and coercive "new world order" is beginning to 




Conflict and Cooperation in the Emerging 'New' World Order
It is now apparent that the old order is indeed crumbling -- but amid such 
disorientation that the world is confronted not with a new order but a new  
global disorder. [...] Whatever shape the upcoming system eventually takes, it 
is clear that the major decisions affecting the international economy ... will be 
made in Tokyo, Bonn,... as well as in Washington. (Ann Crittenden] ^
We are still experiencing the decay of the older order and not yet the 
inauguration of a new. (David Gordon] ^
There are junctures or 'breakpoints' in history when the possibilities for major 
change are particularly great and the possible outcomes unusually wide. (John 
Ikenberry] ^
Introduction
in I; 0 previous chapter, I attem pted to apply Gramsci's concept of 
hegemony as "intellectual and moral reform" in order to account for the 
contemporary dominance of market ideology and spread of related neo-liberal 
views throughout the developed and developing world. I argued that post­
war Keynesian hegemony has largely been discredited and eclipsed by the 
intellectual and political world-view of neo-liberalism. The new right's 
elaboration, dissemination and control of ideational forces has been integral 
in producing a global "market consensus." At the economic policy level, this 
consensus involves: i) a frontal assault on the moral and economic legitimacy 
of state interventionism; ii) curtailment of Keynesian regulatory and state 
welfare policies, and internationally; iii) an intellectual justification of export- 
led development policies, emphasizing privately-determined market forces.
lA nn Crittendon, cited in Tfilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for 
World Management. Holly Sklar (ed.), Boston; South End Press, 1980, pp. 436.
2 David Gordon, "The Global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations?" New Left 
Review.. 168, (March-April 1988), pp. 25.
^  John Ikenberry, "A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American 
Postwar Settlement," International Organization. 46:1, (Winter 1992), pp. 318.
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Although the confluence of neo-liberal ideas and neo-conservative 
politics in the 1980s has moved the international capitalist order in a more 
"liberal" market-oriented and less state-controlled direction, nobody knows 
for certain what new political and economic structures will emerge from the 
present crisis of restructuring in the 1990s. This chapter is in an attempt to 
sketch out some of the contours and dynamics of the evolving "new" world 
order.
In section one, I present the main thesis of this chapter arguing that the 
structure of the contemporary capitalist order is taking on a "triad" form, with 
material power disproportionately concentrated in three regions of the world 
economy: the United States, European Community and Japan. I advance the 
position that transnational corporations (TNCs) and emergent social forces 
associated w ith globalized production will be of paramount importance in 
shaping the future contours of this triad. Section two looks at the so-called 
"new world order" through the eyes and writings of the US Council on 
Foreign Relations. My suggestion is that dominant intellectual and political 
forces in the United States are consciously aware of the rising importance of 
Japan and the European Com munity to North-western determined and 
dominated world order strategies. Section three, the core of the chapter, 
argues that the three dominant powers seem to be taking up "specialized" 
roles in the triad international division of labour commensurate with their 
respective economic and political strengths. Thus, the United States is argued 
to be supplying the coercive link in a "trilateral bloc," while the European 
Community looks after reintegrating defunct communist regimes in Eurasia 
back within the capitalist fold, and Japan provides the material surpluses for 
managing the Third World debt crisis. Section four looks at the South in this
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"new" [disjorder. I argue that the South is rapidly being left behind, possibly 
even forgotten, in this perversely Northern-centric capitalist order. A brief 
concluding section speculates on the future of the left and the need for an 
alternative vision of a truly new world order.
I. Structural Transformation in  the Evolving World Economy
The present international econom ic 'order' consists of three Interlinked 
phenomena' I) the growing complexity In the organization of the modern 
economy; II) the transnationalization of the world econom y, which Is 
Irreversible and In full expansion ... in the North and the South and iii) the 
predominance of the private sector and free market forces, both in the majority 
of national economies and In international relations. In all those phenomena, 
the transnational corporations are dominant factors. [Third W orld Guide 
91/9214
The "transnationalization of the world economy" is not a unique 
phenomena in and of itself. Historically, in the 500 years plus development 
of the world capitalist system, the geographical expansion of capital has 
generally tended to spread unevenly across the globe, reflecting technological 
developments in communication, transportation and production techniques, 
as well as the penetration by "metropolitan" capital into "peripheral" areas. 
W hat really is new in the present-day economy, however, is the 
unprecedented acceleration of in ternationalization tendencies in the 
economy. Up to, and including the early years of this century, production was 
international but corporations, for the most part, remained national. Since 
the end of World War II, however, the progressive developm ent of a 
corporate "world-view," as opposed to a national view, accelerated as 
American investors, via the Marshall Plan and Third World decolonization, 
sought to establish themselves in new lucrative markets.
4 "The Power of Transnational Corporations," Third W orld Guide 91/92 . M ontevideo: 
Garamond Press, 1990, pp. 101.
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Although the post-war geographical expansion of capital has been 
primarily an American dom inated phenomena, with the ascendance of 
Japan, a uniting Europe and the "miracles" of the NICs over the past two 
decades, transnationalization tendencies have sped-up drastically. By 1985, 
the estimated total value of international production -  defined as production 
organized on a world scale through industrial systems that transcend national 
boundaries -  for the first time exceeded the total value of international trade. 
Today, over 50% of the world's industrial output can be accounted for by 
international production, up from an estimated 30% in 1960.
Susan Strange argues that three structural changes in the contemporary 
dynamics of the world economy help explain the accelerated drive toward 
globally organized production. First, according to Strange, technological 
advancem ents in le thods of production  — whereby production is 
progressively more knowledge, capital and skills-intensive -  require hitherto 
nationally-oriented firms to seek out a niche in global markets in order to 
maintain a competitive edge. Secondly, Strange contends that the progressive 
deregulation and integration of international financial capital markets have 
facilitated a greater movement of productive capital investing abroad, making 
global production easier, quicker and cheaper than ever before. Thirdly, with 
im provem ents in telecom m unications (i.e., fax m achines, satellite  
transm issions, telex, etc.), com puter and transport technologies (i.e., 
containerized shipping), the available mix of corporate strategies used by 
multinationals for keeping production costs down has been enhanced, which 
is increasingly put to use in order to fend off intensive international 
competition. For Susan Strange, then, advancem ents in production 
technologies, international financial deregulation and the corporate drive for
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security help account for the accelerated trend tow ard international 
production.^
At the same time production has become more internationalized, it 
has also become more concentrated and centralized in the command control 
of transnational corporations (TNCs). Throughout the 1980s and into the 90s, 
the very biggest corporations have continued to get even bigger. Driven by 
persistent recessionary conditions, prevailing high interest rates, unusually 
low profit margins, and heightened internecine strife, aggressive industrial 
restructuring tendencies intensified on a global scale in the 1980s fore ng 
bankruptcies, mergers, acquisitions and hostile corporate raids. The 
unabashedly capitalist serial Fortune reported that in the 1980s, "counting 
friendly and hostile deals, more than a tliird of the companies in Fortu . e 500 
industrials were swallowed up by mergers and corporate acquisitions."^ In 
the United States alone, according to the serial, buyers dished out more than 
$1.5 trillion in "friendly" mergers, "predatory" acquisitions and "hostile" 
take-overs.
The centralization and concentration of capital in transnational 
corporate control validates Marx's great insight that the development of 
capitalism tends to concentrate an ever increasing amount of wealth in an 
ever-decreasing number of hands. According to the E conom ist, in 1950 
approximately 50% of the stock shares on the New York and London stock 
exchanges were owned by individuals. By 1989, only 21.3% of London and
5 Susan Strange, "An Eclectic Approach," The New International Political JEcoaomy. Craig 
Murphy and Roger Tooze (eds.), Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1991,33-50.
 ̂ Edmund Faltermayer, "The Deal Decade: Verdict on tlie '80s," Fortune. August 26, 1991, pp. 
58.
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New York stock shares were owned by individuals, while fully three-quarters 
were controlled by large international or transnational corporate in terests/
In today's leaner and meaner business environm ent, TNCs have 
become the driving force in the contemporary economy, constituting the 
dom inant or hegemonic position in the production hierarchy. Virtual 
monopoly control of technology, patents, and intellectual property rights 
underscore the tendency of TNCs toward market oligopoly. It is estimated 
that, "three companies dominate 70 to 75 per cent of the banana trade, six 
companies account for over 70 percent of the cocoa trade, and six companies 
control 85 to 90 per cent of the leaf tobacco trade."8 So much for competition 
and the open, "liberal" economy! A passage from Norman Girvan provides 
an excellent political economy perspective on multinationals:
When we speak of the multinational corporations [MNCs] w e mean ... a large 
and rapidly expanding sector of the world economy characterized by a 
revolutionary new system of production and accumulation. The main features of 
this new system are diversified internationalized production under centralized 
control; massive size and huge financial resources of the basic institutional unit; 
technological dynamism and leadership; and high and continuously growing 
concentration of economic power. In a very real sense this new  system now  
dominates the world economy, whether developed or underdeveloped. Both 
quantitatively and qualitatively the MNC is  continually enlarging and 
in tensify ing  its sphere of operation and control; attempting to absorb, 
subordinate, or liquidate all other systems of production and accumulation.^ 
[emphasis added]
The raw economic power concentrated in multinationals is evidenced 
in the increasing share of global wealth appropriated by TNCs. The United 
Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) estimated that 25% 
of total world gross domestic product was contributed by TNCs in 1986, up
^Economist. June 22,1991.
8 Third WQfld_Guide,9.1131. pp. 105.
 ̂ Norman Girvan, "Economic Nationalists vs. Multinational Corporations: Revolutionary or 
Evolutionary Change?" Trilateralism; The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning, for 
World Management, pp. 441.
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from 20% in 1 9 7 1 .^ 0  1 9 9 0 , the combined sales of F ortune 's global 500
industrial corporations totaled in excess of $5 trillion, equivalent to 29.44% of 
the total world domestic product of all nations ($17,190 trillion), as expressed 
in 1988 values. [By way of comparison, the total value of world merchandise 
traded in goods and services for 1991 was $3.53 trillion (US).]
It is no exaggeration to say that the very largest TNCs are countries in 
their own right. The 1990 sales for General Motors, the largest company in 
the world, for instance, exceeded the 1988 GNP of Austria, while GM’s 
combined assets of $180 billion are more than the total value of goods and 
services produced in Switzerland for 1988. Figure I highlights the data for ten 
TNCs on Fortune's Global 500 list for 1990.
Figure I.






1. General Motors (US) 125,126.0 180,236.5 761,400
2. Shell Group (UK) 107,203.5 106,349.1 137,000
3. Exxon (US) 105,885.0 87,707.0 104,000
4. Ford Motor (US) 98,274.7 173,662.7 370,400
5. IBM (US) 69,018.0 87,568.0 373,816
6. Toyota (Japan) 64,516.1 55,340.3 96,849
7. IRI (Italy) 61,433.0 N .A . 419,500
8. British Petro (UK) 59,540.5 59,199.2 116,750
9. Mobil (US) 58,770.0 41,665.0 67,300
10. Gen. Electric (US) 58,414.0 153,884.0 298,000
Source: "The Global 500," Fortune (July 29,1991).
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations in World 
Development: Trends and Prospects. New York: United Nations, 1988.
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The majority of TNCs are headquartered in a few select industrialized 
countries. A survey of Fortune's global 500 corporations reveals that 164 of 
the top 500 largest firms (based on yearly sales figures) are American based, 
while 129 are European and 111 Japanese based. Based on the aggregate sales 
of the top 100 companies in 1990, American TNCs accounted for 39% of sales, 
Japanese 16% and German 12%, respectively. Figure II reveals that fully 75% 
of the largest TNCs in the world are concentrated in just five industrialized 
countries.
Figure II.
Distribution of the Global 500 by Country of Origin: 1990 Data
Country






United States 164 General Motors (1) 125,126.0
Japan 111 Toyota Motor (6) 61,516.1
Britain 43 British Petroleum (8) ,59,540.5
France 30 Elf Aquitaine (76) 32,939.2
Germany 30 Daimler-Benz (11) 54,259.2
Sweden 17 Volvo (78) 14,688.6
Canada 12 Alcan Aluminum (150) 8,846.0
South Kv ea 11 Samsung (14) N.A.
Switzerlaii t 11 Nestle (25) 33,359.0
Australia 9 Broken Hill Prop. (120) 10,825.5
Note: Ranking of company by sales appears in parenthesis.
Source: "The Global 500," Fortune Oulv 29,1991).
Although an uncertain indicator of national economic strength and 
leadership in world production, the authors of a 1987 study entitled, 
"America and the Changing Structure of Hegemonic Production," use the 
international distribution of the world's largest 50 firms (based on yearly sales 
figures) from 1956 through to 1980 to examine America's changing status as a 
hegemonic power in world production. Their findings "clearly show that the
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United State's position in the world economy had declined over the period. 
In 1956/ 42 of the world’s top 50 firms were based in the United States. By 1980, 
the number had shrunk to 23."11 Only 16 American-based companies were in 
the top 50 in 1990. By comparison, Japan had zero TNCs in the top 50 in 1956, 
three in 1980, and nine in 1990.
The Role of the State in Restructuring
The rising power of international capital relative to national capital
and organized labour has been consistently reinforced by key policy decisions
made by neo-liberal state managers in  the 1980s and 90s. In many crucial
areas of economic policy, the anti-Keynesian managers have served to further
strengthen Internationalizing tendencies in the economy by closely aligning
the state along side the corporate interests, desires and perspectives of
transnational capital:
A profound restructuring of production, along lines promoted by large corporate 
capital, has been reinforced by interrelated developments at the level of the 
state and production. [...] In particular, the state found itself less able ... to 
maintain ... its legitimacy through the elaboration of the post-war Keynesian 
social contract. With its hegemony in peril, the advanced capitalist state, to 
varying degrees, invariably has aligned itself closer to large, corporate capital 
and acceded to neo-conservatist solutions to [economic] crises. Thus [the state] 
has become a powerful force in promoting a realignment of social forces and 
enforcing a series of policies compatible with broader neo-conservatist projects 
of restructuring and internationalizing production, privatization, deregulation 
and dismantling the Keynesian welfare state.^^ [emphasis added]
N eo-liberal m anagers perceive the sta te 's  role in economic
development as one of protecting market freedoms a n d /o r ensuring the
Albert Bergeson, et. al., "America and the Changing Structure of Hegemonic Production," 
America's Changing Role in the World System. Terry Boswell and Albert Bergeson (eds.). New  
York: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1987, pp. 159.
^2 Robert Kreklewich, "North American Integration; The International Context," Forging  
Identities and Patterns of Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Harry Diaz et. al. 
(eds.), Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press Inc., 1991, pp. 29.
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conditions for competitive markets to prevail on an international basis. They
devalue currency exchange and interest rates, deregulate national restrictions
to the free flow of capital and profit, and provide lucrative business
incentives, such as lax pollution controls, all in a desperate bid to remain
internationally competitive. Attracting new sources of productive  capital,
which is becoming increasingly scarcer relative to speculative capital, is the
name of this new economic development game. In this highly competitive
struggle to secure new sources of productive investment, not only do states
compete against other states, bu t also community against community, and
increasingly, worker against worker. Generally speaking, as the Canadian case
under the corporate d irectorsh ip  of the M ulroney adm inistration
dem onstrates, the elusive yet incessant drive to be "internationally
competitive" via the m odicum s of neo-liberalism  -- i.e., free trade,
monetarism, state non-interventionism, deregulation, privatization, etc. -
necessarily involves a reconcentration of economic power in favour of large-
scale internationally-mobile capitals, since only they have the political
wherew ithal and material resources to survive intensified world-wide
competitive pressures. Small and medium-scale capitals are absorbed in a
Darwinian social struggle where bigness has become rightness.
Although the structural power of international capital tends to
decrease the overall bargaining position of the state, it is unmistakably certain
that corporate capital still favours a politically divided world;
TNCs clearly favour an inter-state system founded on nation state ... rivalry.
TNCs rely not only on the services provided by nation states in terms of internal 
security and the reproduction of a compliant working class; they also favour 
com petition between nation states to enhance the structural power of 
transnational capital. The scramble of nation states to attract TNCs to their 
shores highlights this structural power. [...] It is a fallacy therefore to suppose
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that the importance of the nation state in the world order has diminished with  
the rapid internationalization o f c a p i t a l . [emphasis added]
By threatening disinvestment and /o r relocation, especially in recessionary
periods, international capital can play states off against one another in a bid to
secure the lowest possible labour costs and ensure labour's non-militancy;
Transnational firms, in contrast to national firms, can threaten unions with 
plant closures and relocation of investment to other countries. Countries with 
relatively weak or politically controlled labour movements will, other things 
being equal, tend to attract investments at the expense of countries with strong, 
independent labour movements.
The classic British imperialist strategy of divide and rule has been taken up 
effectively by the world's 500 or so global corporate powers; classical nation­
state imperialism has given way to the economic imperialism of Exxon, 
Toyota Motor and Daimler-Benz, respectively.
Although difficult to prove, there does appear to be an implicit new 
social contract reached between neo-liberal state managers and transnational 
corporate capital in which the state assumes the social responsibility -  and 
associated costs -  of training, educating, nurturing and skilling the labour 
force in accordance to the dynamic requirements of international capital. 
This suggestion is perhaps affirmed in the fact that the state's role in the 
economy, particularly in the macroeconomy, despite the persistent anti-statist 
rhetoric of the neo-libertarians, has increased not decreased:
[T]he role of the Slate has grown substantially since the early 1970s; state 
policies have become increasingly decisive on the international front, not more 
futile. Governments have become more and more Involved in active management 
of monetary policy and interest rates in order to condition exchange rate 
fluctuations and short-term capital flows. They have become actually and 
potentially decisive in bargaining over production and investment agreements.
And, small consolation though it may be, in an era of spreading monetarist
Peter Burnham, "Neo-Gramscian Hegemony and the International Order," Capital and 
Class. 45, (Autumn 1991), pp. 86.
I'l Stephen Gill and David Law, "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital," 
International Studies.Quarterly. 33:4, (December 1989), pp. 487.
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conservatism, everyone including transnalionai corporations has become 
increasingly U jpendent upon coordinated state intervention and resolution of 
the underlying dynamics of crisis.^^
The State, therefore, is increasingly central to capitalist strategies for 
resolving the world economic crisis. To cope with, and hopefully overcome 
the crisis, the state has taken on the role of supplying comfortable and 
profitable havens for international investors in a turbulent world economy. 
International investment capital is increasingly concerned with how much -  
or how little — the state expends in providing its citizens with the basic 
hum an amenities and social infrastructure needed to reproduce a highly 
technical and skills-oriented work-force. Clearly in this globally competitive 
game, Canada and the United States are rapidly losing ground relative to 
Germany, Japan and the newly industrializing countries (NICs) in South-East 
Asia. The tendency of international capital, in fact, is to unify hitherto 
disparate national labour forces on an international scale as a general wage- 
cost reduction strategy. As a consequence, a global "wage contract" is 
emerging, whereby the cost of purchasing labour power is determined not by 
national standards, bu t by the com petitive price prevailing in the 
international marketplace. Labour, particularly high-skilled labour, has 
become an increasingly "commodisized" good.
An International of Capital?
As early as 1975, the perceptive Canadian Marxist scholar Stephen
Hymer observed that an international capitalist class, based on Fortune's 500
largest corporations, was in the process of formation;
[A]n international capitalist class is emerging whose interests lie in the world 
economy as a whole and a system of international private property which
15 David Gordon, "The Global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations?" pp. 63-64.
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allows free movement of capital between countries. The process is contradictory 
and may break down, but for the present there is a strong tendency for the most 
powerful segments of the capitalist class increasingly to see their future in the 
further growth of the world market rather than its curtailment.^^ [emphasis 
added]
Advancing Hymer's case, contemporary Gramscian-influenced scholars 
Stephen Gill and David Law have persuasively argued that the material 
interests and concerns of a leading in ternational class "fraction" are 
inextricably bound up w ith the progressive "transnationalization" and 
"liberalization" of the global political economy. In the present conjuncture, 
neo-liberal policy is thought to be congruent w ith the dom inant material 
interests of this globally nascent capitalist class. Thus, for these two scholars, 
the global political economy complex is theorized to be not only an 
international state system, but also an international class system with class 
forces operating across, as well as within, national boundaries.
For Gramscian political economists, emergent social forces generated by 
changing production structures are the starting point for thinking about 
possibilities of present and future world order development. Concerning the 
evolving contours of world order. Gill contends that a dialectical struggle is 
currently being waged between transnational social forces and national social 
forces:
[T]he principles of organization of [the] reconstructed and restructured world 
order system are increasingly those associated with liberal economic ideas and 
interests (e.g., transnational capital), which are engaged in a dialectical 
struggle vis-a-vis embedded mercantalist and statist perspectives (often 
associated with the public sector, the security complex and protected industries 
that are non competitive internationally).^®
Stephen Hymer, The Multinational Corporation; A Radical Approach -  Papers by Stephen 
Hymer. Robert Cohen et. al. (eds.). New York; Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 262.
See Stephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political Economy; Perspectives. Problems and 
Policies. Baltimore: johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.
I® Stephen Gill, "Historical Materialism, Gramsci, and International Political Economy," Ihe 
New International Political Economy, pp. 65.
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Stephen Hymer himself predicted that the progressive "deterritorialization of 
the capitalist mode of production" would initiate a new dialectical struggle in 
which national industries, non-mobile labour and associated class forces 
reliant for their survival on the state would be in constant collision with 
international interests. While it is perhaps too early yet to predict which set 
of social forces -  i.e., national or transnational -  will ultimately prevail in the 
global political economy, the rising protectionist mood in the North, the 
tendency tow ard "managed" rather than "free" trade systems and the 
apparent fragm entation of the world economy into three regional neo- 
m ercantalist blocs centred on the United States (NAFTA), Germany 
(European Community) and Japan (Pacific Rim) would suggest, at the present 
time anyway, that nationalist social forces have gained the upper hand. Even 
still, as Craig Murphy points out, the global political economy is highly fluid:
[Tjhe puzzle is far from being solved. In fact, it is not even clear that it is a 
single puzzle that is being solved. Intellectuals, political parties, business 
leaders, and governments in the North all seem to be working on at least two 
puzzles at a time. We may end up with three North-South systems, one centred 
on V/estern Europe, one on the United States, and one on Japan. [...] Or we could 
end up with two blocs or one, But no matter which order emerges, most signs 
point to a continuation of the pattern of the early 1980s. The position of the 
dependent Third World in [the] new bloc or blocs will be subordinate, probably 
even more subordinate than in the postwar North-South bloc.l^
Whatever order(s) eventually emerge from this period of restructuring, it is a
guaranteed bet that the major decisions determining the contours of the
future world order system will be made in Bonn, Tokyo and Washington.
Craig Murphy, "Freezing the North-South Bloc(k) After the East-West Thaw," Socialist 
Review. 20:3, (March 1990), pp. 40.
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The "Triad” in the Global Political Economy
Several key macroeconomic indicators point to the unmistakable 
conclusion that the post-Cold War global political economy is, for all intents 
and purposes, a "triad," with total global wealth and total political economy 
power disproportionately concentrated in three countries or regions of the 
world capitalist complex: Japan, the twelve country European Community 
and the United States. Fully 72% of the total goods and services produced by 
the entire world in 1988 was contributed by the fourteen members of the triad. 
On the other hand, 128 countries from the developing world accounted for 
only 14.5% of world product in 1988. Figure III highlights the unequal -- and 
growing -  gross distribution of total global wealth appropriated by the triad 
and the rest of the world, both developed and developing.
Figure III.
Percentage Share of Total World Product Appropriated by Country or Region in 1988
Total World Gross Percentage Share of
Domestic Product Global World Product
(■ $ trillions -) (- %'age distribution -)
...................................  1988 ........................................
World Total 17.190 100%
Triad Totals 12.431 72.3%
United States 4.847 28.2
Japan 2.844 16.5
European Community 4.740 27.6
G-7 Countries Totals* 11.967 69.6%
Industrialized Countries Totals * *  14.710 85.5%
Developing Countries Totals *** 2.480 14.5%
Notes: * The G-7 Countries include, by order of GDP size: USA, Japan, Germany, France, 
Italy, UK, and Canada.
** Data is for 33 Industrialized Countries.
*** Data is for 128 Developing Countries.
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 1991.
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While the gulf between the North and the South -- and between the 
rich and the poor within the North -  is steadily widening, the gap between 
the triad powers at the centre of the world capitalist system is closing rapidly 
in several key macroeconomic indicators, both in relative and absolute terms. 
In fact, if we consider the European Community a "united" political economy 
entity — which is still very far from the truth -- it is the world’s most powerful 
"bloc." Figure IV looks at the triad in the global economic order more closely.
Figure IV.
The "Triad" in the Global Political Economy: (1968 Statistics)
US £ £ U]2an
Population (millions) 266 328 128
GNP ($ billions) 4,863 4,520 2,577
GNP per capita 19,840 13,620 21,020
Exports ($ billions) 393 526 287
% of industrial countries GDP 35.0 33.4 20.6
current accounts ($ millions) -113,740 +39,430 +82,610
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.3 9.2 2.2
# of Companies in Fortune 5(X) 164 129 111
IMF Voting Power (%) 19.6 28.9 6.1
World Bank Voting Power (%) 15.1 29.7 8.7
ODA as % of GNP 0.15 n.a. 0.32
Note: The European Community is shown as a united "bloc."
Sources: Economist; IMF; Fortune: World Bank; UN; UNDP.
Figure IV underscores the fact that the capitalist world order Is now a 
polycentric one; a preponderance of power no longer rests in the United 
States. The precarious and uncertain domestic and international economic 
position the United States finds itself v is -a -v is  Japan and a uniting Europe 
now place real constraints on America's freedom to dictate the course of 
international affairs in a post-Cold War setting. As Noam Chomsky asserts, 
"the basic contours of the actual new world order were coming into focus
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twenty years ago, with the emergence of a 'tripolar world' as economic power 
diffused within US domains."20 The glory days of American hegemony have 
clearly past.
The Triad and Foreign Direct Investment
Recent trends in foreign direct investm ent (FDI) also reinforce the 
assertion that it is becoming increasingly pertinent for political economists to 
see and theorize the evolving world order structure in triad terms. A study 
published by the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations 
(UNCTC), for instance, confirms that the triad is the m ost powerful and 
fastest growing trading and investment "bloc" in the contemporary world 
economy. The Centre's report shows that there was a marked trend in the 
1980s toward what it calls "triad trade" and "triad foreign direct investment." 
According to the Centre, during the 1980s international investment by TNCs 
exploded, averaging 29% each year. Figure V shows that a staggering 90% of 
total FDI stock in the world in 1989 was invested by a member from the triad.
Figure V.
Percentage of Foreign Direct Investment by Country or Region of Origin
1960 1973 1989
  percent of total.....................
Triad Totals 93% 92% 90%
United States 47.1 48.0 28.3
Europe 45.2 39.0 50.2
Japan 0.7 4.9 11.5
All Others LQ fiJ. Ifidî
Total 100% 100% 100%
Source: Monthly Review. 43:9, (February 1992), pp. 12.
2^ Noam Chomsky, "The Struggle for Democracy in a Changed World," Review of African 
Political Economy. #50, (April 1991), pp. 15
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As of 1989, the Uiiited States accounted for the largest single stock of overseas 
investment with $345 billion, compared with $332 billion for the EC, and $110 
billion for Japan. By the Centre's calculations, the sum total of foreign direct 
investment stock had surpassed the $1.5 trillion mark in 1989. Over 80'X, of 
that total was controlled by members from the triad.21
Throughout the 1980s, FDI became increasingly selective, situated in 
and on the triad members itself. [See Figure VI].
Figure VI.
Concentration By Region of Accumulated Foreign Direct Investment
1967 1973 1980 1989
—  percent distribution......
Developed Countries 69.4 73.9 78.0 80.8
Underdeveloped Countries 2ILâ 2 M  22J2 1 2 2
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Monthly Review. 43:9, (February 1992), pp. 14.
In part, this accelerating investment pattern centred on the triad is explained 
by transnationals driving to firmly im plant them selves in lucrative 
European, American and Japanese markets in expectation of escalating 
N orthern protectionism. Nonetheless, the tendency for triad members to 
invest amongst themselves, at the expense of developing countries, is a 
disturbing trend. Despite desperate efforts of the Third World to attract 
m uch-needed overseas investm ent, just five developing countries — 
Singapore, Brazil, Hong Kong, China, and Mexico -  accounted for more than
21 See United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), World Investment 
Report 1991: The Triad in Foreign Direct Investment. New York: UNCTC, 1991.
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half of all investment flows to the developing world in 1989. Although there 
are a number of free-export processing zones in the Third World, it is 
apparent that as production becomes progressively intellectual and capital- 
intensive, the corporate powers that be clearly prefer a highly specialized, 
educated and skilled work-force. Indeed, transnationals which relocated to 
the Third World during the austere 1970s and 80s are coming back "home" to 
the North in droves as most labour forces in the South are quite unable to 
meet the dem anding and unceasing changing employment requirements 
which globally organized production necessarily entails. The struggle in the 
South would seem to be one of staying afloat in a global sea of poverty. Many 
formerly Third World countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, are sinking 
into an abysmal Fourth, or even Fifth World status in the post-Cold War 
global hierarchy. Most citizens of the South (except of course its elites) lack 
the necessary purchasing power to buy many of the high-tech, high-cost goods 
TNCs produce. All of which underscores the tragic fact that the developing 
countries are becoming less and less a priority for the dom inant political 
economies of the world, and more and more marginalized in  a "triad" global 
system.
Conclusion to Section I
In this section, I have pu t forward the thesis that the international 
"order" is taking on a triad structure centred on Japan, the United States and 
the European Community. I looked at the increasing importance of TNCs in 
capitalist development, suggesting that emergent social forces connected with 
international production will be vital actors in determining the shape of 
future world order. So far the argum ent has been presented in highly
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structuralist terms, as if to imply that globalization tendencies, which have 
given rise to the triad, are the benign evolutionary products of "advanced" 
transnational /  national capitalist development. Of course, as Gramsci would 
suspect, this is far from the truth. In the next section I outline, in more 
dynamic detail, the intellectual and political foundations of the system which 
are consciously striving to shape, in high Gramscian fashion, a trilateral 
world capitalist order.
II. Shaping a New World Order: The US Council on Foreign Relations
Policy ideas do more than simply 'enlighten' political elites. They have a 
political as well as a cognitive impact. They offer opportunities for new  
coalitions of interests and give intellectual force or Inspiration to those 
groupings. Ideas do change minds, but it is in their practical value in solving 
political dilemmas which give them a force in history. [John Ikenberry) ^2
Despite America's substantial and ongoing relative material decline
v i s - a - v i s  Japan and a uniting Europe, it is still undeniably the dominant
power in the international state system; the United States continues to set the
agenda for global change. Im portant economic, political and military
decisions which impact the world economy profoundly still emanate from
the corridors of power in Washington. Institutionally, the international
system  consistently reflects the "liberal" w orld-view  of American
internationalist-m inded business and political elite. Perhaps even more
im portant, from a Gramscian perspective anyway, American consumerist
values, culture, language and ideology permeate the entire global political
economy complex. As America still holds a commanding position in the
world, crucial intellectual debates concerning the "new" post-Cold War
John Ikenberry, "A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American 
Postwar Settlement," pp. 318.
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international order and America's place in it will doubtless be of paramount 
importance to the evolving dynamics of world order.
In the next section I look at the recent "world order" writings of the US 
Council on Foreign Relations. It is argued that the vision its intellectuals 
disseminate as Gramscian-type persuaders of public opinion in the pages of 
the journal Foreign Affairs is im portant for understanding what the ruling 
classes in America are thinking, and more importantly, doing to bring the 
"new world order" into being.
The US Council on Foreign Relations
The US Council on Foreign Relations was established to inform,
enlighten and influence public and private opinion in the United States -
and elsewhere -  through persuasion:
In speaking of public enlightment, it is well to bear in mind that the Council 
has chosen its function [as] the enlightment of the leaders of opinion. These, in 
turn, each in his own sphere, spread the knowledge gained here in ever- 
widening circles.23
The Council's main public sounding board is the journal Foreign Affairs. 
which is published five times annually by the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. While the journal's raison  d 'e t r e  is supposedly to 
"inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas," 
the scholars highlighted in Foreign Affairs generally tend to subscribe to the 
hegemonic "neo-realist" tradition dom inant in liberal American political 
economy scholarship.
An over-riding concern in neo-liberal scholarship is the "problem" of 
how the three dominant (or so-called "great powers") in the world system -
Council on Foreign Relations, 1951 Annual Report. Cited In Trilateralism: The Trilateral 
Commission and Elite Pianning for World Management, pp. 134.
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America, Japan and a uniting Europe — can best manage their "complex 
interdependence" in an era of continuing American hegemonic decline. The 
general unchallenged assumption in this scholarship is that a stable world 
order structure requires a "benevolent" system supporter — i.e., a hegemon 
who can be entrusted with the responsibility of providing moral and 
intellectual leadership, while at the same time strong enough to guarantee, by 
force if necessary, the "rules" of an "open" world economy. Although 
variations on the neo-realist hegemonic stability theory do exist, suffice it to 
say that the majority of these intellectuals equate the classical "pax" period of 
American hegemony -  1945 to circa 1973 -  with international stability and 
order. They equate the present-day period of chronic financial dislocation and 
political disorder with a decline of American power at the world level.
The keynote address of American neo-realism is the need to develop 
"international collaboration" and steering mechanisms to stabilize the world 
economy in rapid and profound transformation. Neo-realists assert that since 
"the United States no longer has the moral authority or the economic 
leverage to dictate the course of events ... leadership has of necessity become a 
collaborative effort."24 Fred Bergsten provides the context for this thinking:
To restore effective systemic defences, America, Japan and a uniting Europe must 
join to provide collective leadership. The Big Three need to start acting as an 
informal steering committee for the world economy -- reinvigorating the 
existing institutional structures, creating new ones and initiating concrete steps 
to utilize them consistently. [...] Effective international economic cooperation 
will depend on the achievement of joint leadership by the Big Three economic 
superpowers.^^
24 Michael Aho and Bruce Stokes, "The Year the World Economy Turned," Foreign Affairs. 
70:1, (Winter 1991), pp. 160.
25 Fred Bergsten, "The World Economy After the Cold War," Foreign Affairs. 69:3, (Summer 
1990), pp. 105.
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In this new "polycentric" world, America is encouraged to make the difficult 
adjustment from hegemon to partner. Meantime, a uniting Germany and 
Japan are encouraged to take greater leadersh ip  responsibilities 
commensurate with their economic super-power status in the international 
trade, monetary, and security regimes which manage global order — i.e., 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Group of 
Seven Industrialized Countries (G-7), General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), United N ations (UN), In ternational M onetary Fund 
(IMF)/World Bank, etc. It is generally understood amongst neo-realists — and 
many within the ruling classes of America -  that a peaceful resolution to the 
world economic crisis is attainable only through political accommodation and 
genuine international cooperation. For these intellectual and political forces, 
international collaboration in a post-Pax Americana era via "management by 
committee" strategies is not only necessary, but also desirable.
The political sentimentalities of Foreign Affairs and its subscribers tend 
to be aligned w ith  w hat m ight be referred to as American "liberal 
internationalism ." This political economy view-point, as Stephen Gill 
relates, is associated w ith the "enlightened" m aterial in terests of 
internationalist-oriented business and political fractions within the American 
ruling classes:
[TJhey are concerned with opening the world to the freer movement of capital, 
goods and services: they are liberal economic internationalists. [Tjhey advocate 
that the US government cooperate more with its key allies in providing a 
steering and stabilizing capacity for the global economy, as well as helping to 
underpin its systemic Integrity. [They] ... demand greater macroeconomic 
stability. The persistent US budget deficits are viewed by this grouping as a
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key cause of the huge balance-of-payments deficits, the rise nf protectionism, 
and the gyrations in, and current weakness of, the US dollar.^^
The ideological view-point produced and disseminated in the pages of
Foreign Affairs, is thus hardly representable of "the people." However,
despite the obvious politico-intellectual -  and hence ideological slant -  of the
journal, recent contributions to Foreign Affairs frequently offer to the
excluded a penetrating insider's view into the "new" thinking presently
informing high-level architects of post-Cold War American foreign policy.
Project "Sea-Change:" The Councils' Plans for a New World Order
Foreign Affairs frequently deals in prescriptive measures that the 
United States could and /o r should take in managing contradictions arising in 
the world economy. In the autum n of 1990, for instance, the Council 
launched an ambitious, on-going scholarly program  entitled "Project Sea- 
Change." As the editors of Foreign Affairs put it, the project's "primary 
purpose ... is to generate a series of imaginative analyses of a radically 
changing American role in the world" in the hope of inspiring "a wider 
debate on the future of America in the world."^^ Leading intellectuals of 
American foreign policy have been asked by the journal's editors to "describe 
a vision of the future in those key geographical and functional areas of 
greatest relevance to American security and w e l l - b e in g . I n  essence, the 
Council's "Sea-Change" project w ants leading establishm ent scholars of
Stephen Gill, "Reflections on Global Order and Sociohistorical Time," Alternatives. 16:3, 
(Summer 1991), pp. 291.
27 The Editors, "A World Transformed," Foreign Affairs. 69:4, (Fall 1990), pp. 92. The Fall 1990 
edition of Foreign Affairs reproduces several articles inspired by the Sea-Change project. The 
full collection of essays has been published in Sea-Changes: American Foreign Policy in a 




American foreign policy to articulate their vision of America in a "new world 
order." As one would expect, organic intellectuals are indispensable for 
thinking about the contours of an evolving world order system. To bring 
America's best minds together to bear on the problems of the world is what 
the "Sea-Change" project is all about.
The Council's "Sea-Change" project appears to be prom pted by four 
"momentous" transformations, particularly in Eurasia, in the global system. 
These include: i) the gradual eclipse of the Cold War at the world level; ii) the 
collapse of East European and Soviet state socialist models; iii) the growing 
importance (or challenge) of Japan and the European Com m unity to 
dominant Northwestern world order strategies and iv) the embrace of market 
principles and liberal democratic values the world over.29
Although the "new world order" phrase has become summarily 
popular everywhere ever since US Secretary of State James Baker IF first 
announced to Congress that America was working on a "new order" ■ the 
Middle East in September 1990, it is important to note that Baker himself has 
admitted that the administration has only just begun thinking about a "new" 
system. On a deeper, more politico-practical level, the intellectual thrust of 
Project "Sea-Change" may be to provide some much-needed substance to the 
Bush administration's poorly defined "new order" vision. Given the Bush 
administration's self-identified greatest fault -  i.e., the lack of a "vision 
thing" -  it may well be up to the intellectuals w ithin the powerful US 
Council on Foreign Relations "think-tank" to come up w ith America's 
political blueprint for a "new world order," which would include (one would
For a discussion of the so-called "sea-changes" in world politics, see in particular Mile 
Kahler's article, "The International Political Economy," Foreign Affairs. 69:4, (Fall 1990), 139- 
151,
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expect) a more coherent definition of the "new order" phrase, as well as an 
ideological defence of America's real interests in it.
It is perhaps instructive at this point to note that the Council's 
contemporary intellectual project, which is aimed specifically at formulating a 
coherent American post-Cold foreign policy, is not without historical 
precedent. For instance, the Council's intellectuals were heavily involved in 
all aspects and on all levels of planning for a new post-World War II order 
which, in the Council's mind, would be guaranteed and dominated by the 
United States. Specially assigned by the State Department in 1940, the Council 
established a task force group — the War and Peace Studies Project -- whose 
twofold purpose was to: i) design American strategical war aims and ii) plan 
for the eventual peace. Regarding the latter, as early as 1942 the task force 
group had laid much of the intellectual and technical groundwork for 
integrating and reconstructing the post-war world economy under American 
leadership. In "A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the 
Anglo-American Postwar Settlement," John Ikenberry convincingly argues 
that the Council's "experts intervened at a particularly fluid moment in 
history to help the British and American political establishments identify 
their interests, thereby creating the bases of postwar economic cooperation."^^ 
In addition to helping design the international monetary arrangements for a 
global Keynesian order, the Council also proposed, in early 1943, the seed idea 
for an international body which would be responsible for maintaining post­
war peace and security -  the United Nations. Laurence Shoup and William 
Minter maintain that during the war:
39 John Ikenberry, "A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American 
Postwar Settlement," pp. 291.
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[T]he Council's power was unrivaled. It had more information, representation, 
and decision making power on postwar questions than the Congress, any 
executive bureaucracy except the Department o f  State, or other private group, 
it had a very large input into decisions on the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank, and the United Nations. The formulators had indeed been able to 
gain positions of strength and put their plans for US hegemony into effect.^^ 
[emphasis added]
Through the conscious planned efforts of Keynesian-influenced US 
intellectuals, then, a carefully constructed new world order -  Pax Americana - 
- emerged from the systemic chaos of World War II.
In thinking about a "new" post-Pax Americana world order, three 
issues deemed vital to America's national interests can be identified by 
project "Sea-Change." They include: i) active American collaboration in 
creating a new security apparatus for Europe; ii) a refocusing of attention on 
N orth-South developm ent, democracy and peace issues, including: 
"selective" restrictions on Third World arms sales; a reconcentration of 
efforts focusing on nuclear non-proliferation in the South; and stepped-up 
vigilante-type campaigns aimed at restricting the North-South traffic in illicit 
drugs, containing the spread of AIDS, and reducing the threat of international 
terrorism; and iii) a redistribution of power and "burden-sharing" roles in the 
international financial and economic organizations commensurate w ith the 
special political abilities and economic strengths of Japan, the European 
Community and the United States.
O ther au thors suggested  that prom oting  global capitalism , 
reinvigorating the world economy and reorienting former "command" 
economies in Eurasia toward market principles are plausible (and desirable 
goals) for the architects in W ashington searching for a new post-Cold War
Laurence Shoup and William Minter, "Shaping a New World Order: The Council on Foreign 
Relations' Blueprint for World Hegemony," Trilateralism; Elite Planning for W orld  
). 150.
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American foreign policy. Despite differing individual prejudices concerning 
where America should be focusing its efforts, however, all authors are in 
genuine consensus on one point: in the evolution of the world economy 
America should, and will have to play, a more conciliatory and constructive 
and a less unilateralist and protectionist role than in the past. Hence, 
"unilateral American action is likely to be less effective, and the workings of 
an untram m eled m arket may be less desirable than innovation (or 
renovation) of m echanism s for international c o l l a b o r a t i o n . " ^ 2  Former 
National Security advisor to the Carter administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski 
provides an "enlightened" neo-realist's summary of America's challenges in 
the "new world order." [’•'Note: In the passage selected, I have taken the 
liberty of highlighting the key themes of the US Council's "Sea-Change" 
project.]
Unless America pays more attention to its domestic weaknesses a new global 
pecking order could emerge early in the next century... Accordingly, US policy 
will have to strike a more deliberate balance among global needs for continued 
American commitment, the desirability of some devolution of ... regional 
security responsibilities and the imperatives of America's domestic renewal...
More emphasis will have to placed on cooperation w ith genuine partners, 
including shared decision-maWng in  world security issues... Though America is 
today admittedly the world's only superpower, global conditions are too 
complex and America's domestic health too precarious to sustain a worldwide 
Pax Americana. A truly new world order, based on consensus, rule of law and 
peaceful adjudication of disputes, may eventually become a reality. But that 
day is still far off. As of now, the [new world order] phrase is a slogan in search 
of substantive m e a n i n g . ^ ^  [emphasis added]
32 Miles Kahler, "The International Political Economy," pp. 150.
33 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Selective Global Commitment," Foreign Affairs. 70:4, (Fall 1991), pp. 
20 .
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The Council's Links to the Trilateral Commission
In many key respects, the Council's new order vision mirrors that of 
the Trilateral Commission, which was established in 1973 by powerfully 
influential private business persons and public officials from the United 
States, Western Europe and J a p a n . 3 4  The key purpose of the Trilateral 
Commission, in the words of one of its founders, David Rockefeller, is to 
prom ote greater "understanding and cooperation am ong international 
a l l i e s . "3 5  Holly Sklar, author of Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission 
and Elite Planning for World Management, is more to the point:
[T]he Commission’s purpose is to engineer an enduring partnership among the 
ruling classes of North America, Western Europe and Japan -- hence the term 
'trilateral' -- in order to safeguard the interests of Western capitalism in an 
explosive world. The private Trilateral Commission is attempting to mold 
public policy and construct a framework for international stability.3^
More generally, the establishment of the Commission in 1973 can be seen as
an early conscious response of an internationalist-m inded business and
political class to a declining American hegemony. It is also a recognition of
intellectuals from that same international class of the rising importance of
Japan and Europe to dominant North-western strategies for stabilizing the
international order in rapid transformation.
34 It is perhaps not surprising that the intellectual thrust of the US Council on Foreign 
Relations' Sea-Change project parallels that of the Trilateral Commission. Many past and/or  
present members of the Trilateral Commission are regular contributors to Foreign Affairs. 
Generally speaking, however, the US Council holds more political currency in the United 
States than what is populariy thought of as an elitist and exclusive Trilateral Commission. For 
a detailed discussion of who currently belongs to the Trilateral Commission, see Stephen Gill, 
American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1990.
35 David Rockefeller, cited in Trilateralism; The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for 
W.pjld-Managfimit. pp. xii.
36 Holly Sklar, Trilateralism. pp. 2.
153
The trilateralist goal of fostering greater international cooperation is
sought by creating "some type of common vision of how the political
economy works, what its key problems are, why these problems exist, how
they might be approached collectively, and perhaps solved."^^ In particular,
trilateralists consume a great deal of effort in attempting to "internationalize"
the outlook of its Japanese members. Japan's "different" national political
culture, its isolationist and Fascist past, its growing anti-American
sentiments, businesses' close alliance with government, and the general lack
of "internationalist" m inded intellectuals in Japan have caused "problems"
for the would-be architects of a trilateral world order. Regarding Japan's
isolationist intellectuals, one German member of the Trilateral Commission
laments in a recent edition of Foreign Affairs:
[Tjhere exists no sizable number of Japanese intellectuals, comparable to the 
Atlanticists in Europe, who genuinely believe in internationalist ideas and 
common purposes, other than the containment of communism. The few who do 
profess shared ideals in personal contacts with foreigners or in international 
forums still tend to conform to mainstream Japanese international opinion in a 
domestic setting, so as not to be thought of as 'un-Japanese.'^^
The "Japan problem" would appear to be the largest stumbling block
for the Trilateral Commission, and by extension, the US Council's project for
promoting coopération amongst international "allies." Despite the Council
and Commission's strategic long-term plamiing, in present-day United States
Japan "bashing" has become a "politically correct" sport of sorts -  indeed, a
popular strategy for getting [re?]-elected to the country's highest political
office. On the other hand, Prime Minister Kiichi M iyazawa's recent
37 Stephen Gill, "Intellectuals and Transnational Capital," Socialist Register 1990, Ralph 
Miliband et. al, (eds.), London: Merlin Press, 1990, pp. 3(j().
38 Karel van Wolfren, "The Japan Problem Revisited," Foreign Affairs. 69:4, (Fall 1990), pp. 
51.
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comments that Americans "lack a work ethic/' are lazy and partly illiterate do 
little to promote friendly relations between "allies." Neither does America's 
persistent negative $40 billion trade [im]balance with Japan. In fact, if one was 
to typify American-Japanese relations in a word it would most certainly not 
be jovial. Which of course brings us to two over-riding questions: to what 
extent, and for whom, can a "new" world order be planned by cloistered elitist 
intellectuals from the US Council or the Trilateral Commission? Indeed, 
"the key question ... is whether contradictions can be politically managed, and 
if so, by whom and for what p u r p o s e s ? " ^ ^
III. Co-Operation and Conflict in the New World Order:
The Kautsky-Lenin Debate Revisited and Recast
A truism about the New World Order is that it is economically tripolar and 
militarily unipolar. [Noam Chom-^ky)
There is little doubt that for an "organic" trilateral alliance to become 
Gramscian hegemonic would require a great deal of intra-elite and cross­
national cooperation between different national and international fractions of 
bourgeoisie social forces from Japan, the United States and Europe. The 
cooperation that trilateralism would necessarily entail is believed to be 
impossible in orthodox Marxist interpretations of capitalist restructuring, 
Marxists generally reject the notion that ruling classes can consciously and 
strategically plan, via world order designs of the US Council, the institutional 
underpimiings for a "new world order." They maintain that capitalist world 
order has little to do w ith the consciousness of policy m akers, or the 
articulation of a persuasive ideology. For orthodox Marxists, world "order" -
Stephen Gill, "Intellectuals and Transnational Capital," pp. 296.
Noam Chomsky, "New World Order?" Guardian Studies. April 1991, pp. 9.
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to the degree that one can speak of order in a situation of perpetual 
international anarchy, constant economic and political crises and disorderly 
inter-imperialist rivalry -  is produced by material not ideational forces. They 
assert that Gramscian followers' preoccupation with the articulation of neo­
liberal ideology is an idealist account of ideas determining economic policy. 
For Marxists, world order is purely accidental not purely design. In short, 
orthodox Marxists reject Gramscian political economy because it is believed to 
over-emphasize the power of ideological structures (idealism) at the expense 
of material forces (economism) in accounting for international capitalist 
restructuring.^!
In defence of the Gramscian perspective, Marxian theoretical orthodoxy 
is rejected on the grounds that it tends to under-estimate or marginalize the 
"hegemony as consensus" problematic addressed by Gramsci, while over­
em phasizing the economically determ ining variables of the system . 
Gramscian-influenced scholars contend that radical transformations in the 
global political economic order cannot be simply reduced to, nor understood 
as, the product of intensified "super" imperialist rivalry. The Marxist 
schema, as recently suggested by Peter Burnham that, "restructuring of 
accumulation occurs in a context of inter-imperialist rivalry in which nation­
states seek temporarily to overcome the contradictions of the capital relation 
which are manifest in uneven development "42 is believed to have been 
superseded by em ergent global production and class structures. In a 
transnational world capitalist system where social power is increasingly
4! For an orthodox Marxist critique of Gramscian political economy, see especially, Peter 
Burnham , "Neo-Gramscian Hegemony and International Order," Capital and Class. 45, 
(Autumn 1991), 73-93.
42 Ibid., pp. 81.
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concentrated in agencies which operate across, as well as within national 
boundaries, it is believed to be very problematic to see the world in terms of 
competing national capitalisms of the classic imperialist theories:
[Mjany socialist perspectives on international relations have failed to develop 
in such a way that they are able to capture adequately the nature of global 
transformations. This is perhaps because many recent writers have been 
constrained by the dominant heritage of earlier theories of imperialism. The 
classical theories of imperialism -- inspired by Lenin, Bukhairn and Hilferding 
-- were developed at a period when interaction between nation-states, acting in 
a militarist-mercantalist way to further the interests of their own monopoly 
capital, seemed to be the primary manifestation of international conflict. Most 
classical views have a tendency to reify the interstate system, seeing national 
capitalist classes and states as particular and relatively fixed configurations in 
a wider system of permanent inter-imperialist rivalry and crisis.
The point to be made is that imperialist theories -  defined classically in terms
of inter-nationalist rivalry, territorial conquest and military expansionism -
have theoretical defects w hen applied to the contem porary case of
international restructuring. Although conflict am ongst nations remains
central to our understanding of what is likely to replace the old Pax American
order, it is a new conflict which transcends the boundaries and schema of old
state-centric theories and political practices.
The contemporary ideological divide between orthodox Marxists and
"revisionist" Gramscian scholars has its roots deeply situated in the famous
World War I Kautsky-Lenin exchanges. In 1914 Karl Kautsky argued, in
heretical fashion, that the progressive developm ent of capitalism could
eventually lead to a phase he called "ultra-imperialism," a phase of capitalist
development in which rival capitalists of disparate political and national
creeds would set aside their individual differences and join mutual forces
Stephen Gill, "Intellectuals and Transnational Capital," pp. 294-295.
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together in combating the Marxian tendency for the rate of profit to fall.44 
Kautsky was of the opinion that a stable and cooperative organization of 
relations amongst dominant rival capitalists could be achieved on the 
grounds that greater economic cooperation would inevitably lead to greater 
forms of political cooperation. Thus, for Kautsky, it was possible to conceive 
of a day when an internationalist "coincidence of interests" am ongst 
capitalists developed. While not eliminating capitalist conflict altogether, 
Kautsky believed this coincidence of interests would significantly mitigate 
some of the more destabilizing tendencies inherent in a capitalist mode of 
accumulation.^^ The type of cooperative world order structure advanced by 
the intellectuals w ithin the US Council on Foreign Relations would most 
closely approximate a neo-Kautskian interpretation of "advanced" capitalist 
developm ent.
In counterpoint to Kautsky, Lenin argued in his classic 1916 work 
Imperialism. The Highest Stage of Capitalism, that capitalists could never 
fully set aside their individual differences or meaningfully cooperate with 
one another, let alone create a Kautskian-type stable world regime for 
capitalist accumulation. Arguing on more classical Marxist ground, Lenin 
claimed that crises tendencies inherent in the capitalist mode of production 
and accum ulation, in conjunction w ith the M arxian law of uneven 
development, always compel capitalists of one country to seek gain at the 
expense of others. Sticking to Marx's dictum that "one capitalist always kills
44 According to Marx, the rate of profit tends to fall because, with the advance of technology, 
more capital is progressively invested in "fixed" (i.e., machinery, production materials and 
processes) as o p p o sé  to "variable" capital (i.e., workers' wages).
45 See Karl Kautsky, "Ultra-Imperialism," re-publlshed in New Left Review. 59, (January- 
February 1970), pp. 41-46.
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many/' Lenin contended that national capitalisms engage in cut-throat zero- 
sum competition in order to exploit market share, secure access to raw 
materials, and therefore ensure their own competitive advantage. For Lenin, 
the underlying and incessant profit motive driving capitalist accumulators 
negates Kautskian-type cooperation and affirms inter-imperialist rivalry (ie. 
"international anarchy") as the "normal" state of affairs governing the 
relations of the dom inant im perialist powers. Neo-Leninists view the 
fragmentation of the world economy into three power blocs centred on Japan, 
the United States and Germany as an affirmation of Lenin's classical 
Imperialism treatise.
In this section, I look at both the evidence for and against capitalist co­
operation in a post-Cold War system. My suggestion is that both neo- 
Kautskian tendencies (i.e., international economic forces) and neo-Leninist 
elements (i.e., national political forces) are dialectically impacting the global 
political economy. Thus, it is argued that the central dynamic responsible for 
restructuring the contemporary world economy consists in the tensions 
arising between a politically divided world of different sovereign nation­
states and social forces which operate on a trans-national or global basis. This 
dialectic, I believe, is suggested in the struggle now being waged at the global 
level which pits internationalist-oriented social forces who favour an "open" 
global political economy v i s - a - v i s  the neo-liberal economic programme 
against those more nationally-oriented social forces whose interests, 
perspectives and desires are served by a more parochial state-centred, neo­
protectionist policy. As Holly Sklar puts it:
[A] struggle is being waged between the factions of the capitalist class whose
vested interests are served by protectionism and super-militarism and the
global banks and corporations w hose profits and power depend upon
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international free trade [...] What is occurring is not just a battle over short-run 
profits and power alignments. [...] We are seeing a struggle over the shape of 
the national division of power, the international division of power, and the 
nature of the role of the state in the process of capital accumulation for the 
coming decades.^^
The current conjuncture, then, cannot simply be understood in exclusively 
Kautskian or Leninist terms; it is a case of both cooperation and conflict, not 
simply cooperation or conflict. In key policy areas, however, I would be 
willing, w ith some qualified hesitation, to hazard the thesis that collusion 
rather than collision of dom inant capitalist interests is winning the day. 
Thus, a new multilateralist structure for managing the contradictions of the 
world capitalist system is beginning to emerge, but certainly not without 
many unintended and unforeseen consequences. Indeed, a trium virate 
structure for world order centring on the European Community, Japan and 
the United States may be organically evolving not because of the conscious 
planning efforts via the intellectual modicums of the US Council on Foreign 
Relations. Rather, a "triad" world order structure is emerging because no 
single power acting alone can ensure the stability of the world economy in 
rapid transformation.
Managing But Not Resolving the Crisis
Governing elites in the industrialized world are ever cognizant of the 
painful fact that it is becoming more problematic to formulate a coherent 
national economic plan, trade and industrial strategy in light of the 
transnationalization of production, internationalization of capital circuits and 
the growing interdependence (or more to the point dep en d en ce ) of their 
national economies. Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary order
Holly Sklar, Trilateralism. pp. 579.
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in 1971, the sped-up processes of global integration and dependence have 
generally meant that the business cycles of the developed market economies 
have become increasingly synchronized. To paraphrase David Gordon, when 
one economy sneezes, others echo. For instance, the Japanese economy, 
which has grown steadily and rapidly for 58 consecutive months, has finally 
begun to contract as the American economic slow down (more like shut 
down) becomes generalized across the entire world economic frontier.
In this integrated world economy, elites of the industrialized world 
have sought ways to further strengthen the international regimes -- the 
GATT, OECD, IM F/W orld Bank, etc., -  which manage their collective 
dependence. As Charles Jencks observes, "the New World Order is emerging 
... as much accidently as by design, because the formerly 'great powers' must 
now form coalitions to achieve their ends, and this means negotiation and 
c o m p r o m i s e . "47 Leaders of the industrial w orld seek to harmonize, 
coordinate a n d /o r  "fine tune" their disparate national economies in 
accordance with macroeconomic management concerns. They recognize, for 
instance, that international coordination and cooperation in key areas of 
interest and currency exchange rates are vital for managing — though not 
fundamentally resolving -  the world's financial crisis. This crisis has been 
precipitated by a progressive delinking of production from traditional 
monetary exchange structures. Although trillions of dollars change hands 
daily in the world's currency, bond, futures and stock exchanges, most of 
these speculations in paper are "symbolic," creating very little genuine or 
lasting productive value;
47 Charles Jencks, "New World Order; Stone, Paper, Scissors," Marxism Today. February 1991, 
pp. 15.
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In today's world economy, the 'real' economy of goods and services and the 
'symbol' economy of capital, money, and credit are no longer bound tightly to 
each other. They are indeed moving farther and farther apart. World trade in 
goods and services amounts to around $3 trillion a year. But the London 
Eurodollar market alone has a yearly turnover of $75 trillion, a volume at least 
25 times that of world trade. [...] The translation mechanism has broken 
down.̂
Aided by "super" computer-enhanced technologies, financial capital 
acts swiftly and decisively to government action a n d /o r  miscalculation. 
Frequently, as happened in the October 1987 "crash" of the New York Stock 
Exchange, dislocation in one market of the world threatens the stability of 
another thousands of miles and cultures away. The result of this type of un­
planned and pervasive pandem onium  in the m arkets is chronic 
international financial instability. It is little wonder, then, that faced with the 
prospect of the "symbol economy" breaking down any day at any time of the 
day that the world's elite seek to accommodate each other's mutual interests 
via the international organizations w hich m anage their dependence. 
However, as Susan Strange convincingly argues, capitalist leaders religiously 
attend high-power international summits not out of any good will, but 
because they are all afraid:
Heads of state meet at ever-frequent summits not because they believe much 
will be accomplished, but because they are afraid. They can see the dangers 
ahead if the competitive game leads to too much conflict or too little control 
over market forces. Summits are a kind of ritual reassurance. [...] Together with 
the protestations of goodwill at successive summit m eetin gs,... suggests that 
there is some basis for Kautsky's notion of the ... avoidance of damaging conflict 
and the resolution of differences. Yet the com petition, w ith undertones of 
conflict, remains. [...] There are good reasons for thinking, then, that the 
increase both in the intensity of conflict and the concern for co-operation arc 
structural and permanent.*^^ [emphasis added]
Diana Tussle, "Trading in Fear? U.S. Hegem ony and the Open World Economy in 
Perspective," The New International Political Economy, pp. 89
49 Susan Strange, "New World Order: Conflict and Co-Operation," Marxism Today. January 
1991, pp. 33.
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While proven crisis managers in Washington, Bonn and Tokyo have,
at least temporarily, stabilized the world economy, they have not been able to
resolve the underlying dynamic roots of crisis. Although they implicitly
recognize the need for Kautskian economic cooperation, Leninist political
rivalry remains central:
The more thoughtful members of the ruling capitalist class are well aware how  
chimerical the notion of a rising international of capital is. It is true that in 
view of the growing complexity and the many pitfalls in the world of global 
finance, they seek ways to strengthen, or create new, international institutions 
which can help to minimize the potential chaos they face. But as much as the 
need is understood in the abstract, and as many steps as have been taken in the 
hope of greater cooperation, there is no letup in the drive of nations to acquire 
more power and wealth. The upshot is that the speeded-up globalization of 
recent years has not led to harmony. On the contrary... it is itself a product of 
growing disharmony. Contrary to widespread expectations, sources of tension 
among the leading capitalist powers have increased side by side w ith their 
growing interdependence.^ [emphasis added]
A Pax Nipponica?: Japan in the New World Order
Although many Marxists see intensified inter-im perialist rivalry 
between Japan and the United States as the central dialectic driving 
international restructuring, it is not at all clear what would motivate Japan to 
want to usurp the Americans as moral guarantors of a new world order. As 
Americans are now painfully finding out, the costs of bearing a global 
hegemony are born by the state and its citizenry, while the majority of the 
benefits are absorbed by multinationals which are reluctant to swear their 
political allegiance to any flag. In other words, the hegemon in this new 
system does not necessarily reap the same benefits it once d id  when 
contrasted with the previous Pax Americana order.
"Ciobtilization - To What End?: Part 1," editors. Monthly Review. 43:9, (February 1992), pp. 
1- 2 .
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Not surprisingly, Japanese political elites are more than a bit 
a (bivalent about challenging the pre-eminence of the United States. A 
fundamental challenge to US monetary hegemony, for instance, would 
require that Japan undermine the status of the US dollar as the world's 
reserve asset. The probability of Japanese monetary revolt appears highly 
uiilikely, given that Japan would not want to provoke an economic war with 
the United States which, as all analysts agree, would be devastating to both 
economies. Figure VII illustrates that, while the "internationalization of the 
yen" has increased dramatically over the past fifteen years, the yen still only 
accounts for 8% of foreign exchange currency holdings, compared with 60% 
holdings denominated in US currency.
Figure VII.
% Share of National Currencies in Holdings of Foreign Exchange
1975 1983 1989
................... percent distribution..............
US Dollar 79.4 71.4 60.2
Japanese Yen 0.5 3.1 7.9
German mark 6.3 11.8 19.3
Pound Sterling 3.9 2.5 2.7
All others 9.9 9.3 9.9
Source: "Globalization - To What End?: Part II," Monthly Review. 
43:10, March 1992, pp, 9.
Although the central role of the US dollar as the key international currency 
has declined significantly in the past fifteen years giving rise to a "new" 
multicurrency international order, the dollar is still the world's most prized 
and sought after currency in both the formal and underground economies.
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In other matters beside currency, however, Japan has also appeared 
ambivalent about challenging the United States. In trade, the Japanese have 
been known to go out of their way to boost imports from the United States in 
order to placate rising protectionist sen tim ents w ith in  Am erican 
congressional and security circles. In fact, in many instances, the Japanese 
have seemed rather content to ride on the coat-tails of American economic 
malaise (although the Bush administration of late does seem tired of Japan's 
so-called "free-riding"). As for assuming the reigns of global leadership, 
therefore, perhaps the president of the Japan Economic Research Centre 
think-tank in Tokyo put it best for himself, his office, and possibly even his 
political superiors: "I have mixed feelings about being a dominant economic 
power. [...] We hope the United States can recover and Japan will be the 
second fiddle. Being Number 2 is really quite pleasant."51 Furthermore, for 
all its economic prowess, Japan still lacks a sufficient "power-over" capacity to 
enforce its will on the world stage -  provided of course it even had one to 
enforce. Like Canada, the "vital core" of Japanese foreign policy is 
headquartered in Washington, not Tokyo. The implicit understanding’̂ , albeit 
not without its tensions, seems to be that the boys in the Pentagon di«»t the 
plans for a US-dominated "new" world order and Japan should willingly foot 
much of the costs. Though the relationship between the Americans and the 
Japanese is far from cozy -  as the on-going bitter "car war" struggles and 
excessive amounts of xenophobic-induced Japan "bashing" by US presidential 
hopefuls demonstrate -  we should not expect a Pax Nipponica to replace the 
Pox of the Americans any time soon.
51 Yutcika Kosai, cited in International Economic Policy: Beyond the Trade and Debt Crisis. 
Toronto: Lexington Books, 1989, pp. 108.
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More by American default than by the US Council's grand design, in 
fact, Japan has emerged on the world stage to take a greater leadership role 
commensurate with its economic superpower status. At the insistence of the 
United States, Japan's special "roles" in assuring the stability of the prevailing 
financial and political status quo would appear to be fourfold: i) stabilizing 
America's persistent budgetary shortfalls; ii) propping up, from time to time, 
a plummeting American dollar; iii) acceding to, and paying for, America's 
militarist adventures abroad, and iv) providing the consensual "carrot" for 
Third World development. It has been suggested that the Japanese contribute 
anywhere up to 40% of the annual funding of American budget deficits, 
thereby help ing  to stabilize the in ternational economy in rapid  
transformation. As of January 1992, America's national debt -  money the 
American government owes to its own citizens in its own currency -- stood at 
$3.6 trillion. To date, Japan, and to a lesser degree Germany, have successfully 
absorbed the "shocks" of American monetary policy, including partly 
financing Reagan's arms race with the "evil empire" during the "second" 
Cold War in the 1980s. Although the message is slow to be received in 
Washington, it is resoundingly loud and clear every place else: the United 
States no longer has the economic clout to unilaterally run a hegemony in 
and on its own terms. The net effect of a combination of persistent budgetary 
deficits, inflationary defence spending, crippling domestic and international 
recessions (especially 1979-1982 and the p.esent), and poor macroeconomic 
perform ance th roughou t the decades of "restructuring" graphically 
demonstrate that the "limits of the globally possible" are changing, even for 
the Americans. American dictate is giving way to "allied" compromises in 
managing a new world and its troubles.
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Yen for Development
In addition to bank-rolling America, Japan has also been coming
round, albeit slowly, to the idea disseminated by members of the Trilateral
Commission (among others) of recycling some of its huge current account
surpluses, particularly with the United States, back into the international
economy. The trilateralists view Japan’s "special" role as managing the Third
World debt crisis via the IMF/World Bank/Paris group:
A general capital increase of the World Bank has been agreed but has yet to be 
fully subscribed. To function effectively, the IMF will need a significant 
increase of quotas sooner rather than later. It is important over time for voting 
rights in these institutions to reflect relative international economic weight.
This requires periodic revisions of historically established shares for specific 
countries or specific groups of countries as their roles change in the world 
economy. In the current negotiations about IMF quotas, Japan's share should be 
increased while, for example, the shares of the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and developing countries as a group should be l o w e r e d . ^ ^
It is extremely important to note that Japanese contributions to the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, in support of the Baker (now 
Brady) initiatives for Third World debt restructuring and reduction -  not 
forgiveness -  respectively, have steadily increased during the 1980s. The fact 
that Japan is now the world's leader in m onetary contributions to the 
IMF/World Bank -  eclipsing even the United States in 1989 -  demonstrates 
that the influence of the Trilateral Commission, while in precipitous decline 
ever since the Reaganite revolution turfed out Jimmy Carter's trilateralists, 
still informs key decision-makers of the capitalist world from time to time. 
As the Globe and Mail recently reports, Japan has in fact taken over America's 
role of the world's banker of last resort:
[Fjor better or for worse, Japan Is already the world's banker and lender of last 
resort. [...] Japan Is in a position to supply 80 per cent of the $l-trillion that the
Trilateral Commission, International Financial Integration: The P olicy Challenges. 
(Triangle Papers # 37), New York: Trilateral Commission, pp. 21.
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World Bank estimates will be needed over the next decade to relniild Iraq and 
Kuwait, restructure the economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and 
shore up the U.S. budget deficit. [’Another way of saying the same thing is 
that all other lenders combined are unable to supply more than 21) per cent of 
the world demand for capital in the 1990s.] ILthe Japanese economy remains 
h ealthy... it will be in a position to pick up the bills.'*^ [emphasis added]
Figure VIII illustrates that in stark contrast to the declining official
developm ent assistance (ODA) of most other industrialized nations,
(particularly the United States), Japan's share of the industrial countries’ ODA
has risen significantly since 1960. Japan now accounts for just slightly under
one-fifth of all industrial countries' ODA, compared with the United States
17.0%, France 11.46% and Germany 11.0%, respectively.
Figure VIII.
Official Development Assistance: Industrialized Countries
i m 1970 1989 
percent GNP — ■ ($ millions)
% Share
USA .56 .31 .15 7,659 17.0%
Japan .22 .23 .32 8,949 19.9%
UK .56 .42 .31 2,587 5.74%
Canada .16 .41 .44 2,320 5.15%
Germany .38 .33 .41 4,949 11.0%
France .21 .46 .54 5,162 11.46%
Italy .19 .17 .42 3,613 8.02%
Sweden .06 .41 .97 1,799 4.00%
Netherlands .38 .60 .94 2,094 4.65%
Average .33 .35 .32 45,030 ’
Note: ’ ODA for industrial countries total does not include the Soviet Union. 
Source: Human Development Report 1991. United Nations Development 
Programme, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
While a large percentage of Japanese aid still tends to focus on 
developing its Pacific ties -  only 18% of Japan's ODA went to less developed
"Japanese Economy Grows for 58th Straight Month," Cil
11.
l it  (October 1,1991), pp. B
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countries outside of the Pacific Rim in 19S9 -- Japan's aid has progressively 
become more international and less tied. Debt-ravaged sub-Saharan Africa, 
for instance, received $900 million from Japan at the end of the 1980s, 
compared with just $130 million at the beginning of the decade. As 
European, American and Soviet aid to the developing world dries up in 
expectation of their stepped-up efforts to reorient their own economies, Japan 
will undoubtedly come under greater international pressure to shoulder 
more of the development "burden." W hether Japanese politicians will 
decide to follow the American lead and use its increased leverage in 
international organizations as a further extension of its foreign policy, 
however, still remains to be decided. As Japan's business interests now span 
the globe, we can surely expect its political leaders to become more 
internationally sensitized.
IV. America In a New World Order
This idea [about the new world order] of the Pentagon seems a new but sad and 
weak American dream. No reasonable person can underestimate the actual, and 
more Important, the potential strength of the United States. But entrusting its 
dream to the armed legions brings to mind ... the fall of the Roman Empire. 
Unfortunately, that lasted a long time and was accompanied by unspeakable
One of the key aspects of the US Council's blueprint for a new world 
order is the assumption that a stable and efficient "polycentric world" requires 
the collective leadership of Japan, the European Community and the United 
States. While enviable in theory, it is quite likely that the Council's long­
term cooperative vision will be subverted by the short-term re-election 
interests of the republican party itself. The Marxist scholar, Fred Bloc,
Cited in the Globe and Mall. March 13,1992, pp. A17.
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provides a useful commentary applicable to the tensions arising between the 
short-term perspective of national politicians and the long-term interests of 
international capitalists:
In situations ... where state managers are pursuing neomercantalist policies and 
the internationally oriented business community is ... urging greater 
international cooperation, it often remains unclear which group's policies are 
the more enlightened -  that is, which are more sensitive to the long-term 
interests of capitalism. Neither group is responding to the needs of capitalism 
as a system; each is acting on its own short-term and long-terms interests. The 
state managers are pursuing policies they regard as necessary for their 
continued exercise of political power, while the internationally oriented 
business interests are acting to insure their direct stake in an international 
economic climate in which they make money
In fac t the United States' budgetary deficit, current account trade 
imbalances (particularly w ith Japan), increasing xenophobia and rising 
tendency to blame everyone else but itself for its economic troubles have 
created enorm ous logistical problem s for the kind of m ultilateralist 
cooperation envisioned by Foreign Affairs' visionaries. As Stephen Gill 
argues, "there is very little to suggest that the US leadership is conscious fully 
of the need to reconstruct a more cooperative, consensual and coordinated 
form of international leadership, at least with its key allies in Western Europe 
and J a p a n . " 5 6  America's faltering economy is creating an internal erosion of 
self-confidence in its ability to lead. As Shafiqul Islam argues, pervasive 
economic uncertainty and insecurity in the United States have fueled 
American jingoism, which all too frequently leads to the absurd, reactionary 
politics of xenophobia:
Fred Bloc, "Trilateralism and Inter-Imperialist Conflict," Trilateralism . pp. 529. Bloc 
maintains that "state managers" are preoccupied with three interrelated goals which 
legitimize their political rule: i) securing the nation's position within the international state 
system ii) maintaining or restoring reasonable levels of economic activity and iii) building or 
preserving a political base of support that extends into the subordinate classes.
55 Stephen Gill, "Reflections on Global Order and Sociohistorical Time," pp. 294.
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America's 'Japan problem’ is not the trade deficit or direct investment, or 
burden sharing, but the economic ascendance of Japan at a time when America 
has lost confidence in its ability to compete on a level playing field. This loss of 
self-confidence and the failure of American leadership have produced a 
national insecurity that is being transformed into a hostile rhetoric, and, too 
often, absurd policies,
Of crucial importance to the evolving contours of the world order is 
the outcome of key policy debates currently raging amongst and across the 
different nationally and internationally oriented fractions within the ruling 
political and economic classes in America. Broadly speaking, nationalist 
social forces in the United States are associated with; the security apparatus, 
including strategic military industrial complexes and intelligence services; 
internationally non-competitive industries, which rely for their survival on 
state subsidies and protectionism; and the American public sector. In 
contrast to the nationalists, the identification of internationalists' interests to 
the United States is less black and white. The internationalists, because of 
their corporate interests, possess an ideological view-point which tends to be 
more global in its vision than that of the more parochial-centred nationalist 
sentiments within the American political economy.
In recent foreign policy, trade and industrial economic development 
debates, it is possible to detect a rapidly growing schism between the 
internationalists who favour pursuing long-term m ultilateralist objectives, 
and those nationalist social forces in American political culture who favour a 
more unilateral and-damn-the-rest approach. The key debates and tensions 
between domestic internationalists and domestic nationalist forces can be 
sum m arized, respectively: in foreign policy, in ternationalism  vs.
Shafiqul Islam, "Capitalism in Conflict," Foreign Affairs. 69:1, (January 1990), pp. 182
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isolationism; in trade, multilateralism vs. unilateralism; and in economic 
development strategy, protectionism vs. free trade.
In the foreign policy debate, it is important to note that in a recent 
public opinion poll 62% of the American electorate and 9 7%  of its leaders 
continue to favour an active US role in the post-Cold War world. As the 
serial publishing the poll asserts, "American global preeminence may be 
diminishing, but America is not abandoning internationalism."^^ Under 
Bush, the United States has in fact pursued a foreign policy likened to 
"pragmatic transnationalism." Unlike the previous Reagan-rights, the Bush 
adm inistration has been m uch more willing to use and strengthen 
international institutions for the purpose of maintaining global order and 
stability (if only for the purpose of lending legitimacy to American foreign 
policy initiatives). Hence,
by late 1989 Bush and his Secretary of State, James Baker 111, [were stressing] 
more comprehensive co-operation with the major allies (especially Japan and 
Germany), [including] a move towards an internationally defined reconstruction 
of the European political settlement. A large number of plans are currently 
emanating from government and business circles designed to rebuild Eastern 
Europe and the Third World politically and economically. [Tlhese initiatives 
imply the multilateralism of financing with large contributions from US allies, 
especially Japan.59 [emphasis added]
The implied reference is that America has the brain power and the necessary
imagination for designing world order strategies, but its brain-stormers sorely
lack the material resources to implement their plans.
In trade, it is possible to discern a three-pronged "strategic" approach:
In areas where the United States believes it has solid comparative advantage 
-  agriculture, services, direct investment and intellectual property rights -  the 
Bush Administration is still using a multilateral approach to trade
58 John Rielly, "Public Opinion: The Pulse of the Nineties," Foreign Policy. 82, (Spring 1991),
pp. 82.
59 Stephen Gill, "Intellectuals and Transnational Capital," pp. 299.
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negotiations under the G A lT s Uruguay Round. When it comes to specific 
sectorial interests -- mostly in manufacturing, high-tech or low-tech -  the 
administration is using a unilateral approach. Finally, the overall trade 
policy seem s to be guided increasingly by 'bloc-ism' and bilateralism.^^ 
(emphasis added]
A good healthy dose of liberalization when and if it meets the needs of the 
ruling political and economic elites; otherwise, the tried and trued policy of 
protectionism and sectorial "imperatives" prevails.
Finally, in the industrial economic development debates in the United 
States one detects a general loss of faith in the neo-liberal la i s s e z - fa i r e  
strategy. The strongest support for a state interventionist policy comes, not 
surprisingly, from the internationally non-competitive sectors within the 
American economy, including, most prominently, the American automotive 
industry. Here it is important to note that approximately 75% of America's 
trade deficit with Japan is accounted for by automotive manufactures. In line 
with this powerful lobby, economic theory is now actually creating support 
for a protectionist industrial development strategy via "strategic" trade, 
American "content" requirements, and sectorial trade initiatives.
At the present time, it is not entirely clear which set of social forces — 
nationalist or internationalist -  will prevail in the United States. Although 
highly fluid indicators, the violent regeneration of American politics 
following the Gulf War, the tendency to blame anyone foreign for its own 
economic woes, the "fast-tracking" of the North American Free Trade Accord 
(NAFTA), and the various re-election schemes to put "America first" would 
suggest that nationalist forces, at least temporarily, have gained the upper 
hand. Thus, the prosecution of the Gulf Way may be interpreted as a 
nationalist backlash by the m ilitary-industrial establishment and certain
ShafiquI Islam, "Capitalism in Conflict," pp. 175.
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rightist forces in American society against domestic internationalists. In a 
similar fashion but different context, the Bush administration's decision to 
put North American trilateral free-trade negotiations with Mexico and 
Canada on the so-called "fast-track" to counter similar trading blocs 
apparently emerging in the Pacific Rim and "Fortress" Europe may be further 
indication that the teeter totter's balance is tipping in the nationalist's favour.
The prevailing sombre isolationist mood in Washington is particularly 
nasty in regard to the Japanese, who are consistently portrayed by the far 
American right (and increasingly by the democratic "left") as the "enemy," 
engaging in discriminatory and "predatory" trade practices. According to one 
public opinion poll recently published in Foreign Policy. 60% of Americans 
feel that Japan is the most pressing foreign policy "problem" for the United 
States, anticipating that Japan's growing economic "prowess" will be a more 
critical security threat to America's vital interests and national security in the 
next ten years than a military threat, broadly conceived. Also significant is 
the fact that about 75% of the American public and its leaders believe that 
Japan practices "unfair" trade with the United S ta te s .C o lle c tiv e  leadership, 
central to the purpose of the US Council's blueprint for a new cooperative 
world order, is indeed hard to fashion.
As Bush is pushed even further rightward to secure his nomination 
for the 1992 presidential campaign by his ultra-conservative republican 
challenger Patrick Buchanan, the great fear is that the great nation will retreat 
inward and pursue introverted rather than extroverted foreign policy 
initiatives. In the current presidential election campaign, it is significant to
See John E. Rielly, "Public Opinion: The Pulse of the Nineties," Foreign Policy. 82, {Spring 
1991), 79-96.
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note that any issue even remotely smacking of foreign aid has been 
ideologically shunned by republican and democrat alike as the presidential 
hopefuls set their election sights inward. Meantime, monies already ear­
marked for the IMF and additional increases for UN peacekeeping exercises 
have been balked at by the US congress. The consensus reached among 
America's leaders, its intellectuals and the public at large seems to be that the 
country's extensive foreign commitments have brought on its domestic 
decline. As Paul Kennedy's enormously popular treatise of American 
declinism entitled, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic C hange 
and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 puts it, "in the largest sense of all, ... 
the only answer to the question increasingly debated by the public of whether 
the US can preserve its existing position is ' n o ! ' " ^ 2  w ith  the Cold War 
winding down, Americans widely perceive that the United States is now a 
globally over-stretched power. As a consequence, the country's leaders are 
under increasing pressure to put domestic renewal, not foreign policy, first.
Contem porary American introversion closely approxim ates Alan 
Cafruny's development of Gramsci’s interpretation of minimal hegemony:
Minimal hegemony refers to a regime under which the rulers do not wish to 
lead anybody, i.e., they do not wish to concord their interests and aspirations 
with the interests and aspirations of other classes. They wish to dominate' 
and not to 'lead.' Important contradictions have developed between the 
interests of the ruling and subordinate groups. [...] The ruling group is no longer 
strong enough to devise policies capable of serving common interests. [...] The 
regime is unstable and lacks integration. [...] What is lacking ... is the ability of 
either the ruling group or the opposition to resolve contradictions at the 
econom ic-political level, resulting in a process of drift and chronic 
instability.^^
<̂ 2 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economie Change-_aad_Milltajy 
Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House, 1987, pp. 533.
^  Alan Cafruny, "A Gramscian Concept of Declining Hegemony: Stages of U.S. Power and the 
Evolution of International Economic Relations," World Leadership and H egem ony.
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America's "drift," defined in terms of an increasingly narrower view of its 
self-interests, underscores the fact that Gramscian "intellectual and moral 
leadership" functions Oi global hegemony have largely been abandoned by the 
Americans; or else, as the Gulf War highlights, are provided but in extremely 
contradictory and self-serving ways -  usually at the expense of its 
international "allies." For Stephen Gill, the tendency of the US to pursue 
"power-over" rather than consensus-building strategies for world order 
highlights the US's loss of Gramscian hegemony. More substantially, it 
probably signifies a malignant shift to a more Pentagon-like preponderant 
power interpretation of hegemony:
It seems ttiat the United States has decided that the form of hegemony it 
prefers is less Gramscian (i.e., consensual, legitimate) and more narrowly 
Realist (i.e., based upon dominance and supremacy). Whether this can be the 
foundation for a stable, let alone a more legitimate and authoritative world 
order, i s , ... rather doubtful.^^
The Persian Gulf War: The Last Gasp for a Dying Hegemon?
In the run-up to the 1988 presidential election, George Bush promised 
to the American public that he would "make kinder the face of the nation 
and gentler the face of the world." Since his inauguration, however, the 
Bush administration has pursued an aggressively interventionist, unilateral 
and violent foreign policy. In Nicaragua, Panama, and most recently in the 
"liberation" of Kuwait, America has shown itself not to be kinder or gentler, 
but more violent than ever.
In the lead-up to the Gulf War, George Bush proclaimed to the world 
that "we [America] seek ways of working w ith other nations to deter
International Political Economy Yearbook Volume 5, David Rapkin fed.), Boulder; Lynne 
Rlennei Publishers, 1990, pp. 106.
Stephen Gill, "Reflections on Global Order and Sociohistorical Time," pp. 310.
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aggression, and to achieve stability, prosperity and, above all, peace." 
Underlying Bush's statement is the implied reference that the stability of the 
global economic system and the welfare of global security requires the 
political commitment and cooperation of the dominant capitalist powers. As 
an experiment in devolving leadership responsibilities down to its "allies" 
for defence of global security, however, the "Desert Storm” operation was not 
the unqualified success which the Bush administration was seeking. To be 
sure, holding together the "allied" coalition while seeking the blessing of the 
United Nations to wage war on Iraq were major coups for the United States 
diplomatic core.^5 Despite the admirable performance by the diplomats, 
however, tensions amongst the "allies" in America's efforts to coax them to 
go to war ranged from lypical British and Canadian pro-Americanism to 
German reluctance, French hesitation and Japanese recalcitrance. Regarding 
the latver's wishy washy should-we-go/should-we-not stance, the general 
perception in the United States was that Japan did not "pull its own v eight." 
Japan was once again portrayed as a "free-rider." Americans generally believe 
that Japan did not take up the full political and strategic responsibilities seen 
to be associated with their economic superpower status. Although the 
Japanese contributed $13 billion to the war effort -  more than Japan's foreign 
aid programme yearly earmarks for Third W orld developm ent — the 
Americans felt that Japan paid too small a price, especially considering that 
Japan is largely dependent on Mideast oil supplies. Furtherm ore, in 
comparison to the American forces assembled (or even Canadians under
These diplonvUic coups did not come without their own social and political costs. Among 
manv others was the Americans agreeing to turn a blind eye on the Foviet military crackdown 
in the Baltics in exchange for Gorbachev's blessing of the coalition’s war aims in the UN's 
powerful Security Council.
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arms for that matter), Japan's late deployment of a tiny self-defence force 
serving in a non-combative "supportive" role to the coalition powers was 
almost laughable. Meanwhile, in Japan, the popular perception there was 
that the Americans unilaterally made the decision to go to war with Iraq fully 
expecting Japan to finance a major part of the war's bill. As one commentator 
aptly puts it in describing the friction between Japanese war financiers and 
American warlords: "in the moment of truth, an economic superpower 
found itself merely an automatic teller machine -  one that needed a kick 
before dispensing the cash , "66 it is also important to note that the strongest 
internal support for the war in Japan mainly came from internationally- 
minded Japanese business persons, who severely criticized the ruling liberal 
democratic party's inability to respond effectively, or play a more loading rolo 
in the Gulf crisis.
From a Gramscian view-point, the prosecution of the Gulf War
painfully demonstrates m ounting — and perhaps structurally incurable -
materialist and ethico-moral contradictions in the nature of American power
in a post-Cold War setting. In terms of materialist capabilities, having to rely
on external financing for the Persian Gulf war effort — including $37 billion
from "friendly" Arab states, as well as an additional $17 billion from its
Western "allies," notably, Japan and Germany -  highlights a growing
contradiction between American foreign policy and its on-going domestic
economic demise, As Dennis Healy argues:
[I]n the end, the financial weakness of the US is likely to rule out the idea of 
[re] establishing a Pax Americana in the Middle East or anywhere else outside 
the Western Hemisphere. Washington could not have afforded such an effort 
without pledges of aid from its allies ... By the time President Bush ieaves
66 Voichi Funabashi, "japan and the New Worid Order," Foreign Affairs. 70;5, (Winter 
1991/92), pp. 58.
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office, America is likely to owe the rest of the world a thousand billion dollars, 
requiring an annual payment of some $70 billion in interest.^^
It is indeed highly significant that the Gulf War was the first war this century
that the United States felt compelled to ask the international community to
help finance. America's growing economic insecurity and rising jingoism
prompts Arthur MacEwan to argue that, "George Bush, and those around
them have built their policies on the belief that US pre-eminence in world
affairs can be reestablished and that it can be reestablished on the basis of
military strength."^^
In terms of ethico-moral concerns, the inclination of the United States
to rely upon institutionalized violence in the Gulf rather than pursuing a
non-violent consensual resolution suggests a crisis of political legitimacy. In
exercising hegemony globally, the "right to lead" em anates from the
hegemon's ability to avoid or at the very least, regulate conflict at the
international level by providing moral and ideological leadership. According
to Robert Cox, hegemony "is inscribed in the mind. It is an intersubjective
sharing of behavioral expectations. [...] Social conflict is not eliminated (it
never could be), but is institutionalized and regulated. "69 Dropping "smart"
bombs on retreating Iraqi troops in Kuwait is a demonstrably clear sign of
hegemonic weakness, not strength. In an expansive or "deep" hegemony, as
Gramsci shows, subordinate groups are encouraged to buy into, internalize
and share the normative concerns and principles of the dominant, which are
presented and defended in universalistic terms. In short, hegemony is much
67 Dennis Healy, "New World Order?", Ih e Guardian. April 13,1991, pp 6.
Arthur MacEwan, "Why the Emperor Can't Afford New Clothes: International Change and 
Fiscal Disorder in the United States" Monthly Review. 43:3, July-August 1991, pp. 89.
69 Robert Cox, "Middlepowermanship, Japan and Future World Order," International Tournai. 
44:4, (Autumn 1989), 823-862.
1 7 9
m ore than  dom inance. C ontrary  to the Bush adm in istra tion 's 
pronouncements that Americans have "kicked" the habit of the "Vietnam 
syndrome once and for all," American minimal hegemonic status will likely 
bring still further displays of violent chauvinism. But, as the Khmer Kouge 
sixteen years after and Saddam Hussein prove, subordinate nations and 
peoples are rarely, if at all, beaten into submission.
[AIMoraiity in the New World Order
In and through the Gulf crisis, the Bush administration attempted to 
mobilize world popular opinion for waging war against Iraq by appealing to 
"universal" values of international law, global justice and respect for the 
individual. The justification for using force -- to "liberate" and restore 
"democracy" in Kuwait — served to obscufate the deeper intent of protecting 
the "free" world's access to cheap Mideastern oil reserves,
The Gulf War sets an important, if frightening precedent, in defence of 
an American militarily-dominated post-Cold War international order. That 
precedent is precisely that the North has the right -  and indeed the moral 
obligation -- to intervene in the South, by force if necessary, to ensure 
regional and global security. As Noam Chomsky correctly observes, "the tacit 
assumption is that the public welfare is to be identified with the welfare of the 
Western industrial powers, and particularly their domestic elites."^’ Here, as 
elsewhere, it is important to note in the selective moral defence of this world 
order of ours, the rising tendency of western leaders toward a wholesale 
adoption and application of neo-Kantian-type universalistic principles to
^0 For an excellent discussion of the real intent of the Gulf War, see Peter Gowan, "The Gulf 
War, Iraq and Western Liberalism," New Left Review. 187, (May-june 1991), 29-70.
Noam Chomsky, "The Struggle for Democracy in a Changed World," pp. 16.
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international standards and behaviour of conduct in the inter-state system. 
Since the end of the Cold War, for instance, leading intellectuals and 
politicians in the western world frequently assert that the world is now 
intolerably safer from the threat of war because the dominant states in the 
system are [liberal] democracies (or attempting to become such) and history 
somehow "proves" that democratic nations do not go to war w ith one 
another. In the ideological defence of the Gulf War, on the other hand, 
capitalist leaders based their arguments for going to war against Iraq almost 
exclusively on the claim that western liberal democratic values, traditions 
and institutions are universalistic principles, which are applicable to, and 
desirable for, adoption in non-w estern civilizations too. Thus, the 
intellectual justification for statist militarism abroad was ideologically 
conceived on the grounds that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait violated the 
sanctity of "good" international behaviour and threatened the general 
universal interest. Therefore, under the pretext of international law, the 
recourse to use military force to remove Saddam Hussein, (who was, and still 
is, afterall, an "enemy" of democracy -  a new "Hitler" in fact) was justified.
World Order or Disorder?
In the wake of the Gulf War, several radical scholars have suggested 
that the contours of the emerging world order are beginning to take on a 
trilateral structure. As Samir Amin contends, the Gulf War may further 
consolidate a triumvirate structure of world [dis]-order:
(T]he war (in the Persian Gulf] may consolidate a triumvirate -- the United 
States, Japan and Germany. The latter two countries, which contributed 
heavily to financing of the war, know how to pay America to police a world 
unified by the market. [,..] This new order hardly merits a name of its own; I 
call it the Empire of Disorder, structured by a strictly military self-concept,
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with ou t  any  vision that  w oul d  enable  it to address  the }>enuine problems of 
h u m a n i t y  7 “
This evolving world order structure would appear to be based upon the
relative special strengths and capabilities of the three dominant nation-states
in the new international divisions of labour and power -  Germany, japan
and the United Slates. Craig Murphy puts forward the controversial thesis
that in the new order of states,
the United States may end up 'specialb.in;»’ in building the eoerrive links, 
while japan specializes in building ... economic links, and the huropean 
Community specializes in Keynesian assistance to Kastern Europe.'^
In both the Amin and M urphy scenario, it would be anticipated that the
United States would move forward to become the enforcer of international
capitalism, strategically intervening on behalf of the interests of transnational
corporate capital whenever, and wherever, reiyuired. japan, on the other
hand, would continue in. its role as the world’s banker of last resort, financing
America's militarist adventures abioad and domestic deficits back borne,
thereby restoring confidence in the international financial system. Germany
and a uniting Europe, on the other hand, would look after reintegrating the
former communist countries of Eurasia back within the capitalist fold.
In this perverse world order — an order which is w ithout the
countervailing military power of the Soviet Union -  American nilitary and
intelligence power reigns supreme. With the possible fusion of i nst and the
former "Second" Worlds (excluding China of course), the suggestion is that
the United States may be aligning itself in a position to use its uncontested
military dominance to establish the coercive link in a trilateral bloc, exacting
Samir Amin, "Tlie Real Stakfs in the Gulf War," Monthly Review. 43:3, (July-August 1991), 
pp. 22.
Craig Murphy, "Freezing the North-South Bloc(k) Aftei the East-West Thaw," pp. 41.
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military tribute from its key allies to keep the world "free" from Third World
security and international terrorist "threats/' both real and perceived. As
Stephen Gill asserts,
The United States seems determined to use its vast military power to sustain its 
global primacy, and shows a willingness to attempt to extract resources in the 
form of tribute from its allies and clients to pay for it. [...] This type of payment 
by tribute may become a feature of the emerging world order. [...] The 
likelihood of this type of strategy being used is increased by the crisis in the 
Soviet Union, because there is less and less an effective counterweight to the US 
armed forces in the global military structure.^^
Stephen Gill's commentary is frightfully re-affirmed in a Pentagon 
strategic planning paper recently leaked to the international press in March 
1992. According to the Globe and Mail, the secret document outlines the 
Pentagon's strategy for a one-superpower dominated world and also "the 
need to keep it that way." As The Globe goes on to report, "with chauvinistic 
insensitivity, the document says the United States m ust deter rivals 'from 
even aspiring to a larger regional or global role' by persuading them to 
remain under 'benevolent' US p r o t e c t i o n .  while doubtlessly an attempt 
by the brass boys at the Pentagon to protect their lion's share of ihe budgetary 
pie (which ranks second behind social security in terms of GDP expenditure), 
the document is an ominous barometer in which to gage the current rising 
mood of protectionism and isolationism now predom inate in American 
political culture. Beyond a doubt, the current pro-in terventionist 
administration in Washington represents the greatest obstacle to a genuine 
"organic" alliance being formed amongst the dom inant three powers in the 
global political economy.
Stephen Gill, "Reflections on Global Order and Soclohistorical Time," pp. 294. 
See Globe and Mail. "Candidates Set Sights Inward," March 13,1992, pp. A l.
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The possibility of the United States becoming more receptive to the 
"rent a global cop" scenario suggested by Stephen Gill, Craig Murphy, Noam 
Chomsky and Samir Amin (among others) is given even more renewed 
impetus in recently published US current account deficit figures for 1991. 
Aided by payments from its Gulf War allies -- $42.4 billion worth in 1991 -  
America's current account deficit with the rest of the world in 1991 came in at 
a nine year low, just $8.62 billion, compared with a $92.1 billion deficit for 
1990. Military tribute from the Gulf War contributed to nearly one-half of the 
drastic decline in the US trade [im]-balance for 1991.^^ It would seem that the 
Pentagon, George Bush and the rest of the military industrial complexes in 
America weathered the Desert Storm quite nicely, profiting handsomely from 
a "war" that some analysts disparagingly, yet coi 'ectly refer to as a "turkey 
shoot."
But America's power goes even deeper than its raw military might. In 
a recent article published in Foreign Affairs entitled "Intelligence for a New 
W orld Order," for instance, the author anticipates a more symbiotic 
relationship developing between the worlds of American intelligence 
services and private American-based multinational corporations located in 
the South. The author calls for more emphasis on political intelligence and 
international surveillance of Third World countries in order to provide 
American transnationals with the latest economic corporate intelligence and 
political risk a n a l y s i s / ^
See Globe and Mail. "Trade Deficit Hits Nine-Year Low," March 18, 1992.
See Stansfield Turner, "Intelligence for a New World Order," Foreign Affairs. 70:4, (Fali 
1991), 150-166.
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Presently, the ominous possibility of state intelligence gathering 
services being used to further the global political economic agenda of 
American transnationals looks favourable, if still inconclusive. This 
possibility is recently suggested in the on-going Congressional debates 
concerning budgetary allocations for the US military and intelligence services 
in a post-Cold War setting. While American service personnel and military 
hardware have been substantially reduced in line with relaxing East-West 
tensions, state counter-intelligence services have been less adversely affected 
than one would be led to expect. There is an emerging consensus within CIA 
circles that with the demise of the Soviet Union and the growing "challenge" 
of Japan and a uniting Europe to Northwestern world order strategies, the 
preeminent threat to the US "national interest" now lies in the economic, not 
military, sphere. In this "new" reality, it is widely assumed that economic 
and technological domination will supersede military domination. Thus, 
having access to the best and latest knowledge is crucial for business 
juggernauts competing in a global marketplace where the only effective limits 
to capital movement are times zones and where capital, aided by computer- 
enhanced technologies, acts increasingly faster and decisively to the decisions 
of politicians. When contrasted with the previous order, then, knowledge 
and information play more decisive roles in a globally integrated system of 
production and exchange. Just as knowledge is power, "intellectual capital 
will continue to occupy an increasingly greater component of production as 
opposed to material c a p i t a l . A n  appropriate inference to draw would be 
that state intelligence services will be applied to an even greater extent in the 
Third World than in the previous order, thereby ensuring that American
Robert Kreklewich, "North American Integration," pp. 31.
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transnationals maintain a "comparative advantage" [economic double-speak 
for monopoly] in knowledge and protection of intellectual proprietary patent 
rights in an increasingly meaner competitive world economy.
One Two or Three Blocs?
W ith the mood in the North turning more protectionist and hostile 
each passing day, it appears that not even George Bush (or General 
Schwarzkopf for that matter) can salvage a capitalist order lurching toward 
consolidation of three regionally integrated economic and trade blocs, centred 
on the United States (NAFTA), the European Community and Japan (Pacific 
Rim). The proliferation of managed trade agreements -  it is estimated that 
nearly one-half of all international trade is under some kind of managed 
trading system -  underscores the obvious fact that "the global trading system 
is being determined less and less by market f o r c e s . T h i s  triangular geo­
fragmentation of the world economy is certainly not the kind of world [disj- 
order the Council or the Trilateral Commission's intellectuals envision.
The loss of faith in the industrialized world in la issez-fa ire  capitalism 
raises the haunting specter of a return to a chronically unstable neo- 
mercantalist world order system similar to the type which prevailed in the 
turbulent period between the two World Wars of this century. It is a 
commonly held view among political economists and policy makers alike 
that should the curreiit Uruguay Round of GATT talks fail -  which are 
stalled on issues pertaining to the removal of constraints on services, 
European agricultural subsidies and intellectual property rights -  then the 
multilateral trade institution, which lays down the rules for $3 trillion a year
Robert Kreklewich, "North American Integration," pp. 27,
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in international commerce, would be placed in jeopardy. In all likelihood the 
world economy would fragment along the geo-continental divides of Europe, 
North America and the Asian Pacific Rim.
As in structuralist dependency theory, one could anticipate a future 
world order situation in which each of these three "core" regions would 
dominate politically and economically, extracting surplus from its dependent 
"satellite" or peripheralized components. Larger unsettled issues in this 
scenario include questions of emerging militarisms, and perhaps even more 
importantly, how or where the South would figure into this kind of geo- 
economic fragmentation of the global political economy. As each mini-bloc 
would effectively incorporate a South w ithin  a N orth, triangular 
fragmentation would most likely m ean that the "traditional" South (ie. 
Africa, Latin America, and Asia) would be relegated to an even more 
subordinate position in the larger North-South system. As Robert Gilpin 
notes, "there is great danger that a more regionalized world economy will be 
composed of a few islands of relative prosperity in a turbulent sea of global 
poverty and alienated s o c i e t i e s .
To be sure, capitalist business and political leaders are aware that 
neomercantalist thinking and protectionist trade practices would have dire 
consequences for the stability of the world economy. Nearly every article 
written for the international business community in the establishment press 
concerning the GATT is parenthesized in terms of the lessons to be drawn 
from past history, namely, free trade safeguards the stability of the 
international commercial system, while neo-mercantalism would have a
Robert Gilpin, The Poiitical Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1987, pp. 400.
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destabilizing impact, inciting destructive trade wars, protectionism, "blocist"
m entality and even a m ilitary confrontation. Thus, leaders in the
industrialized North are cognizant of the fact that it would not be in their
dominant interests to have the GATT talks fail. It is not surprising, then, that
extraordinary efforts have been made to "save the GATT." The fact that the
impassed talks have been extended well beyond their expected completion
date, and the fact t h a t  the GATT negotiating forum has not been abandoned
by the dom inant states, are indicative of the place of importance a
strengthened multilateral trading system has assumed among leaders of the
industrialized world. Michael Wilson, Canada's new trade and industry
m inister in charge of prom oting C anada's w orld competitiveness, for
example, is recently quoted as saying that the current round of talks in
Geneva represent, "the most critical economic issue facing the international
c o m m u n i t y . "81 Even ex-prime minister Margaret Thatcher, notorious for
her ideological disdain of "Continentalism," has recently surfaced in the
United States to warn the Americans of the dangers of a world economy
fragmented into competing power blocs:
If a European superstate were to be forged, it would almost certainly develop 
interests and attitudes at variance with those of America. We would therefore 
move from a stable international order with the United States in the lead to a 
more dangerous world of new competing power blocs. This would be in no one's 
interests, least of all America's.®^
Yet rhetorical fears of "power bloc" formation initiating a return to 
heightened neo-Leninist imperialist rivalry appear to be wildly exaggerated. 
Undeniably there is a movement toward more "regionalized" trade in the
81 Cited in the Globe and Mail. "Ganging Up on the GATT: Asia Pacific Bloc Puts Aside 
Differences to Urge Trade Deal, " November 15,1991, pp. B 13.
82 Margaret Thatcher, cited in Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Selective Global Commitment," pp. 8
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world economy. However, forging closer geo-economic ties does not 
necessarily mean forging closer political ties; Kautskian economic cooperation 
does not invariably mean political cooperation. For instance, there is little 
evidence to support the case that members of the European Community, who 
are rapidly moving toward an integrated fi ■; market area, are moving any 
closer to political integration or developing a unified foreign policy. The clear 
divisions arising among individual Community members’ stance over the 
US prosecution of the Gulf War is a case in point. More recently, the EC's 
failure to resolve the Yugoslavia crisis has dem onstrated its political 
impotency:
Europe's repeated failures to prevent or stop the fighting in Yugoslavia is stark 
evidence o f the yawning gap between the European Community's goal of 
political unity and emergence as a great power and the reality of differing 
national goals and agendas. [...] The 12-member EC, while dreaming of and 
planning for political union, has as yet no mandate or structures to project a 
common foreign policy ... nor have members shown much commonality of 
purpose.®^
The general lack of congruency between European economic unification and 
political disunification underscores the observation that Europe 1992 is not a 
historical "bloc" in the true Gramscian sense. Nor for that m atter, are 
NAFTA or ASEAN or any others — at least for now.
Generally speaking, economic [injsecurity not politics is the driving 
force behind the global tendency towards regional integration. In the Canada- 
US free trade negotiations which were signed in January 1988, for instance, it 
was the much weaker and dependent nation under the corporate directorship 
of the pro-big business Mulroney administration who zealously pressed for 
the deal, not the Americans. Canada's historical dependence on the
"EC Leaders Fail First Major Test," Globe and Mail. October 7,1991, pp. A8.
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American market -  in 1987, nearly 80% of all Canada’s trade was with the 
United States •- has progressively "continentalized" the Canadian economy. 
In selling the free-trade package to Canadians, the Mulroney administration 
was clever enough to exploit fears that if Canada was "shut out" of its largest 
market, then it would be all over for Canada. Those same fears which the 
neo-conservatives in Canada played on to further the corporate interests of 
Bay Street are being exploited by the Mexican government at the present time. 
Thus, it is the drive for market security in an increasingly insecure world 
which largely accounts for th regionalization tendencies in the global 
economy.
The foregoing discussion would therefore suggest a different resolution 
to the world economic crisis than the one presented by neo-Leninists. The 
fact of the matter is that the present transnationa l capitalist system is both 
qualitatively and quantitatively different from the earlier im perialist period. 
National economies are now more interpenetrated via global production and 
exchange mechanisms. Identifying sources of nation-state power where 
production is increasingly organized on a global, as opposed to national, scale 
is problem atic. The com petitive drive among nations and among 
transnationals alike is for security, not imperialism. As a consequence, the 
state has much more complex interests to manage -  particularly the 
contradictions arising between domestic internationalist and nationalist 
oriented fractions of the bourgeoisie -  than in earlier periods of capitalist 
development. In short, although conflict is endemic between and amongst 
the dominant national powers at the centre of the world capitalist system, 
transnational social forces acting across national borders remain central to the
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shape that the international order eventually takes. All of which begs the 
question: where does the South fit into a Northern-dominated world order?
IV. Development Without the Cold War: 
The South in a New World Order
All the world Is linked together, inextricably. But it is linked in an 
asymmetrical and skewed manner. The^e are links between the North and the 
South, but the countries of the South are politically, economically, and 
culturally subordinate to the much stronger and better-organized North. This is 
true even of the larger countries of the South in almost all exchanges; the 
relationship is of dependence much more than interdependence. [South 
Commission: The Challenge to the South]
A recent editorial in West Africa expressed a great deal of optimism for 
Third World development prospects in a post-Cold War political economy:
One legacy of the ending of the super-power conflict would ... seem to be that 
the agenda for [this] decade will be much more one of North-South than of 
East-West. With a possible fusion of the First and Second Worlds, the Third 
World now moves centre stage.®^
All early optimism aside, however, the end of the Cold War has not meant
that the Third World has moved centre stage. In fact, despite the return to
"normal" relations between East [whatever that is anymore] and West, early
indicators point to the troubling fact that the South, particularly the most
underdeveloped regions of the South, will be even more marginalized in an
evolving Northern determined and dominated "triad" world order structure
than the previous N orth /South  system. This disturbing possibility is
suggested in the declining percentage in recent years of official development
assistance set aside by the industrialized countries for Third World
development.
The Challenge to the South: The Report of the South Commission, London: Oxford 
University Press, 1990, pp. 8.
West Africa. "North-South and G-15," February 5-11,1990, pp. 163.
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Nor has the end of the Cold War brought with it the long and widely 
expected "peace dividend" for Third World development. C' 'en the current 
desperate situation in Eurasia, the South's peace dividend is not likely to be 
forthcoming any time soon either. [This despite the perverse fact that there 
have been 125 wars of proxy fought on Third World soils since 1945, with an 
estimated loss of 20 million lives]. Already the largest aid package since the 
Marshall Plan are in the works for the former W arsaw Pact countries. 
Recently, the floundering republics of the fractured Com monwealth of 
Independent States secured $24 billion worth of "tied" aid from the West. No 
similar "Marshall Plans" have been proposed for Africa, Asia, Latin America, 
or any other areas of the South. Reintegrating the defunct communist 
regimes back within the capitalist fold -  at the expense of Southern 
developm ent -  will likely be a major preoccupation for the North for some 
time to come yet, In short, as the permafrost of the Cold W ar thaws, the 
South has been rapidly melting away from the attention of the North. It is 
clearly not yet Surendra Patel's miraculous "Age of the Third World."
Understandably, the end of Cold War hostilities has not been met with 
a profuse amount of joy in the South. Rather the typical reaction in the 
South has ranged from one of ambivalence to get-on-with-it pragmaticism. 
On the one hand, few are likely to miss the insidious division of the South by 
the superpowers along specious Western capitalist vs. Eastern socialist lines. 
On the other hand, the disintegration of the Non-Aligned Movement is 
likely to mean that the collective bargaining power of the South vis-a-vis the 
more powerful North, albeit sporadic and often-times ill-conceived as it was, 
will be progressively neutralized as the integral glue of the Cold War comes
1 9 2
totally unstuck; playing the non-aligned card to its advantage is no longer an 
option for the South.
Though the Cold War is over, there does seem to have taken place a 
malignant transmutation of Cold War ethos from East-West to North-South 
terms. The 1990 US Panamanian invasion, as seen in terms of its deeper 
purpose — i.e., keeping the Panamanian Canal under American control in 
order to ensure the "free" flow of trans-oceanic shipping traffic -  and the 1991 
Gulf "war" — i.e., re-securing the North's control over critical oil reserves -  
are two stark warning signals that a new Cold War of North against South is 
heating up. If we consider for a moment the perverse fact that it cost 
America's "allies" tens of billions of dollars (perhaps even hundreds) more to 
wage a two month war on Iraq than all of the North's ODA commitments 
combined to the Third World in 1988, then we get an indication of where the 
North's first priorities lie in a post-Cold War complex. Furthermore, there 
was very little or no consultation with the South before the "allies" struck 
Iraq, despite the obvious fact that higher oil prices would hurt the non-fuel 
producing countries in the South the hardest. Make no mistake, the "lesson" 
that recent US military interventions in Grenada, Panama and Iraq sends 
down to the rest of the South is ominously stated: do not upset the status quo. 
While disciplinary neo-liberalism is the preferred and less expensive model 
for keeping the South subordinate to the interests of the North, the United 
States has shown that it is prepared to use domination by military force to 
protect its and their "allies" geo-strategic and vital resource interests.
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The World Bank and the IMF in the 1990s:
New Thinking or Just the Same Old Stuff?
In the 1980s, the North's decision to restructure rather than forgive 
Third World debt via the Baker, now Brady initiatives, has turned a short­
term crisis of finance into a long-term crisis of development in the Third 
World. Figure IX hits some of the more salient aspects of the crisis.
Figure IX.
Developing Countries External Debt and Debt Servicing Ratio; 1990-1992





Developing Countries Debt 
(in trillions of US dollars)
External Debt as % of Total 
Export of Goods and Services
Debt Servicing Payments*
(in billions of US dollars)
Debt Servicing Payments as % 
of Exports of Goods and Services
Notes; * Debt Servicing Payments refer to actual payments on total debt plus actual 
amortization payments.
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook. May 1991, Washington, pp. 192.
The development "disaster" of the 1980s -  and 1990s -  has forced the 
World Bank and the IMF to re-evaluate (though not fundamentally alter) 
their neo-liberal model for Third World development. The Bank's belated 
rediscovery of the "human dimension" of development in its latest 1991 
World Development Report (a noticeable shift from the preoccupation of the 
1980s when national economies were the obsessive development concern) is 
generally construed as a positive element in the Bank's "new" look for the 
1990s, One would like to believe that the rediscovery of hum an beings as 
both subject and object of development in the 1990s will be genuinely sincere,
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not just the latest development fad in a series of many disasters to infect the 
Washington twin sisters.
Important in encouraging the Bank and Fund to at least consider 
putting a more "human" face on development has been the two H um an 
Development Reports, first published by the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) in 1990. Building on the philosophy of its first report -  
namely, that development cannot be measured by national income averages 
alone -  in the latest edition of the UNDP's report its architects call for a "new 
hum an order" and a new "global agenda for hum an development." In 
sum m arizing the UNDP's hum an development philosophy, the authors 
contend that,
... the basic objective of human development is to enlarge the range of people's 
choices to make development more democratic and participatory. These choices 
should include access to income and employment opportunities, education and 
health, and a clean and safe physical environment. Each individual should 
also have the opportunity to participate fully in community decisions and to 
enjoy human, economic and political freedoms.*^
In short, the UNDP's conception of human development implies that "men,
women and children must be the centre of attention -- with development
woven around people, not people around development."*^
Unlike the W orld Bank’s m ost recent report, the H u m a  n
Development Report candidly breaches the hitherto taboo subject of Third
World militarism, explicitly linking the militarization of the economy at the
tremendous social expense of human development. While academics have
long linked underdevelopment with military spending, the UNDP's report is
perhaps the most strongly w orded critique produced by a respected
UNDP, Human Development Report 1991. New York: Oxford University Press, pp, 1.
*7 Ibid.
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international body since the relaxation of East-West tensions. As such, the 
UNDP's critique of military spending in the developing world represents an 
important departure in international development forums from the ghastly 
days when the Cold War cast its deathly pall of silence. It would now seem 
that the North is much more concerned with dis-arming the Third World 
than arming it. However, dis-arming in a political economy context where 
coercion is frequently needed to ensure that the IMF "stabilization" package is 
implemented will likely prove immensely more difficult.
The UNDP also condemns the World Bank's dogma of balancing 
national budgets, often by squeezing social rather than military expenditures. 
To curb Third W orld m ilitary spending, the UNDP encourages arms 
reductions be included in future aid negotiations between North and South. 
It recommends that aid be "tied" in proportion to GNP spent on the military. 
Although the report does not explicitly say so in black and white terms, it 
does implicitly open the door to the future possibility of a m ilitary 
"conditionality" component to be added to the already burgeoning package of 
strict SAP reforms.
In many areas, the thinking behind the UNDP's Hum an Development 
Report is more "progressive" than the World Bank's. In keeping with the 
more-capitalism-in-the-Third W orld-the-better-philosophy, the Bank's most 
recent report does not even entertain the idea that the capitalist system is the 
source of the world's inequalities, dysfunctions and imbalances. As William 
Graf notes, development through orthodox trade and market policies via 
"structural adjustment" effectively denies Southern political economies the 
privilege to choose their own unique development path:
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Adherence to such a strategy negates other roads to development based on 
autochthonous growth, self-reliance or socialist-collectivist strategies, and 
locks countries following it firmly into the world capitalist system. Here the 
export sector becomes the motor for development of exogenously oriented 
countries and the point of reference (and dependence) the capitalist North.^*
The view of development from the Bank's skewed vantage point in
Washington is an extremely technocratic and ahistorical one. According to
Bank pundits, the state’s only role in economic development is that of
creating an "enabling" environment for the functioning of competitive
market structures. For instance, in its latest report, the Bank outlines four
critical areas in a development strategy it refers to as "market-friendly." The
W orld Bank's m arket-friendly approach to developm ent emphasizes:
investment in hum an capital; a competitive domestic economy; making
strong and effective linkages w ith the outside world; and a stable
macroeconomic policy. Vinod Thomas, one of t h e  c h i e f  a r c h i t e c t s  of t h e
Bank's "new" development strategy, summarizes the plan in these succinct
terms: "put simply, governments need to do less in those areas where
markets work, or can be be made to work, reasonably well. Governments
need to let domestic and international competition flourish.
While one would have expected a more balanced and self-reflective
report, especially given the development disaster of the 1980s and the end of
Cold War hostilities, the pitch of the Bank's free market doctrine has if
anything been heightened, not tempered. The Bank uncategorically rejects
the insinuation that adjustment failures during the 1980s (of which there are
many, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa) were in any way related to its neo­
** William Graf, "Anti-Brandt: A Critique of Northwestern Prescriptions for World Order," 
Socialist Register 1981. pp. 38.
Vinod Thomas, "Lessons from Economic Development, " Finance and Development. 28:3, 
(September 1991), pp. 8.
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liberal development strategy. A.ccording to the Bank and Fund, the failure of
adjustment in the 1980s lies not in the adjustment package itself, but in bad
timing and sequencing of the reform process. It is now a commonly held
view within the development establishment that the lack of coordination
between the different elements of adjustment creates unresolvable tensions
between "easy" and "hard" reforms.
The current "sequencing" debate of market and political reforms
within Bank and Fund circles underscores the fact that the orthodoxy still
regards development as a technical, institutional or even cultural problem;
there remains a serious ahistorical and apolitical underestim ation of the
socio-political effects and costs of structural adjustm ent. This naive
technocratic thinking is recently demonstrated in a commentary provided by
the new chairman of the IMF's development committee, Alejandro Foxley,
Minister of Finance for Chile:
There are many countries where you do not have the entrepreneurial capacity, 
spirit and other prerequisites for effective privatization. [...] What has to be 
done in [these] cases is to stimulate, induce, and facilitate the process of 
emergence of an entrepreneurial class, so that it can take charge of the process 
of development and of the productive activities in the economy.^^
Mr. Foxley's comments confirm the suspicion that despite all the
Bank's recent talk about "rediscovering" the hum an dim ension of
development, the traditional m odernization perspective that the Third
World needs only to emulate the First still holds powerful ideological
currency within the development establishment. Although the Bank's public
relations image has changed w ith the "new" times, there has been no
recognizable shift in the Bank’s rigid, and seem ingly irretractable
Alejandro Foxley, "Setting the Development Agenda," Finance and. Development. 28:3, 
(September 1991), pp. 33.
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modernization paradigm. While the basic tenets of capitalism
are the subject of intense debate in the protectionist North, in the South neo­
liberalism is still widely fomented and applied with repressive zeal. 
Economic liberalism is still stronc;ly proclaimed at the tremendous social and 
political costs of destroying, or at the very least, seriously jeopardizing 
political liberalism. Although many adjusting states ha\e  re-introduced the 
concept of multi-party elections at the insistence of their Northern debt 
collectors, more political parties is not likely to lead to more genuine 
democracy. The gap between symbolism and realism is still very large.
In sum, the sad truth of the matter appears to be that the South is 
rapidly being left behind in a Northern-determined and dominated world 
order system. A stagnant and uncritical development dialogue is a bleak 
reminder that the South has largely been forgotten by the North. More 
conclusively, perhaps, the u n q u e s t io n e d  passive acceptance of the 
W ashington consensus in the South would suggest that the neo-liberal 
economic development paradigm has achieved hegemonic dominance in the 
sense understood by Gramsci.
V. Conclusion
There will be no day of days then when a New World Order comes into being.
Step by step and here and there it will arrive, and, even as it comes into being it 
will develop fresh perspectives, discover unsuspected problems, and go on new 
adventures. [H.G. Wells]
Despite the trans-nationalizing tendencies in the world economy, the 
globe is still politically divided into over 160 — and rapidly growing -  
sovereign, conflictual and egotistical nation-states. While economic spaces
91 H. G. Wells [1942], cited in The Guardian. "New World Order?" April 1991.
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have become progressively larger and more integrated in recent years,
political spaces have become smaller and more fragmented. In spite of the
best efforts of organic intellectuals from the US Council on Foreign Relations
to negotiate a stable multilateral political economy mechanism for resolving
the contradictions of the system, conflictual relations amongst nations
remains central to the question of capitalist restructuring in a "new order."
The Council's project is indeed far from realized. In fact, there may be little
basis for thinking that the central contradictions of "advanced" capitalism —
namely, contradictions between labour and capital, between economic growth
and ecological collapse, between North and South, between genders, between
states, between classes, and between fractions of national and international
capital -* can be overcome by conscious strategic planning. As Stephen Gill
notes, despite a fairly developed economic structure, there continues to be a
pronounced underdevelopment of the political structure necessary to sustain
a global production system:
Despite the growth of transnational networks of interests and identity, 
reflected in the activities of private international relations councils, cross­
investments, and alliances, and the impetus given to the activities of the UN, 
the global political superstructure is very underdeveloped. This stands in 
contrast with economic structures that are tending toward planetary reach, and 
the brave new world of integrated financial markets and mobile capital whose 
only substantial boundaries are time zones.
Kautsky's anticipated "ultra-imperialism" phase has yet to materialize. 
In the .300 year historical development of the world capitalism system, all 
attempts -  including Keynesianism's -  at "taming" its contradictions, have 
failed. It is likely, too, that current attempts will also fail. Despite the rising 
share of global wealth appropriated by the Global 500 corporate juggernauts,
Stephen Gill, "Reflections on Global Order and Sociohistorical Time," pp. 296.
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an "international" of capital and a "withering away" of the state is still 
illusory. Messy new "threats" to global security i.e., international terrorism, 
AIDS, a fragile planetary ecology, Islamic fundam entalism , "creeping" 
nationalism in Eurasia, etc. -- continuously challenge the surgical-like 
precision planning of the would-be architects of the brave "new world."
Finally, I should also like to say that all this talk about a new world 
order does not come at a good time for many on the left who are still 
struggling to come to terms with the "mass" rejection and subsequent 
dissolution of the state Stalinism in Eurasia. Yet it is of param ount 
importance for the left to overcome this intellectual and political sclerosis 
and begin thinking about what kind of new order we would like to see. As 1 
attempted to argue in this chapter, dom inant social forces in the global 
political economy are consciously more aware of the new world -  and its 
troubles — than the left is willing to concede. Dominant intellectual and 
political forces in the world system are mobilizing themselves, consciously 
developing world order strategies which are designed, however imperfectly, 
to overcome nation-state/international contradictions through long-term 
strategical planning. Of course, they are not likely to ever fully realize their 
co-operative project. Although a small consolation, the right doesn't know 
exactly where it is going anymore either. Nonetheless, the point is that it is 
trying. The left, on the other hand, does not even know how to make its own 
global connections, let alone realize a "socialist international" project. It is 
my contention that the left's inability to think and act globally -  i.e., beyond 
the seductive bourgeois entrapments of the nation-state, orthodox political 
parties and practices -  is the legacy of a defeatist working-class-is-the-saviour- 
of-the-world thinking. There is no monolithic working class, there probably
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never was -  and we can be damned sure that there never will be one in the 
future either. Capturing and turning the nation-state into the worker's 
paradise is not a viable alternative. Cuba is presently coming face to face with 
that unwholesome reality. Capital is not bound by the territorial embrace of 
national loyalties -  and neither should the left.
Of course, we needn't think that the left's demise will be terminable. 
To revitalize the left, we must begin thinking about what we want in a truly 
new world order. If we don't, the Pentagon will surely deliver on what they 
think we need. And now, lastly, since Gramsci has provided the analytical 
and inspirational framework for this thesis, it is appropriate that the final 
word about the "new order" should go to him:
The elements of a 'new culture' and 'new way of life' which are being spread 
around under the American label, are still just tentative feelers. They are not 
due to a new 'order' deriving from a new basis, because that has not yet been 
formed. [...] [I)t is not from the social groups 'condemned' by the new order that 
reconstruction is to be expected, but from those on whom is imposed the burden of 
creating with their own suffering the material bases of the new order. It is they 
who 'must* find for themselves an 'original', and not Americanized, system of 
living, to turn into 'freedom' what today is ' n e c e s s i t y ' [emphasis added]
Gramsci, "Americanism and Fordism," pp. 317.
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Chi'^pte*. Five.
Why We Need Gramsci: Concluding Remarks to 
Capitalist Hegemony and the 'New' World Order
Of the many meanings of democracy, the most realistic and concrete one in my 
view can be worked out in relation to the concept of hegemony. [Antonio 
Gramsci] ^
The problems of the restructured world economy cannot be solved by gung-ho 
free enterprize and free markets. [Patricia Marchak] ^
Nobody would make Descartes responsible for the French colonial wars, nor 
Jesus for the Inquisition, even less Thomas Jefferson for the U.S. invasion of 
Vietnam. But it has been made to seem that Karl Marx built the Berlin Wall 
and nominated Ceaucescu the leader of the Romanian Communist Party. 
[Michael Lowy] ^
Our main problem as social scientists and human beings is not only to analyze 
what is happening, but also to decide which side we want to be on. [Stephen 
Hymer] ^
In this thesis 1 have sought to demonstrate that concepts developed by 
Antonio Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks can be practically adapted and 
applied to the emerging international capitalist order. I have used Gramsci's 
conceptualization of hegemony as "intellectual and moral reform" in order to 
account for the reason why conservative intellectual and political forces have 
been able to gain influence and power in and through the crisis of global 
restructuring. A Gramscian political economy approach was selected for 
analyzing the changing nature of capitalist hegemony and the evolving 
international order because Gramsci, unlike most other Marxists, believed 
that ideas do make a difference in the constitution of hegemonic leadership
I Antonio Gramsci, "Notes on Italian History," pp. 56.
 ̂ Patricia Marchak, The Integrated Circus: The New Right and the Restructudng of Global 
Markets. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991, pp. 252
 ̂ Michel Lowy, "Twelve Theses on the Crisis of Really Existing Socialism,'" Monthly Review. 
43:1, (May 1991), pp. 36.
'I Stephen Hymer, Papers by Stephen Hymer. Robert Cohen et. al. (eds.). New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979, pp. 272.
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stnategies. For Gramscian inspired political economists an ideology, when 
integrally related to the economic base of society, is theoretically treated as a 
p o w e r f u l  force in class transformation.
As I stressed in this thesis, the moral and commercial axioms of the 
19th century's free market ideology have been vigorously resurrected and re­
instilled by socially conservative "new right" political and intellectual forces. 
The new right political economy -  understood as a system of social thought 
and political action which combines a "supply-side" approach to economic 
transform ation with traditional conservative values concerning the 
organization of society -  was presented in this thesis as the main political 
group responsible for restructuring the contemporary world economy. The 
right's strategy of economic development was shown to be premised on the 
assertion that dynamic forces associated with the private capitalist economy 
can, once unleashed from the "restraints" of government regulation, resolve 
the crisis in the global economy. In line with this view, domestic economies 
in the North and the South have been reorganized along market principles 
with the private sector becoming the main mechanism for prom oting 
economic development. Thus, driven by an ideological view-point which 
shuns any state engineering of the economy as "socialist," the new right's 
ideology has been instrumental in transforming capitalist hegemony at the 
world level in a more market-oriented and less state-dominated direction.
A key argument of this thesis has been that the unremitting efforts, 
persuasive argumentation and influential ideas of the right's intelligentsia 
have triumphed on the ethical, moral and intellectual terrains of class 
struggle. As a consequence, traditional Keynesian-influenced intellectuals 
and politicians have been largely discredited — indeed, in many cases,
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absorbed -  by the right's "counter-revolution." In exclusive private right- 
wing think-tanks and public forums, the right's intelligentsia has controlled 
the ideological and practical terms of the economic development debate in 
both the North and the South.
The thesis emphatically argued that the contemporary ideological 
hegemony of market capitalism is directly attributable to the consummate 
development and refinement of monetarist economic theory and the spread 
of related neo-liberal principles to other disciplines, including, most 
prominently, development economics. By fusing classical economic theory 
w ith the radical adversarial politics of neo-conservatism , the right's 
ideologues have provided the necessary Gramscian-type intellectual and 
moral leadership absolutely crucial for new right's transform ation of 
capitalist hegemony. The right's intelligentsia has provided the ideological 
rationale, intellectual coherency and theoretical defense for the political 
right's assault against state capitalism. Hence, the right's cadre of intellectual 
forces has prepared the ideological framework for the reinstatement of a .self­
regulating market order.
An analysis of the policy initiatives of the structural adjustment 
programme for Third World development, initiatives which were shown to 
be prim arily prem ised on w ithdraw ing the state from the economy, 
convincingly revealed that the right's intellectuals have been instrumental 
ideological forces in producing, controlling and dissem inating the 
"Washington consensus." We have seen that the passive and uncritical 
acceptance of the IMF and World Bank's neo-liberal economic development 
paradigm  would suggest that m arket capitalism  has achieved global 
hegemony in the sense understood by Gramsci. Consequently, the debate
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over "structural adjustment" in the South (and "restructuring" in the North) 
has now been reduced to mere procedural squabbling over the "sequencing" 
of market and or political reforms; questions are rarely, if a t all, raised about 
the desirability or even viability, especially the ecological sustainability, of the 
reforms themselves,
Neo-liberalism's now unchallenged model of economic development, 
particularly the pervasive belief in "market efficiency," is illustrative of the 
power intellectual forces can exert in entrenching a structure of economic 
dominance. Informed by Gramsci's insights into how and why subordinate 
groups submit themselves to exploitation, this thesis has argued that the 
right's supreme control of the ideological discourse is the main reason beliind 
the world-wide genuine acceptance of the political and class agenda of big 
business. Although internationally mobile capital concentrated in the 
oligopolic control of transnational corporations is now undoubtedly the 
driving, dominant and dynamic force behind "restructuring" in the North 
and "adjustment" in the South, and, in all likelihood, will largely determine 
the still unclear future contours of the "new world order," the dominance of 
transnational capital was shown to be consistently reinforced by the decision­
making of neo-liberal managers at the state level. The right's strategy of 
economic development in the North is based on deregulating, desubsidizing, 
and privatizing the Keynesian welfare state, is  well as ensuring that 
competitive "open" markets prevail on a world scale. This strategy is in 
direct ideological conformity with the material interests, perspectives and 
desires of transnational corporate capital- The policy promotion of free trade 
and a free-m arket economy necessarily involves a reconcentration of 
economic and social power in the corporate control of the world's largest
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producers. Since global restructuring is an undeterm ined process, the 
strategic intervention of the right's intellectuals in helping to shape a 
reconfigured world capitalist order along market lines is the cause, not the 
effect, of the contemporary dominance of transnational capital.
Despite the market consensus reached among elites at the present time, 
it is clear that neo-liberal hegemony rests on a very narrow and fragile social 
base, Global politics are considerably more fluid, and certainly less consensual 
than in the previous American-dominated Keynesian world order. T he  
defects of classical liberal theory are that the implementation of the invisible 
hand of the market relies on the enforcing hand of the state. In the Third 
W orld, for i n s n e e ,  our discussion has dem onstrated that economic 
liberalism via the IMF-led structural adjustment programme is advanced at a 
trem endous social cost to political liberalism. The disciplinary, anti­
democratic and fraudulent aspects of new right rule, which in the case of an 
expansive hegemony generally remains latent only to be applied in marginal 
and /o r deviant cases, have come to dominate political and social life. Indeed, 
it is becoming increasingly clearer that if there is to be a resolution to the 
world economic crisis via the modicums of neo-liberalism, then it will have 
been achieved on the backs of the poor, for it is the rich and the powerful in 
society, not the im poverished subordinate classes, who are the most 
vehement spokespersons for fomenting the dubious ethical, economic and 
moral superiority of "free" markets, monetarism and austerity.
My chief concern in this thesis has been to demonstrate that Gramscian 
political economy can be practically adapted for advancing our understanding 
of the contemporary dynamics of the world capitalist system. Although 
Gramsci’s method in the Prison Notebooks could hardly be called systematic.
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or for that matter finished, he nonetheless sketched a superior conceptual 
framework which reaches far beyond the theoretically confining base- 
superstructure reductionism of Marxist orthodoxy. The fluidity and creativity 
of Gramsci's concepts easily lend themselves out to applications to global 
political economy.
Gramsci understood that politics, culture, ideology, ethics, philosophy, 
morality and class consciousness are not determined processes. I have 
demonstrated in the course of this thesis that ideology, and the dissemination 
of ideological structures of thought by a dominant political group in society, 
plays an important -- indeed decisive -  role in influencing the outcome of 
Marxist class struggle. By intensely focusing attention on which ideology is 
hegemonic in society, I have show n that social scientists can better 
understand the intellectual, political, cultural and philosophical processes 
involved in producing change in the global complex. I would assert in this 
concluding chapter that a réintroduction of a philosophical, rational analysis 
of values and politics into political economy theory is absolutely essential. To 
begin understanding the new right movement — and thus beginning the 
struggle against it -  we need to pay more explicit attention to the right's 
ideological world-view, together w ith the associated moral and political 
values underlying the economic transformation of capitalist hegemony in the 
North and the South of the world system. Ideas are profoundly changing our 
world.
As Gramsci determ inedly pointed out, history is never m ade by 
mechanical forces alone. Rather, history is the product of the application of 
the active human will to the social world. Gramsci believed that all human 
beings are, in one way or another, "philosophers" -  we are all intellectuals,
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because each person interprets the world in his or her own unique way. But, 
like Marx, Gramsci conceded that philosophers have only interpreted our 
world and the point still remains to change it, As Gramsci writes: "... it is not 
the reconstruction of past history but the construction of present and future 
history which is at s t a k e . " 5
The struggle which must go forward is the Gramscian struggle to erect 
a new hegemony, a truly new moral, cultural and intellectual world order 
which would be broadly based on democratic participation regardless of race, 
skin colour, gender, nationality or religious creed. We must now begin 
choosing our allies, we must choose whose side we want to be on.
I leave you, dear reader, with one of my all-time favourite passages 
from Gramsci, which was written in the despairing depths of World War 
One, just a few months prior to the Pussian Revolution. The passage 
contains a familiar theme for those who have studied Gramsci: "pessimism 
of the intellect, optimism of the will." The passage is called "Indifférents."
Whatever happens, the evil which befalls all of us, the possible good 
that one heroic action (of universal value) might generate, is not due to the 
Initiative of the few who act, as much as it is due to indifference or the 
absenteeism of the many. What takes place is not the result of what a few 
want, but of the fact that the great mass of men submit to the will the few.
[...] In fact, the fate which seems to dominate history is nothing but th.. illusory 
appearance of this indifference and of this absenteeism. A few hands, 
unobserved and uncontrolled, weave the fabric of our collective life, and the 
mass ignores It because it is not concerned. The destiny of an epoch is 
manipulated according to narrow visions, immediate purposes, the ambitions 
and personal passions of small, active groups. The masses of men do not know 
because they are not concerned. (...) Some whimper miserably, others curse 
obscenely, but nobody, or only a few ask, ask themselves: if I too had done my 
duty, if I had tried to impose my will, make my advice heard, would things 
have turned out as they have? But no one, or only a few, make a fault of their 
own indifference...
I hate those who are indifferent because I am annoyed by their 
whimpering as if they were eternally innocent. [...] 1 don't have to waste my
5 Antonio Gramsci, "The Modern Prince," pp. 179.
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compassion or share my tears with them. I am a partisan, 1 live, I feei pulsating 
already in the virile consciousness of those on my side the activity of the future 
city that my side is building. And in it the social chain does not weigh on the 
few. In it what happens is not due to chance or fate, but to the intelligent work 
of citizens. No one in it sits by the window looking, while the few shed their 
blood in sacrifice.
1 live, I am a partisan. This is why 1 hate those who do not take sides, I 
hate those who are indifferent.^
Let us not be indifferent.
 ̂ Antonio Gramsci, "Indifférents," originally published in La C itta  Fiitura  February 11,1917.
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